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← 147 Conn. App. 761 - State v. Maner

147 Conn. App. 761 - State v. Maner’s Empirical Analysis

2014

Citation profile

34
cited by 34 later decisions
1
states following
November 2025
most recently cited

34 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Kotteakos v. United States · State v. Golding · Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Doerr v. Doerr · Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Pemberton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[w]hen a defendant raises on appeal a claim that improper remarks by the prosecutor deprived [him] of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the burden is on the defendant to show ... that the remarks were improper”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “It is well established law, however, that a defendant who fails to preserve claims of prosecutorial [impropriety] need not seek to prevail under the specific requirements of State v. Golding , 213 Conn. 233 , 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), and, similarly, it is unnecessary for a reviewing court to apply the four-pronged Golding test. ... Our Supreme Court has explained that the defendant's failure to object at trial to ... the [occurrence] that he now raises as [an instance] of prosecutorial impropriety, though relevant to our inquiry, is not fatal to review of his [claim]. ... This does not mean, however, that the absence of an objection at trial does not play a significant role in the determination of whether the challenged statements were, in fact, improper. ... To the contrary, we continue to adhere to the well established maxim that defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's argument when it was made suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was [improper] in light of the record of the case at the time.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments. ... When making closing arguments to the jury, [however, counsel] must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the heat of argument. ... Thus, as the state's advocate, a prosecutor may argue the state's case forcefully, [provided the argument is] fair and based upon the facts in evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. ... Moreover, [i]t does not follow ... that every use of rhetorical language or device [by the prosecutor] is improper.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.