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← 147 F.3d 77 - Figueroa v. Rivera

Figueroa v. Rivera’s Empirical Analysis

147 F.3d 77 · 1998

Citation profile

139
cited by 139 later decisions
1
states following
October 2024
most recently cited

56 federal appellate · 46 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 139 later decisions — most recently October 2024 · most notably Haley v. City of Boston (2011), Scott v. Hern (2000)

56 federal appellate · 46 district · 1 state decisions

7901998200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Estelle v. Gamble · Heck v. Humphrey · Preiser v. Rodriguez · Spencer v. Kemna · Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 139 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We are mindful that dicta from concurring and dissenting opinions in a recently decided case, Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 , 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), may cast doubt upon the universality of Heck’s “favorable termination” requirement. See id. at 19-21 , 118 S.Ct. at 989 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 21-23 , 118 S.Ct. at 990 (Ginsberg, J., concurring); id. at 25 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. at 992 n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court, however, has admonished the lower federal courts to follow its directly applicable precedent, even if that precedent appears weakened by pronouncements in its subsequent decisions, and to leave to the Court “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 , 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2017 , 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997); see also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 , 109 S.Ct. 1917 , 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). We obey this admonition.”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[w]e hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 . A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to suit. In another respect, however, our holding sweeps more broadly than the approach respondents had urged. We do not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged invalidated,”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), a district court may dismiss a complaint without prejudice as to a particular defendant if the plaintiff fails to serve that defendant within 120 days after filing the complaint”); Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 685 (1st Cir.1980) (holding that district court prepared to act on dispositive motions is not”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.