¶1(concurring). Though I believe the sentence imposed in this case is excessive, I too vote to affirm. I write this concurring opinion to urge further development of appellate review of sentencing.
¶2The history of appellate review of sentencing in Michigan is artfully detailed by Justice Cavanagh in People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 528-552; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), and will not be repeated here.
¶3In People v Coles, supra,the Court formulated two important new rules:
¶4(1) "We first hold that, in order to aid the appellate review process, the trial court must at the time of sentencing articulate on the record its reasons for imposing the sentence given. Articulating reasons for imposing a sentence improves the justification for the sentence and serves to develop a rational policy on which to base sentencing in the future.” 417 Mich 549.
¶5(2) "We next hold that an appellate court shall, upon a defendant’s request in an appeal by right or in an appeal by leave granted, review a trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing, but may afford relief to the defendant only if the appellate court finds that the trial court, in imposing the sentence, abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court. ” 417 Mich 550. (Emphasis added.)
¶6When we apply these two holdings from the Colescase to the facts before us, it is obvious that the sentencing judge was faced with a situation where he had a sympathetic offender who committed a terribly dangerous offense. The tension between the nature of the offender and the nature of the offense was, and is, apparent.
¶7It is not surprising that those who know and care about Mr. Line focus their attention on him, *574feel genuine sympathy for him, and urge leniency.
¶8It is also not surprising that people who focus rather more personally on the gravity of the crime, than on the nature of the offender, take a harsher view. The sentencing judge in Kalamazoo County did just that. In compliance with the first mandate of Coles, supra,he did articulate his reasons for the sentence. He did acknowledge that "there appears to be potential for reformation”, but he also discussed the objective of "disciplining the wrongdoer”, "protecting society” and "deterring others from committing like offenses”. The judge said: "[T]his is an offense which involves the use of a 12-gauge shotgun loaded with 00 buckshot and I have seen the photographs of the damage done to the police cruiser.”
¶9It is probably fair to conclude that the sentencing judge in Kalamazoo County was more concerned with the shooting directed at deputies of the Kalamazoo Sheriff’s Department than with the sentiments of the Chippewa County Sheriff who wrote on defendant’s behalf.
¶10The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v Coles, *575gave us two measuring rods for expanding appellate review of sentences and for judging when a sentence is such an abuse of discretion as to shock the conscience of the appellate court. First, they said: "The excessively severe sentence is one which far exceeds what all reasonable persons would perceive to be an appropriate social response to the crime committed and the criminal who committed it.” 417 Mich 542-543.
¶11Second, the Court discussed the problem where a sentence is "significantly disproportionate to the sentences generally imposed upon similarly situated defendants who have committed similar crimes”. 417 Mich 545. Without resolving the issue of what disparities should be countenanced because of different priorities in different Michigan communities, the Court did make the ruling "that disparity in sentences which results from considerations such as the race or economic status of a defendant or the personal bias and attitude of an individual sentencing judge is unjustified and impermissible”. 417 Mich 546.
¶12When we apply these tests to the present case, whether we agree with the sentencing court’s exercise of discretion or not, it is at least clear that the three members of this panel have not had their appellate consciences shocked by the imposition of a six- to ten-year prison sentence.
¶13Two Court of Appeals jurists have wrestled with the foregoing concepts and their own appellate consciences in a way that I wish to underscore. In People v Landis, 139 Mich App 120; 361 NW2d 748 (1984), Judge Kelly, dissenting, wrote: "I … do not know how sensitive, informed and rational my conscience is in comparing sentences imposed by trial courts to an 'ideal penalty’, whatever that is.” 139 Mich App 123. He subsequently confessed "to foundering in a quagmire of conflicting considera*576tions” while expressing a "conscience … rendered insipid from overexposure to multitudes of lesser penalties for [more] violent and heinous crimes” than the forgery and uttering and publishing case before him. Id.
¶14Judge Shepherd wrote a separate, concurring opinion in People v Rutherford, 140 Mich App 272; 364 NW2d 305 (1985), to "urge the Supreme Court to provide more specific guidance as to how sentences should be considered and reviewed by this Court in light of People v Coles”. 140 Mich App 278. He added:
¶15"My concern is that the present framework of sentence review provides no surer means of curing such abuses than existed prior to Coles, supra.Reliance upon the 'conscience of the appellate court’ will not result in justice evenly applied across the state, for we, like members of society generally, vary in what our consciences dictate.
¶16"In actuality, this Court has tended to review Colesissues in a seemingly narrow fashion, so that the case is rare, indeed, when relief is granted, and the relief that is granted is limited to a remand. Coles, pp 550-551. Hence, the sentencing decision nearly always remains, as it did before, in the hands of the trial courts and is subject to the same abuses at which the Supreme Court took aim in Coles. On the other hand, if this Court were to assume a more dynamic posture in these matters, consistency might be equally lacking, owing to our own individual philosophies regarding treatment of offenders. We need more guidance.” 140 Mich App 279-280.
¶17No one thought that the Colesdecision was the final word on the matter of appellate review of sentencing. Justice Cavanagh saw it as a modest first step in a process designed to resolve the dilemmas of disparity in sentencing. He wrote: "We intend this step toward greater review of sentencing to be a starting point. The scope of *577review may subsequently evolve, by means of case law or statutory enactment, into something more definite or even different from that which we announce today.” 417 Mich 549.
¶18Three months after the Colesdecision of October, 1983, the Michigan Supreme Court took the next step in this evolutionary process by requiring all felony court judges to address sentence guidelines when sentencing any defendant for an offense covered by guidelines. Administrative Order No. 1984-1, 418 Mich lxxx (1984).
¶19The Sentence Guidelines Advisory Committee and the Michigan Supreme Court have had an opportunity by now to see thousands of cases throughout the state in which sentencing judges have either conformed to or departed from sentence guidelines. So long as nothing more is done to enforce adherence to guideline sentences or to fashion a more objective basis for appellate review, the purpose and credibility of this entire effort is in jeopardy.
¶20The majority opinion in this case, quite correctly, states: "The actual minimum sentence imposed, 72 months, does exceed the recommended range. However, such departures are expected and, as long as the trial court articulates permissible *578reasons in support of that decision, unless our appellate conscience is shocked, we do not afford relief.”
¶21The problem is not the sentence in this case. The problem is to what extent are departures from guidelines to be expected? What are permissible reasons for departure? At what point is the appellate conscience shocked?
¶22I join Judge Shepherd who pointed out the inherent weakness that exists unless and until sentence guidelines and the mandate in Colesare sensibly unified. He wrote: "[I]f there is a lack of any direct connection between the guidelines and Colesreview, we are left with insufficient means to evaluate the relative excessiveness of the sentences before us. If we cannot rely upon the guidelines to help form a more educated appellate 'conscience’, we are left again in a realm of subjectivity ….” People v Rutherford, 140 Mich App 281.
¶23If a sensible mechanism for the enforcement of sentence guidelines is not implemented soon, then the likelihood is that sentence disparities will continue to run rampant until the Michigan Legislature intercedes and tells trial judges to function like robots and impose mandatory, prescribed sentences. I believe sentence guidelines offer the best means for promoting more equal but individualized justice. However, it is important that the next step in this evolving process be taken with care and with some degree of dispatch.
¶24The Minnesota Supreme Court has much more experience than our courts in the area of appellate *579review of sentence guidelines. In State v Evans, 311 NW2d 481 (Minn, 1981), that Court fashioned a rule which I believe would serve us well. They said:
¶25"We now have some experience in reviewing sentences imposed by judges in departing from the presumptive guidelines’ sentence. After careful consideration of the problem in light of that experience, we conclude that generally in a case in which an upward departure in sentence length is justified, the upper limit will be double the presumptive sentence length. This is only an upper limit and we do not intend to suggest that trial courts should automatically double the presumptive length in all cases in which upward departure is justified nor do we suggest that we will automatically approve all departures of this magnitude. On the other hand, we cannot state that this is an absolute upper limit on the scope of departure because there may well be rare cases in which the facts are so unusually compelling that an even greater degree of departure will bejustified.” 311 NW2d 483.
¶26 As I understand the defense theory, it is that severe financial problems drove defendant to steal the furs. When he saw the law enforcement officers, he fired in a moment of panic; and, it was at that point that his actions were said to have been suicidal. The record does show that when he was ordered to drop his shotgun, defendant replied, "Your [sic] going to have to kill me.” And, indeed, before defendant was captured, the officers fired seven to nine rounds at defendant. These shots went unanswered and, fortunately, defendant was not struck by any. He was, however, struck by the deputies’ vehicle, in the field where he was finally stopped. As a result he was hospitalized and had surgery. In the hospital he told nurses he had wanted the officers to kill him.
¶27 This order was entered on January 17, 1984, and it became operative for a period of one year beginning on March 1, 1984. Administrative Order No. 1983-3 was a precursor to Administrative Order No. 1984-1. 1983-3 was an invitation to felony court judges to use guidelines for one year, beginning May 1, 1983, and to submit responsive forms to the Sentencing Guidelines Advisory Committee to improve their ongoing analysis. Administrative Order No. 1985-2, 420 Mich Ixii (1985), entered January 23, 1985, continued Administrative Order No. 1984-1 in effect until further order of the Court.
¶28 The "appellate conscience” is perhaps more difficult to discern than "hard core pornography” was to Mr. Justice Stewart, who despaired of ever being able to intelligibly define the term, but who could at least say "I know it when I see it”. Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 197; 84 S Ct 1676; 12 L Ed 2d 793 (1964).