State v. Burris’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

71 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[i]f a defendant should falsely testify about a matter to which the State has contrary evidence, then the State need not sit idly by.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 427 N.J. Super. 314 - State v. Duprey · 385 N.J. Super. 350 - State v. Francis

2. “New Jersey law also distinguishes between the failure to issue the prophylactic safeguards of Miranda and the violation of the privilege against self-incrimination once those protective rights are asserted. E.g., State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 27 , 446 A.2d 1201 (1982) (holding that a failure to warn is merely a violation of Miranda’s prophylactic-procedural safeguards; however, a failure to honor the invoked right to remain silent is of constitutional dimension). New Jersey also recognizes that the right to counsel is one of the protective rights that surround the privilege against self-incrimination and must be included among the Miranda warnings. State v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 284 , 478 A.2d 723 , (1984); see also State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 , 627 A.2d 630 (1993) (finding that under State privilege against self-incrimination, defendant had additional ancillary right to be informed of present availability of counsel based on presumed coercion inherent in custodial interrogation). Like the right to remain silent, once the right to counsel is invoked it assumes a constitutional status, and interrogation must cease; disregard of that claimed right violates the privilege itself. Kennedy, supra, 97 N.J. at 285 , 478 A2d 723 . [ibid]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Knight

3. “The United States Supreme Court observed that a determination of whether a statement is voluntary entails a factual inquiry. It requires careful evaluation of all the circumstances of the interrogation, and, ultimately, the question is whether the defendant's will was overborne. [ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2415-16 , 57 L.Ed. 2d 290, 303-04 (1978).] The Supreme Court has recognized that if the defendant's will was overborne, the confession is not the "product of a rational intellect and a free will." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 , 80 S.Ct. 274, 280 , 4 L.Ed. 2d 242, 249 (1960). A confession that is not the product of such "rational intellect" and "free will" is involuntary and is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 , 83 S.Ct. 745 , 9 L.Ed. 2d 770 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 435 , 81 S.Ct. 1541, 1543 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 948, 950 (1961); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 331 N.J. Super. 11 - State v. Sosinski