Volume 147 — Georgia Reports

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Park. Baldwin superior court. January 14, 1916.</p>

<p>Action upon bond. Before Judge Sheppard. Evans superior court. February 18,1916.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Jones. Habersham superior court. June 16, 1916.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Patterson. Cobb superior court. March 14, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Thomas superior court. April 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge. Worrill. Early superior court. July 81, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Fulton superior court. February 3, 1916.</p>

<p>. Ejectment. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. May 31, 1916.</p>

<p>Accusations of misdemeanor. Before Judge Black. City court of Richmond county. December 7, 18, 1916.</p>

<p>Motion for new trial. Before Judge Jones. Jackson superior court. March 18, 1916.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Searcy. Butts superior court. May 13 1916.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Searcy. Henry superior court. June 24, 1916.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Searcy. Pike superior court. July 7, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for specific performance. Before Judge Park. Baldwin superior court. February 16, 1916.</p>

<p>Appeal. Before Judge Park. Morgan superior court. June 10, 1916.</p>

<p>May 16, 1917.</p> <p>Complaint for land. Before M. C. Edwards, judge pro bac vice. Quitman superior court. October 14, 1916.</p>

<p>1. The act approved February 28, 1876 (Acts 1876, p. 325), purporting to abolish the office of treasurer of Dougherty county and to devolve the duties of that office on the clerk of the superior court and to fix the amount of the bond of the clerk as ex-officio treasurer, which was held to be unconstitutional in Hall V. Tarver, 128 Q-a. 410 (57 S. E. 720), is no authority for excusing the treasurer of Dougherty county from giving a bond in the penal sum prescribed for bonds of county treasurers by the Civil Code (1910), § 571)</p> <p>2. The approval of a bond of a county treasurer for a penalty much less than that required by the statute does not relieve the county treasurer of the necessity of giving a bond in the amount of the statutory penalty, when cited to do so by the proper officer.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Thomas. Thomas superior court. June 19, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Smith. DeKalb superior court. September 15, 1916.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Hardeman. Emanuel superior court. March 11, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Park. Hancock superior court. January 13, 1917.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Worrill. Terrell superior court. August 15, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Littlejohn. Sumter superior court. January 11, 1916. Mrs. Anjanette McNeil brought her petition against B. D. McNeil, in which she prayed that a certain indicated line be decreed to be the true line between certain lands of petitioner and lands of the defendant; that defendant be enjoined from interfering with petitioner’s possession of the land up to the line referred to, and for other equitable relief.

<p>Claim. Before Judge Graham. Jeff Davis superior court. April 1, 1916.</p>

<p>Exceptions to auditor’s report. Before Judge Littlejohn. Sumter superior court. July 28, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Pulton superior court.' June 22, 1916. Miss M. W. Baldwin filed her petition against the City of Atlanta, W. M. Mayo, chief of police, and Charles L. Woodall, license inspector of Atlanta, and alleged substantially as follows: She is an employee of the Gus Mayer Company, of New Orleans, La., a corporation.

Specific performance. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. April 20, 1916.

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Highsmith. Appling superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Toombs,</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge George. Wilcox superior court. February 19, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Worth superior court. February 12,1916.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Graham. Pulaski superior court. January 29, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Hill. Fulton superior court. November 18, 1916.</p>

<p>1. Where the issues of a ease are submitted to the judge, without the in- . tervention of a jury, for his decision upon all matters of fact and of</p> <p>law, and he renders a judgment therein in term time, the losing party may review the judgment either by a direct bill of exceptions or by a , motion for a new trial. Ghance V. Simpkins, 146 Ga. 519 (91 S. E. 773) ; Jones V. Bank of Lula, 135 Ga. 680 (70 S. E. 640) ; Grwnbley v. Brook, 135 Ga. 723 (70 S. E. 655).</p> <p>2. While the lien of a materialman is not complete until a judgment thereon is obtained, after the rendition of the judgment the lien dates from the time of its filing.</p> <p>(а) A partition of land on which such a lien has been filed can not defeat the lien wdiere all statutory requirements are complied with, though the judgment is obtained after partition.</p> <p>(б) If one’s claim exceed his right, the excess of the claim is void, but not the whole claim-; the valid part may be legally asserted, though the invalid part fail.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Kent. Tift superior court. July 4, 1916.</p>

<p>Appeal. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. June 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for mandamus. Before Judge Smith. DeKalb superior court. June 10, 1916.</p>

<p>Intervention. Before Judge Thomas. Thomas superior court. April 19, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. June 10, 1916.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Searcy. Butts superior court. September 2, 1916.</p> <p>Jack L. Patterson, as the executor of Mary Jane Patterson, made application for leave to sell certain land as the property of the testator. Leave having been granted, he advertised the property for sale, and claim thereto was made by Mrs. Henrietta Patterson, the defendant in error. The case ivas heard upon an agreed statement of facts; and was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury. The court adjudged the land to be the property of Mrs. Henrietta Patterson, and the executor excepted.</p>

<p>1. It was not erroneous to overrule a special demurrer to the allegation in the petition, viz.: “A copy of said proof of loss and the offers therein contained is hereto attached.”</p> <p>2. It was not erroneous to overrule the special demurrers to the following allegations in the petition: “That there is no reason in law or morals why payment should be delayed; that petitioner has offered to comply with each and every term'of said policy, and to submit to any examination, has always been ready and willing and is now ready and willing to furnish all of the information within his knowledge; and the failure and refusal of said company, the Jefferson Fire Insurance Company of Philadelphia, to pay said loss is willful and malicious and done with the view and intent to injure and damage your petitioner and to force petitioner into useless and unnecessary litigation.”</p> <p>3. Where a fire-insurance policy contains what is known as the “iron-safe clause,” this clause is a warranty binding on the insured; and where the plaintiff suing on such/a policy shows by his petition that the policy contains such a clause, but fails to allege compliance therewith, or reasons for non-compliance, no cause of action is set out.</p> <p>4. “Where a demurrer is improperly overruled, and the case proceeds to trial, all that takes place in the trial subsequently to the overruling of the demurrer is nugatory.”</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Graham. Montgomery superior court. February 9, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hardeman. Candler superior court. February 9, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. October 21, 1916.</p>

<p>1. A valid exception to the admissibility of evidence can not be made for the first time in a motion for new trial.</p> <p>2. Neither grade of manslaughter was presented by the evidence, and the ■ court properly omitted an instruction on the law of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.</p> <p>3. The evidence supports the verdict.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Searcy. Pike superior-court. February 17, 1917.</p>

<p>1. Adverse possession of lands, under written evidence of title, for seven years will give a title by prescription.</p> <p>(a) But the erection and occasional use of a pen for cattle or hogs, ten feet square, on a lot of wild land (containing 490 acres), and using the land at intervals as a range for cattle, and the cutting of small quantities of timber therefrom, by one who claims under color of title, is not such possession as affords a basis for title by prescription.</p> <p>(J) Nor would the entry and adverse possession in 1909 of a vendee from the purchaser at sheriff’s sale, and the cutting by him of most of the timber under color of title within seven years of the date of the bringing of the action, ripen into a prescriptive title in 1914, when the present suit was brought.</p> <p>2. The verdict was without evidence to support it.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Worth superior court. June 3,1916.. Henry D. Woolard originally owned a lot of land in Worth county, upon which he executed a mortgage and a security deed to the First National Bank of Moultrie. Afterward he obtained a loan from Harriet B. Corcoran of Massachusetts. Later he conveyed the land to E. L. Bryan, subject to the obligations just mentioned.

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Jones. Hall superior court. . August 12, 1916.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Graham. Bleckley superior court. March 23, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. August 4, 1916.</p>

<p>Where on application for a policy of liability insurance the duly authorized agent of the insurer agrees to issue to the applicant a policy as applied for, at a stated premium and to cover specified liabilities, but by fraud or mistake of the insurer’s agent the policy is issued at a higher premium and with broader liabilities, and is delivered to the applicant by the insurer, who collects the premium specified in the preliminary agreement, and the applicant retains the policy without - discovering the mistake until expiration of the yearly term, equity will so reform the policy as' to make it accord with the oral agreement between the parties.</p> <p>It was erroneous to strike the defendant’s special plea, and to enter judgment -upon the auditor’s report finding for the plaintiff.</p>

Intervention. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. May 9, 1916. The American Life Annuity Association, a Georgia corporation, on August 28, 1911, issued a policy of insurance upon the' life of Mary E. Fuller for the sum of $5,000, and Lula J. Fuller, daughter of the insured, was designated as the beneficiary.

Intervention. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. December 22, 1915. The State of Georgia, through its attorney-general, filed its petition against the Irish-American Bank, of Richmond county, alleging, among other things, that the bank was insolvent, and praying that the court appoint a receiver to take charge of its assets and administer them for the benefit of creditors.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. March 4, 1916.</p> <p>Marcus Franklin brought suit against Simon Lesser on a contract in writing, signed by both, and dated February 20, 1891, by the terms of which it appears'that the plaintiff thereby transferred to the defendant all of his rights, title, and interest under certain bonds for title to several tracts of land described in the contract, in settlement of the indebtedness due by the plaintiff to. the defendant, and that the plaintiff desired an opportunity to repurchase the property so transferred; and thereupon it was stipidated that the plaintiff should have the option of purchasing the property conveyed on the following terms: that if Franklin should pay to Lesser the amount expended by Lesser in operating the property for the year 1891, and pay in addition the sum of $3,000, with interest from December, 1888, at eight per cent, per annum, together with all costs and expenses incurred by Lesser in the possession, title, ownership, and management of the property, and seventy-five per cent, on the balance due him on account of moneys expended either to or for M. Franklin or H. Franklin, in connection with the realty in question, or otherwise, on or before November 15, 1891, Lesser obligated himself to convey to M. Franklin all the real estate and personal property set forth in the contract; it being mutually understood and agreed that if Franklin should fail to exercise the privilege of purchasing the property by November 15, 1891, Franklin should have absolutely no claim in law or equity to the property, and Lesser would be empowered and authorized after that date to sell and convey the same at such prices and on such terms as he might deem to his best interest, and repay himself the sum of'$3,000, with interest, together with all costs and expenses incurred in owning or procuring good title to the said property, or in any other manner incident to or connected therewith, and out of the proceeds remaining pay to himself seventy-five per cent, on the principal and interest of the balance of the debt due him by Franklin*on any account; and if there should be any balance after making the foregoing payments, Lesser should convey the same to Franklin. In the petition it is alleged, that, under the terms of the contract between Franklin and Lesser, an express continuing trust was created, of which Franklin was thé beneficiary; that this trust continued from the date of the contract up to the time of filing suit; that the trust was never repudiated until March 28, 1914, on which date the plaintiff demanded an accounting and settlement, which was refused by the defendant on the ground that the former had nothing to hold the other responsible for; that Lesser had disposed of substantially all of the personal property and a part of the realty, but was still in possession of a part of the realty, of the value of $29,000; that the plaintiff was unable to state the exact sum due him" by Lesser, but the proceeds of the sale of a part of the trust estate were more than sufficient to pay off all of plaintiff’s liabilities to the defendant; and that there is much property, or a large balance of many thousand dollars, coming to plaintiff upon a just settlement and accounting between him and defendant. The prayer is, that the defendant be required to make a complete accounting in respect to all personal and real property received by him from the plaintiff, and that judgment be given to the plaintiff against the defendant for such as may be found due, and, if any property remains in defendant’s hands undisposed of under the trust, after payment of the debts therein mentioned, that defendant be required to convey the same to plaintiff. The defendant filed a demurrer, one ground of which was that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition; whereupon the plaintiff excepted.</p>

<p>Accusations of misdemeanors. Before Judge Black. City court of Bichmond county. December 6, 1916. Before Judge Bourke. City court of Savannah. July 1, and August 8, 1916.</p>

Injunction. Before Judge Worrill., Miller superior court. February 13, 1917. The grand jury of Miller County recommended to the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of that county the purchase of a tract of land for the purpose of taking, care of the paupers and the convicts employed on the public roads.

Complaint. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. February 2, 1916. In 1907 Schofield and others, directors of the Exchange Bank of Macon, filed in the superior court of Bibb county a suit in which they made the bank and certain stockholders defendants; and prayed for a receiver to be appointed for the bank, which they as directors found themselves no longer able to operate.

<p>vVhere a dispossessory warrant is sued out to evict a tenant, who files a .counter-affidavit alleging facts which are only defensive in character, and no equitable or affirmative relief is prayed, the action is a statutory one falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; and it having been sent-to the latter, direction is given that it be transferred to the former court.</p>

<p>Motion to vacate judgment, etc. Before Judge Searcy. Pike superior court. February 26, 1916.</p> <p>The Gem Knitting Mills was declared a voluntary bankrupt, and T. J. Berry was appointed its trustee and qualified as siich. On the direction of the bankruptcy court he instituted a suit in the superior court of Pike county against B. M. Turner and others, to recover certain property alleged to have been preferentially conveyed by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy. At the appearance term of this suit, to wit, April, 1914, a settlement was reached between the attorney of the trustee and the defendants, whereby the case was to be settled upon the payment of the attorney's fees and costs of suit. The settlement was carried out, and an order was taken that the ease be entered “settled” upon the dockets and records of the court. Thereafter Berry resigned as trustee and George W. Wood was appointed as his successor. The new trustee, after the term at which the order of settlement had been passed, filed in the superior court of Pike county a motion to set aside the order of settlement, on the ground that the order was void because the plaintiff trustee had no power or authority to settle the case. The defendants filed their demurrers and answers to the petition; and at the trial thereof, his honor Judge Daniel, of the Mint circuit, which circuit embraces Pike county, presided.. He rendered a judgment on May 15, 1915, refusing the prayers of the petition. Shortly thereafter, on May 27, 1915, Judge Daniel died. On June 12 following, no successor to Judge Daniel having been appointed, Wood presented a petition to Judge Mathews, of the Macon circuit, praying for a rehearing of the petition to set aside, which had been heard and passed on by Judge Daniel. As a ground for rehearing it-was alleged that it was impossible for the movant to sue out a bill of exceptions to the judgment rendered by Judge Daniel, because no disinterested member of the bar was present at the trial, and it was impossible under the law to have a bill of exceptions certified so as to review the judgment rendered by Judge Daniel. Judge Mathews ordered a rehearing, and issued a rule nisi requiring the defendants to show cause, before the judge of the Flint circuit, why the order of Judge Daniel of May 15, 1915, should not be revoked, and an order passed in lieu thereof, setting aside the original order settling the case, passed at the April term, 1914, of the court. This motion came on to be heard before Judge Searcy, of the Flint circuit, who, after hearing the petition, passed an order refusing to revoke the order of Judge Daniel of May 15, 1915. The plaintiff excepted to this order; and the defendants by cross-bill excepted to the order of Judge Mathews granting a rehearing.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Littlejohn. Sumter superior court. August 4, 1916. J. J. Hanesley brought suit against the National Park Bank, of New York, to enjoin it from suing him in the city court of Americus on notes given by him to the Americus National Bank and indorsed by that bank as collateral to the National Park Bank.

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Cox. Decatur superior court. May 8, 1916.</p> <p>Alma Lane, and her children, John E., Fannie I., and Bessie L. Lane, by Alma Lane as their next friend, brought suit for the recovery of a certain tract of land, alleging that Alma Lane was the wife of J. Oscar Lane; that while they were husband and wife Oscar Lane executed a deed conveying the property in controversy to Alrpa Lane “and the heirs of her body by J. Oscar Lane, their heirs and assigns;” that at the time of the execution of the deed John E. Lane was in life, he being the child of Alma and Oscar Lane; and that after the date of the execution of the deed there were born to Oscar and Alma Lane two other children, Fannie I. and Bessie L. Lane, The tenendum and warranty clauses of the deed were as follows: “To have and to hold the said bargained-premises, with all and singular the rights, members, and appurtenances thereunto appertaining, to the only proper use, benefit, and behoof of them, the said Alma Lane and the heirs of her body by J. Oscar .Lane, their heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, in fee simple; and the said J. Oscar Lane the said 'bargained premises unto the said Alma Lane and the heirs of her body by J. Oscar Lane, heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, against the said J. Oscar Lane, his heirs; executors, administrators, :and against all and every other person or persons, shall and will warrant and forever defend by virtue of these presents.” It was further alleged that the defendants derive their title from J. Oscar Lane. The court sustained the general demurrer and dismissed the petition; and the plaintiffs excepted.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. April 22, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Fulton superior court. January 7, 1916. Fulton County Home Builders, a corporation, brought suit against.Mrs. Anna E. Eagsdale, alleging that the defendant was indebted to petitioner on three series of notes described in the petition. These notes contained a clause accelerating maturity upon default in the payment of any one note for a longer time than thirty days after maturity.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Eulton superior court. June 20, 1916. The -bill of exceptions, assigns error on a judgment sustaining certain demurrers to a petition and dismissing the action brought by George W. Muller Bank Fixture Company in the superior court of Fulton county. The defendants were E. Morgan, a resident of Chatham county, and the Southern Seating and Cabinet Company (hereinafter called the company), with its principal office in Jackson, Tenn.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. July 5, 1916. Mark L. Tolbert, having three unmarried minor children, to wit, Mark, Harry, and Alline, on October 9, 1900, made his will, as follows: “Item one. [Executors were appointed.] “Item two.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. July 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for specific performance. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. September 9, 1916.</p>

<p>1. It was not error for the judge, sitting without a jury, to render judgment for damages and attorney’s fees, as well as for the amount stated in the face of the insurance policy, in a suit pending thereon' in the city court of Millen, the ease being in default, and no jury having been demanded.</p> <p>2. The allegations of fraud relied upon to set aside the judgment rendered - in the city court of Millen were insufficient, the same being conclusions, without any statement of facts to sustain them.</p> <p>3. The court having jurisdiction of the parties, the matter of service and agency having already been determined, contrary to the contentions of the plaintiff in error, the latter has had all of the opportunities to be heard that are usual in such proceedings, and has not been denied due process of law.</p>

Petition -for injunction. Before Judge Hammond. ■ Jenkins .superior court. October 38, 1916. The county commissioners of Jenkins County advertised for bids for lumber and piling — material to be used in building a bridge and the approaches thereto over a named .stream in the county; and also for bids for the building of the same. Two bids were received for furnishing the lumber, but there were no hids for building the bridge.

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Hammond. Jenkins superior court. September 11, 1916.</p> <p>The children of M. M. Perkins, minors, by their father as guardian, brought an action of ejectment against M. D. L. Perkins, to recover the following described, realty: “That lot or parcel of land, with improvements thereon, situated in the 61st district G. M. of Jenkins County, Georgia, formerly Burke County, containing 3 acres, more or less, bounded as follows: north by Julia E. Perkins; east by lands formerly of Alice G. Perkins; south by lands of the estate of Lake, now belonging to M. D. L. Perkins, and also by public road; and west by lands formerly belonging to Ann L. Ward, now belonging to M. D. L. Perkins.” Plaintiffs claim title to this property under a warranty deed from Ann L. Ward, executed and recorded in January, 1903, under the heading, “State of Georgia, Burke County,” conveying to “Alice G. Perkins, and to the heirs of her body after her death, the following described real estate: All that tract or parcel of land lying, situate, and being in the '61st dist. G. M. containing three acres more or less, and bounded as follows: on the north by Julia E. Perkins, on the east by lands of Alice G. Perkins, on the south ■ by lands of estate of Lake and the public road, and the west by lands of Ann L. Ward.” It was alleged in the original petition, that the plaintiffs’ mother died on July 27, 1915; that the defendant has been in possession of the land in question since prior to her death, receiving the rents and profits from the same; that he refuses to surrender' the property or to pay the rents and profits thereof, etc. The plaintiffs filed an amendment adding to the description of the land sued for the following: “The 61st district G. M., above referred to, is the name and number of a district in Burke County, of which Jenkins County was formerly a part, and the name and number of the district in the new County of Jenkins, in which said land is located, is the 1635th district G. M. And the western boundary of said land is a straight line beginning at a point on the Green Pork public road 2.32 chains east of the point where the land formerly belonging to A. Barefield corners on said public road, and said line runs parallel with the eastern boundary of said Barefield tract in a northerly direction 5.40 chains. The opposite sides of said tract are straight lines, parallel in location and equal in length. The line along the public road being 5.48 chains in'length.” The petition was further amended by adding the following allegations: Defendant claims title to said land under a deed from Alice G. Perkins (who had only a life interest therein) to one Lake, who conveyed the same.to defendant; and the common grantor of plaintiffs and defendant is Ann L. Ward, who held actual possession of the land at the date of her deed to Alice G. Perkins and the heirs of her body after her death. The plaintiffs are the children and “the heirs of the body” of said Alice G. Perkins “after her death,” and took title to the land as grantees in remainder under the deed from Ann L. Ward, dated January 5, 1903. Ann L. Ward held the property under a deed from G. L. Jackson, dated January 12, 1897, and describing the land as follows: ' “That tract or parcel of land lying and being in the Village of Perkins, County of Burke, State of Georgia, 61st district, G. M., containing four and one quarter (4-1/4) acres, more or less, bounded on the north and east by lands of G. L. Jackson, on the south by lands of Miss M. S. Lake and public road, west by lands of C. I. Eodgers, running from C. I. Eodgers’ corner east seven chains and eighty hundredths, extending back five chains and forty links, parallel with C. I. Eodgers’ line.” On October 6, 1909, Ann L. Ward executed a deed of 1-1/4 acres of said tract to Alice G. Perkins under the following description: “That tract or parcel of land lying and being in the 1635th .district of Jenkins County, Georgia, and in the Village of Perkins, Ga., containing one and one fourth (1-1/4) acres of land, and bounded as.follows: on the north by lands of Mrs. Julia E. Perkins, on the east by lands of Mrs. Alice G. Perkins, on the south by lands of Lake estate and public road, and on the west by lands of A. Barefield.” On October 7, 1908, Alice G. Perkins executed a deed to J. S. Lake, conveying both said tracts, the 1-1/4-acre tract and the remaining 3-acre tract, under the following description: “All that tract or parcel of land lying, situate, and being .in the 61st dist. G. M., Burke County, now Jenkins County, containing 3 acres, more or less, and bounded as follows: on the north by Julia E. Perkins, on the east by lands of Alice G. Perkins, on the south by the lands of the estate of Lake and the public road, and oh the west by lands of Ann L. Ward, according to deed of conveyance made the 5th day of January, 1903, between Ann L. Ward and Alice G. Perkins. Also all that tract or parcel of land lying and being in the 1635th district of Jenkins County, Georgia, and in the village of Perkins, Ga., containing one and one fourth acres of land, and bounded as follows: on the north by the lands of Mrs. Julia E. Perkins, and by the lands of Mrs. Alice G. Perkins on the east, on the south by the iands of the Lake estate and public road, and on the west by the lands of A. Bareñeld, according to deed of conveyance made October 2, 1909,. between Mrs. A. L. Ward and Mrs. Alice G. Perkins.”</p> <p>On May 30, 1910, Lake conveyed the property to the defendant by deed under the following description: “The several tracts or parcels of land situate, lying, and being in said State and County, containing one hundred and seven acres, more or less, known as the Lawton place, and bounded as follows: north by lands of Edmund Hudson and Abram Kelsey, east by lands of Edmund Hudson and Wm. Reynolds, south by lands of M. M. Reynolds, west by lands of Homer Burke and Sloan estate. Also that certain tract or parcel of land, situate, lying, and being in the village of Perkins, in the 1635th district, G. M., said State and county, containing nine and three quarters acres, more or less, and bounded as follows: north by Mrs. Julia E. Perkins, east by lands of est. A. P. D. Lake, south by lands of est. A. P. D. Lake, west by lands of Alonza Bare-field, said tract or parcel of land as last herein named consisting of four separate tracts or parcels of land purchased by said J. S. Lake from various grantors, as will be shown in and by reference to a certain deed from Mrs. Alice G. Perkins to J. S. Lake, dated Oct. 7, 1909, and recorded October 8, 1909.” The defendant claims title to both said tracts, including the one sued for as containing three acres, more or less, under the above-stated deeds, and is in possession thereunder; and .plaintiffs claim only the three (3) acres left after cutting off-the 11/4 acres on the west side of said tract of 4 1/4 acres; and Ann L. Ward intended, by her deed of January 5, 1903, to convey all of said tract of 4 1/4 acres except the 11/4 acres, which she then retained and subsequently conveyed to Alice G. Perkins, by deed dated October 6, 1909.</p> <p>The court on motion struck the amendment, sustained a demurrer to the petition, and dismissed the action.</p>

Appeal. Before Judge Davis Freeman. Chatham superior, court. October 14, 1916. This case was tried upon the record and an agreed statement of facts, which are substantially as follows: Henry C. Wayne was a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point for four years from 1839 to 1843. After graduation he served as a captain in the United States Army until the war between the States.

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. November 3, 1916.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder/ Before Judge Worrill.' Randolph superior court. January 20, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder.' Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. March 17, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint. Before Judge Munro. Taylor superior court. December 16, 1916.</p>

<p>■ Indictment for murder. Before Judge Hardeman. Candler superior court. March 23, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition — intervention. Before Judge Ellis. Fulton superior court. August 4, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. August 5, 1916.</p>

<p>: Equitable petition. Before Judge Park. Morgan superior court. May. 1.3, 1916. .</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeff Davis superior court. May 6, 1916.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hammond. Chatham superior court. December 8, 1916.</p> <p>On September 23, 1916, Priscilla W. Bedford (hereinafter referred to as A) instituted an equitable action against the administrators of the estate of Emma Dorsey, also known as Emma Carter (hereinafter referred to as B). The petition alleged, that on January 1, 1898, A was employed by B “to act as her secretary and also to assist her in attending to her business affairs and to look after her household affairs, for which your petitioner was to receive the sum of $5.00 per week;” that no amount was ever paid; that shortly after entering the employment a parol agreement was entered into between A and B, “by the terms of which, as recompense for her said services,” A “was to receive by will, at the death of” B, described realty; that A constantly performed the services to the entire satisfaction of B until on or about October 1, 1908, upon which date B was indebted to A for such service in a named amount; that at intervals during the period above mentioned A by teaching school earned a stated amount, “which was turned over for safe-keeping” to B; that on January 1, 1915, a new parol agreement was entered into-between A and B, whereby, “as recompense for'her said services and as payment for” the sum which had been turned over for safe-keeping, B should “devise at her death to” A other described real estate instead of that mentioned above; and that on December 9, 1915, B died, “leaving no will so far as complainant is able to ascertain which is entitled to probate.” The prayers of the petition as amended were, for process, and that defendants in their representative capacity be compelled “to convey or devise the property . . referred to in paragraph seven, in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” The defendants interposed a demurrer on the grounds: (a) That the petition sets forth no cause of action. (5) That the suit is brought within one year from the timé of the granting of the letters of administration. The demurrer was sustained and the action dismissed, and the plaintiff excepted.</p>

<p>Motion to amend decree. Before Judge Fite. Whitfield superior court. November 6, 1916.</p>

<p>1. A non-expert witness, under the Civil-Code (1910),'§ 5835, is competent to testify as to his belief in the genuineness or falsity of the signature • to a writing, who will swear that he knows or would recognize the handwriting of the person purporting to have signed. The sources of the witness’s knowledge go to his credit and the weight of his evidence.</p> <p>2. Evidence objected to as irrelevant was not open to that criticism. The • evidence supports the verdict.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Worth superior court. May 27, 1916.</p>

<p>. Claim. Before Judge Highsmith. Appling superior court. June 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeff Davis superior court. April 29, 1916.</p>

■ Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Eulton superior court. June 22, 1916.

<p>Equitable petition and intervention. Before Judge Pendleton. Pulton superior court. August 25, 1916.</p> <p>The Trust Company of Georgia, as executor of the will of Thomas Egleston, deceased, filed its petition for construction of certain items of the will and codicil, and for general direction. DuBose Egleston filed an intervention in which he insisted that the codicil worked a revocation as to item seven of the will; but that the codicil itself was too indefinite and uncertain in meaning to be legally enforced as to the property referred to in items seven and thirteen, and that as to this property an intestacy should be declared. Item seven was as follows: “After the payment of the legacies and annuities provided in items three, four, and five of this will, I bequeath and devise the sum of one hundred thousand ($100,000.00) dollars, out of my estate, to be expended by my trustee, with the advice and consent of the said ■ Rev. W. W. Memminger, Alexander C. King, and Beverly M. DuBose, of Atlanta, Georgia, their successor, or successors, as hereinafter provided, for the purchase of a lot and the erection thereon of a hospital for children, the same to be known as the ‘ Henrietta Egleston Hospital for Children/ This hospital I desire to be a special memorial to my precious mother; and to that end I direct that when the said building is completed the oil portrait of my mother, now in my residence, be placed in some appropriate room in said institution and there kept. . .” That par-t of the codicil necessary for a determination of- the -issues raised by the intervention was as follows: “My will provided for the creation of a children’s hospital; but I now give the executors and coexeeutors full powers to set aside this provision, and to provide for any other charitable object which may appeal to them; also to delay the time for carrying out this provision as adopted and (or) amended by them.” The Trust Company of Georgia and others filed demurrers to the intervention. TJpon the hearing the court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the intervention; and the intervenor excepted.</p>

<p>Equitable petition and intervention. Before Judge Smith. DeKalb superior court. July 26, 1916.</p> <p>C. H. McDonald and J. M. Abrams filed a petition alleging substantially as follows: In tbe case of W. P. Evans v. C. S. Thompson, the superior court in 1915 appointed a receiver of the property of W. P. Evans, consisting of certain houses and lots in the city of Lithonia. W. P. Evans is wholly insolvent and has no property other than that in the hands of the.receiver. Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the court will in the near-future discharge the receiver, and that the properly will be given over to Evans. The receiver has in his hands about $500 belonging to Evans, the same being rents and profits of the property, and after paying the necessary costs of the receivership and other expenses there will be two or three hundred dollars to be turned over to Evans by the receiver. The property now in the hands of the receiver is encumbered with an outstanding deed to secure a debt of about $8,000, and there are outstanding against Evans judgments upon which executions have been issued, exceeding $2500 in amount. C. H. McDonald has an execution dated March 3, 1913, against Evans, for the principal sum of $196.96, besides interest and costs; and J. M. Abrams has eight executions against Evans for $99.69 principal each, besides interest and costs. The whole of the property of Evans, on which the deed to secure debt is outstanding amounting to $8,000, is not worth more than the sum to secure which it was given, and will not bring the principal and interest due on the debt; and if the court does not impound the fund in the hands of the receiver, the plaintiffs will lose the whole of their debts against Evans. They are without remedy at law, and the only way the fund in the hands of the receiver can be reached is by equitable garnishment, and the superior court only has the power to order the fund impounded. They pray, that the court order the receiver to retain whatever sum may be in his hands after being discharged as receiver, and that .he report to the court the amount he has; that the court appropriate the fund so impounded to the different executions now outstanding, according to their priority, after first paying the costs in this case; and that all persons having executions against Evans may become parties and partake of the fund according to their priorities.</p> <p>The Bennett Printing House, Marks, Marks & Holt, and the Sullivan Machinery .Company came in by' way of intervention, and were made parties. They alleged the existence of certain executions in their favor against Evans, dated April 17, 1913, September 18,1913, and August 21, 1913, respectively, and that they.were prior liens to any of the judgments, etc.; and prayed that proper application of the funds be made on their judgments. C. S. Thompson intervened and prayed that certain tax executions in his hands as transferee be first paid out of the fund, and the balance, if any, be credited as a payment on the original debt secured by the security deed. J. B. Stewart, an attorney at law, intervened and claimed a superior lien on the fund arising from the rent of the real estate, a security deed to which had been given to Thompson, by reason of the following facts: He was employed by W. P. Evans to advise with and represent him in a certain controversy pending between Evans and Thompson, for the purpose of protecting Evans in his right and title and possession of the real estate above referred to, and with respect to the rents, issues, and profits of the property. Evans agreed to pay Stewart $2,000 for his services, out of the first property real or personal, money, rents, issues and profits to which Evans might obtain title and the right of possession by suit, settlement, judgment or decree, "provided the same was realized from or on account of the property described in said suit.” A certain sum has been realized, to wit, $544.50, and a judgment against Thompson for $230.40, and that it is in the hands of the receiver and is the property of Evans, who has the title and right of possession to the money, which has been received and realized by reason of the employment of Stewart and as the result of his work. The lien has matured, and nothing has been paid to Stewart by Evans. A detailed statement of the services rendered by Stewart to Evans was set out in the petition, but they are too lengthy to be incorporated in full here. Among the services rendered were, that he obtained a verdict asserting the contention of Evans that the deed in form a warranty deed was in fact a loan deed; he resisted the suit of the receiver in which it was sought to evict Evans; he obtained an order reducing the rent to be paid from $22.50 to $15, and for about twelve months he paid the rent to the receiver; he prepared and presented an equitable petition, obtained a restraining order, and represented Evans in the case which resulted in the appointment of a temporary receiver, etc. The court, after hearing the case, made an order in which he directed that the $544.50 in the hands of the receiver be distributed as follows: (1) The payment of the costs of the proceeding. (2) The sum of $50 to L. B. Norton, attorney for the plaintiffs in this case, out of the fund going to the moving creditors. (3) The sum of $204.10 to C. S. Thompson on two tax fi. fas. held by Thompson, for taxes owing by Evans on the property for the year 1912. (4) $170.92 to C. H. McDonald, in full payment of his execution against Evans, this being the oldest. (5) $7.62 to Bennett Printing House, in full of its execution against Evans. (6) The balance to be paid to the Sullivan Machinery Company, the holder of the next oldest execution against Evans. To this judgment Stewart excepted.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Jefferson superior court. February 6, 1916.</p>

<p>Accusation of misdemeanor. Before Judge Rrauss. City court of Brunswick. October 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Worrill. Early superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Interpleader. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. November 29, 1916.</p> <p>M. Eady rented a house from Guthrie, and gave monthly notes for the rent. Guthrie immediately transferred the notes to the Fourth National Bank of Macon as collateral security for an existing loan. Eady at this time was a tenant of Guthrie on the premises. Subsequently Guthrie was adjudicated a bankrupt, and the premises rented to Eady were sold by the trustee in bankruptcy, and Odom and others became the purchasers. Thereafter Eady filed a petition for interpleader, alleging that he owed and was ready to pay the rent according to his contract, either to the bank or to Odom, and prayed a judgment of the court as to which of these parties should receive the payments. The bank demurred to the petition, on the ground that the claims were not identical, and that interpleader could not lie. • The court overruled the demurrer, and the bank excepted. Afterward the case was submitted to the judge without a jury; and he rendered a decision in favor of Odom. The rent notes were identical in terms, except as to the date of payment, and the following is a copy of one of them r “$20.00. Macon, Ga., August 3rd, 1915.</p> <p>“On the first day of July, 1916, I promise to pay T. D.' Guthrie or bearer, twenty and no/100 dollars, for rent, payable at any banking office in Macon, Georgia. I hereby waive all rights of homestead and exemption as to this debt. Value received. This note to be surrendered in ease building' is rendered untenantable by fire. I agree to make no change or alteration without written consent of owner or agent. This note is given subject also to corn tract between parties hereto. M. Eady.” The note was indorsed by T. D. Guthrie.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. November 15, 1916.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Hill. Fulton superior court. March 3, 1917.</p>

<p>Where a bill of exceptions is taken to the Court of Appeals, and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed on condition that the plaintiff write off from the judgment specific amounts, and that on failure so to do a new trial be granted, the clerk of the trial court is without authority to issue-an execution on the original judgment, less the amounts directed to be written off, until the judgment is formally amended as required by the Court of Appeals. An affidavit of illegality on this ground should have been accepted by the levying officer. The subsequent amendment of the judgment on sales day and before the sale did not have the effect to validate the execution previously issued without authority.</p>

<p>Probate of will. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior' court. April 7, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before- Judge Hardeman. Bulloch superior court. May 16, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeff Davis superior court. July 5, 1916.

<p>1. A surviving partner has no right to continue the partnership business as a going concern where neither the articles of partnership nor the will of the deceased partner so provides. Nevertheless, where a surviving partner does continue the business, which is a banking business, with the consent of the devisees and legatees of the deceased partner, the latter are estopped from raising the issue that deposits subsequently received and paid out on firm liabilities existing at the death of one of the partners should not be treated as a partnership liability.</p> <p>2. While courts do not undertake to equalize partners with reference to the personal services of each rendered by them respectively in conducting the firm’s business, yet they will enforce an agreement for such allowance made by the partners. This agreement need not be express, if it can fairly and reasonably be implied from the actions of the partners and from their course of dealing with each other in connection with the business, or from circumstances under which extra services are rendered by a partner, for which compensation is claimed.</p> <p>(a) The evidence authorized an inference of an implied agreement for extra compensation of one of the partners in this case.</p> <p>(&) The partner claiming extra compensation had overdrawn his account, and the amount allowed by the auditor was within the overdraft. Held, under the facts of the case, that in an accounting to the heirs and legatees of the deceased partner, the surviving partner was not de- ' prived of his right to extra compensation because of the statute of limitations.</p> <p>3. The finding of the auditor with reference to the Hathorn Place, as set out in the third division of the opinion, is not open to the criticism made in the exception to such finding. .</p> <p>4. The auditor was authorized to find that the purchase of the Davis Mill Place was in good faith; and it was not erroneous to refuse to make the purchaser a party to the action after the auditor had made his report and exceptions of law and fact thereto had been filed.</p> <p>5. There was no error in overruling the exceptions of fact. Many of the exceptions, classified as exceptions of law, are really exceptions of fact. So far as the legal questions presented thereby are properly made, they are included in the foregoing rulings.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. July 8, 1916.

<p>Habeas corpus. Before Judge Cranford. Valdosta city court. October 14, 1916.</p> <p>Mrs. J. H. Singletary, as next friend of Lucile Wingate, a female minor, applied for a writ of habeas corpus against J. E. Gornto, sheriff of Lowndes county, alleging that Lucile Wingate was illegally restrained of her liberty by the sheriff under the pretense of an order granted by the judge of the city court of Valdosta, which order was alleged to be void. The sheriff made a return of the habeas corpus, admitting that he held the minor in, virtue of an order of the judge of the city court, but denied that the order of the court or the detention was illegal. The court discharged the writ.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Wright. Eloyd superior court. January 12, 1917. Mrs. Leila Tate is the owner of a small cottage occupied by herself, her husband, and their, children. T. H. Mull owns an adjoining tract of land upon which he has constructed a cotton ginnery.

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Jones. Hall superior court. February 24, 1917.</p>

<p>Accusation of misdemeanor. Before Judge Rourke. Savannah city court. July 1, 1916.</p>

Complaint. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. March 10, 1917. The Thomasville Baseball Club, a corporation, brought an action against the Augusta Baseball Association, a- corporation, on a promissory note, a copy of which was attached to the petition. The defendant filed a plea which was stricken on demurrer, and judgment was rendered by the court for the plaintiff for the amount sued for. The defendant excepted.

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Sheppard. Appling superior court. August 8, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Highsmith. Camden superior court.- September 7, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Highsmith. Glynn superior court. October 26, 1916.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Summerall. Clinch superior court. January 22, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. May 17,- 1916.</p>

<p>Appeal. Before Judge Smith. DeKalb superior court. February 19, 1916.</p>

<p>Exceptions to auditor’s report. -Before Judge Pendleton. Pulton superior court. Jufy 21, 1916.</p>

<p>1. There being evidence in this case tending to show that the decedent was in pursuit of a third person with intent to commit a felonious assault upon him, and that the accused seized the gun with which the decedent was armed, attempting to wrest it from him, and that a struggle for the possession of the gun between the accused and the decedent followed, during which or at the end of which the gun was discharged and a mortal wound thereby inflicted upon the decedent, it was a question for the jury to determine whether or not the circumstances were such as to justify the excitement of passion and to exclude all idea of deliberation and malice on the part of the accused. That being true, and there being evidence to authorize the finding that the shooting was intentional, the law of voluntary manslaughter was involved, and the failure of the court to charge the law upon that subject was error.</p> <p>2. An assignment of error upon the court’s failure to charge the law upon the subject of involuntary manslaughter is not sufficiently definite, where the exception fails to designate the branch of involuntary manslaughter which it is contended' the court should have given. Besides, the defendant’s theory was that the discharge of the gun, which resulted in the death of the decedent, occurred during a struggle for the possession of the gun, and that the shooting was purely accidental; and the judge having instructed the jury that if the shooting was accidental, as contended, the defendant was not guilty of any crime and should be acquitted, there was no ground for exception on his part.</p>

<p>Mandamus. Before Judge Jones. Hall superior court. December 14, 1916.</p>

<p>Award and taxation of receivers" fees. Before Judge Patterson. Cobb superior court. April 15, 1916.</p> <p>W. M. Harris filed a suit for damages against the Atlanta Northern Eailway Company (hereinafter referred to as the railway company) in the superior court of Cobb County, and recovered a verdict and judgment for $3500.00. .The railway company filed a motion for a new'trial, which was overruled, and it then sued out a bill of exceptions returnable to the October term, 1915, of the Supreme Court. At the time of filing its bill of exceptions with the clerk of Cobb superior court the railway company •filed with the said clerk a bond with security, -which was duly approved by the clerk, conditioned to pay to W. M. Harris the eventual condemnation-money in said case, with all future costs, the bond being in the form of a supersedeas bond; but the railway company did not pay the costs on or before filing said bill of exceptions. Harris procured a fi. fa. to be issued upon his judgment and placed the same in the hands of the sheriff, who levied upon certain property of the railway company, and was proceeding to advertise it for sale, Harris claiming that the bond given as aforesaid was -not a supersedeas bond, by reason of the failure to pay the costs. The railway company filed, in the superior court of Cobb County, its petition for injunction against Harris and the sheriff, upon the grounds therein stated, to enjoin the levy and sale of its property. Upon the hearing an injunction was granted by the judge, restraining the levy and sale, Harris then sued out his bill of exceptions complaining of the granting of the injunction; and when this case was reached for decision, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court below granting the injunction. After the remittitur in the injunction case was filed in the office of-the clerk of Cobb superior court, and before any decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court on the bill of exceptions sued out, as aforesaid, by the railway company to review the judgment of the trial 'court denying a new trial in the case which resulted in the verdict and judgment for $3500 in favor of Harris, Harris filed in the superior court of Cobb County what was called an “amendment and cross-bill,” praying for an injunction against the railway company from disposing of the property of said company, that a temporary receiver or receivers be appointed by the court to immediately take charge of all the property of the company and operate it, and that on the final hearing permanent receivers be appointed to sell the property of the company and dispose of the proceeds. This equitable amendment and cross-petition was presented to the judge' of the superior court of Cobb County on the 4th day of March, 1916, and an ex parte order was obtained from'the judge of that court, in which it was ordered that the }Detition be filed and the railway company be served with a copy of the “cross-bill” and the order granted. It was further ordered that the prayers of the complainant for a temporary receiver of all the property of the railway company be granted, and E. P. Dobbs and W. M. Holland were appointed temporary receivers of all the property owned by the company. These receivers were authorized to operate the railroad of the railway company, etc. It was further ordered that the receivers give bond in a stated sum. The railway company was required to show cause before the judge, on the 39th day of March, 1916, why the prayers for permanent receiver should not be granted; and until the hearing the officers and agents of the railway company were enjoined and restrained as prayed in the cross-petition. On March 5, 1916, upon application of the railway company, the judge granted an order modifying the order passed on March 4th, appointing temporary receivers, and vacated the order appointing Dobbs and Holland receivers, but left the rule nisi in force, and the' railway company was required to deposit a certified check for $4,000, payable to the clerk of the superior court, and said check was to remain subject to the further order of the court and the final judgment in the ease; and upon failure to deposit this check, the order appointing receivers was to again become effective. The railway company, in compliance with this order, deposited with the clerk of the superior court the required check duly certified. On March 18, 1916, after the Supreme Court had passed upon the bill of exceptions of the railway company; and had affirmed the verdict and judgment for $2500 in favor of Harris, the same was paid in full, including interest and costs. This payment was made before the remittitur had been returned from the Supreme Court to the superior court. On March 29, 1916, the return day of the rule granted on March 4, 1916, the railway company filed its demurrer and answer to the “amendment and cross-bill” of Harris. The court overruled the demurrer, and the railway company filed its exceptions pendente lite to the overruling of its demurrer, and now assigns error upon its exceptions pendente lite. After the hearing, evidence having been submitted, the court granted an order awarding compensation in the sum of $125 to each of the receivers, and taxing the same, with all costs of the proceeding, against the railway company. To this order the railway company sued out a direct bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge .Pite. Whitfield superior court. September 5, 1916. Williams brought suit upon six promissory notes, two for $5,500 each and four for $1,000 each, which fell due one each on the first day of the years 1915 to 1920, inclusive. There was a written stipulation on the back of each note, signed by the maker, providing for acceleration of maturity.

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Littlejohn. Lee superior court. February 17, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Pulton superior court. April 6, 1916.</p>

<p>The Supreme Court is without jurisdiction of this case, which is an action for damages for breach of contract.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Bell. Eulton superior court. June 26, 1916.</p>

<p>1. The evidence in the case was sufficient to authorize the jury to convict the defendant of being an accessory before the fact of the crime of murder.</p> <p>2. The court did not err in excluding evidence to show that a certain witness for the State had upon one occasion been guilty of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon. Such evidence was not admissible, over timely objection, to impeach the witness.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Tarver. Dade superior court. January 20, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Sheppard. McIntosh superior court. September 6, 1916.</p> <p>Charles M. Tyson, a citizen and taxpayer of McIntosh County, Georgia, brought his petition against the county, to enjoin the issuance and sale of certain bonds, alleging that the board of county commissioners, being the officers charged with levying the taxes, contracting debts, etc., had, after due notice, etc., caused an election to be held to determine whether bonds in a stated amount, for the purpose of funding the county’s floating debt and for raising funds for making certain public improvements, should be issued. There was no attack upon the regularity of the election. Proceedings, admittedly in all respects regular and legal, were instituted to validate the bonds, and on a stated date the judge of the superior court of the circuit in which McIntosh County is located passed an order requiring the County of McIntosh, by its proper officers, to show cause before him at chambers at Claxton, in Evans County, on a day named, why the prayer of the petition to validate the bonds should not be granted; and further ordered that the clerk of the court publish in a newspaper, at least twice before the hearing, a notice to the public that on the day named for the hearing the application would be heard. Due and legal service was made upon the County of McIntosh by service upon its proper officers; and the clerk of the court, in conformity with said order, duly published in a newspaper in McIntosh County the required notice to the public of the hearing. The county made answer, was represented by its attorney at the hearing, and united in asking that the prayers of the petition be granted; and the court rendered judgment validating the bonds, at chambers, at Claxton, Evans County. Upon hearing the petition for injunction the court denied it. The point is raised that the notice given in McIntosh County was not sufficient, as it should have been issued by the clerk of the court of Evans County; also, that the judge was without jurisdiction to hear the application at a point outside of McIntosh County; and, third, that if under the terms of the statute embodied, in the Civil Code, § 456, which relates to such hearings, the filing of the petition, notice of the same, etc., authority is given to hear the petition and to pass the order validating the bonds in another county than that in which the bonds are to be issued, the statute making such provision is unconstitutional.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Brand. Gvdnnett superior court. June 30, 1916.</p> <p>The exception is to a judgment dismissing the case on demurrer. It appears from the allegations in the petition that George Minor was twice married, and died leaving surviving him his second wife and two sets of children, the issue of his respective marriages: The estate left by him was duly administered, in the course of which a statutory year’s support was set apart to the widow and certain land was set apart to the widow as dower; and such property as remained was distributed among the several heirs at law. One of the administrators died, and the other survived the widow; but the estate having been administered, except the remainder after termination of the dower interest set apart to the widow, there was nothing for the surviving administrator to do until after the death of the widow. The widow remained in possession, and-resided on the land set apart as dower until she died. Immediately thereafter the surviving administrator above mentioned sold the land, thereby converting it into money. The first set of children asserted against the estate a money demand for payment out of the fund, on account of certain money which was given to their mother by her father during her coverture, and was turned over by her to her husband, George Minor, the intestate. The second set of children objected to the allowance of the demand, and the administrator thereupon declined to make payment. Suit was instituted against the administrator by the first set of children, to recover the amount. Subsequently the petition was so amended, by consent, as to strike the names of the original plaintiffs, and substitute for them, as sole party plaintiff, the administrator upon the estate of their deceased mother. The petition was several times amended; and in addition to that which is stated above, the following was alleged in substance: The plaintiff’s intestate, the mother of the first set of children, was Nancy Veal Minor. In 1859 her father, William Veal, gave and delivered to her the sum of $600, stating at the time of the gift that “it was to remain her property, and not to become the property of her husband, said George Minor, by possession or otherwise.” Upon receiving the money, Nancy Veal Minor “in turn handed the same to her said husband, said George Minor.” After thus acquiring possession of the money,' George Minor “invested the said money in land or other profitable investment or investments, and .- . said money went into his estate . . as a trust fund of the said Nancy Veal Minor, . . and not as the money of said George Minor, . . and was so recognized and treated.” George Minor recognized the money as a trust fund for Nancy Veal Minor so long as she lived, and after her death he recognized it, so long as he lived, as a trust fund for her heirs, and after his death the money was recognized as a trust fund by the administrators upon the estate of George Minor, who declared that the plaintiff’s demand would have been paid except for the fact thgt there was no money with which to pay, after setting apart the year’s support to the widow, and paying certain moneys to the second set of children to equal the amount paid to the first set; and for the further reason that the first set of children, being assured by the administrator that he would continue to recognize the trust, did not wish to deprive the widow and her minor children. The first wife died in 1863. George Minor died in 1878; and the second wife in 1912. Suit was instituted in 1915, seeking to recover the principal sum of $600, with interest thereon from January 1, 1860. The demurrer was upon the grounds, among others, that no cause of- action was set forth, and that, if any cause of action ever existed, it appeared from the face of the petition to be barred by the statute of limitations.</p>

<p>Complaint for land, Before Judge Worrill. Eandolpb superior, court. July 31, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Bartlett. Polk superior court. May 8, 1916.</p>

<p>Exceptions to auditor’s report. Before Judge Highsmith. Glynn superior court. June 8, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. February 4, 1916.</p>

<p>Tlie race-segregation ordinance of the City of Atlanta, which prohibits colored persons from occupying as a residence any house upon any block upon which- a greater number of houses are occupied as residences by white people than are occupied by colored people, and vice versa, and wliich excepts from its operation the location of residences made before the adoption of the ordinance, and the right of occupancy of residences previously acquired by the persons entitled to occupy them, is not opposed to the bill of rights of the State constitution, which declares that “Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and complete.” Nor is such ordinance repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, as being a denial of the equal protection of the laws and of due process of law.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Hardeman. Screven superior court. May 19, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hardeman. Washington superior court. September 5, 1916. ■</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Worrill. Early superior court. December 30, 1916. (See ante, 169.)</p>

<p>1. There was evidence to support the verdict of guilty.</p> <p>2. The act of the legislature approved November 18, 1915, in reference to 'intoxicating liquors (Georgia Laws, Ex. Sess. 1915, p. 90), makes it illegal for individuals, although they are not carriers for hire, to ship or transport the prohibited liquors therein specified in quantities in excess of that allowed by law from another State into the State of Georgia.</p> <p>3. The court below did not err in charging the jury that “no person in Georgia has the right now, under the law, to ship into this State any intoxicating liquors whatever-for illegal sale, and if any person does so he violates the law.”</p> <p>4. Nor did the court err in charging the jury that “it is a violation of the law for any person to have in his possession, in this State, at any one time within a period of thirty days, more than two quarts of intoxicating liquors, or more than 48 pints of beer or malt, or more than one gallon of wine; and if any person has any more than that amount in their possession, the law presumes that they are having it and holding it for illegal sale, and the burden would be on the party found with such property in hi3 possession to establish his innocence.” The portion of the charge here excepted to states in substance one of the provisions of section 17 of the act referred to above.</p> <p>5. The court properly instructed the jury that “if you find that the defendant delivered this trunk, knowing its contents to be more than- two quarts of spirituous and intoxicating liquors, to a railroad company in the State of Florida, with the intention that it should be shipped and transported by such carrier to Waycross in Ware County, Georgia, and had it consigned to himself as consignee, that delivery to such railroad company, or other carrier, in Florida, would be delivery to him, and possession of such railroad company would be the possession of the defendant. You look to the evidence and-see what the truth is.” This charge states a pertinent principle of law, and does not contain an expression of opinion by the court upon the facts of the case.</p> <p>6. The court below did not err in instructing the jury, in substance, that if the defendant concealed the nature of the contents of the trunk from the railroad authorities, and they were unaware of the nature of the' contents of the trunk, and under those circumstances the railroad company transported it for the defendant, their act in thus transporting the trunk would be the act of the defendant.</p> <p>7. The court did not err in refusing to charge the jury, that, “before you would be authorized to convict the defendant, it would have to be shown by competent evidence that the trunk alleged to have contained whisky was in- the actual possession or control of the defendant;” inasmuch as the jury might have been led to believe by such instruction that possession by the agents of the railroad company, at the time the trunk was being transported in compliance with their duty to transport the same as baggage, was not the kind of possession or control which it was necessary to show in order to authorize the verdict of guilty.</p> <p>8. A question as to the constitutionality of a law can not be raised for the first time in a motion for a new trial, where it was not made either by demurrer to the pleadings or by objections to evidence, or • in some other appropriate way pending the trial. Atkinson, J., dissents from this ruling.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Fulton superior court. July 3, 1915. Lavender E. Eay bought a city lot from Morris. Held: to the Atlanta Trust and Banking Company; and at the same time the bank voluntarily surrendered to Morris his bond for title, which it had obtained from Eay; and Morris executed to the bank a “defeasance” deed to the effect that said deed would be void upon the payment of the purchase-money, and also delivered to the bank a deed…

<p>1. Inasmuch as there was not such a duplication of the evidence, by copying it in full in the bill of exceptions and in the record, as to bring it within the rule laid down in the case of Delh v. Piehens, 92 Ga. 576 (17 S. E. 862), this court will not so apply that rule as to dismiss the bill of exceptions.</p> <p>2. There was evidence authorizing the finding of the auditor that the notes upon which the claims of the American Exchange National Bank and of the Mechanics and Metals National Bank are based were duly executed.</p> <p>3. Where the directors of a bank passed a resolution duly authorizing certain of its officers to borrow money from another bank and to execute the borrowing bank’s promissory notes for the amount and deposit bills receivable as collateral security, and where there was thereafter a course of dealing between the two banks in accordance with this resolution, the execution of a note by the officers of the borrowing bank and the transfer and assignment of collaterals to secure its payment is not invalid for want of authority on the part of the parties giving the note and transferring the collateral, although the note was not given immediately after the passage of the resolution, it appearing that there was no revocation of the authority to borrow money and give such note. And renewals of the note given in pursuance of the authority thus conferred stand upon the same footing as the original note, unless such renewals were given under circumstances which rendered them obnoxious to the law which inhibits the giving of preferences by banks when in failing circumstances. Applying this ruling to the evidence, there was no error in overruling the exceptions to those portions of the auditor’s report favorable to the claims of the American Exchange National Bank and the Mechanics and Metals National Bank.</p> <p>4. The court below did not err in overruling the exception to the finding ' of the auditor allowing certain credits, which exception was based on the ground that the finding was without evidence to support it.</p> <p>5. There was no error in overruling the exceptions to those portions of the auditor’s report referred to in the assignments of error numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in the bill of exceptions.</p> <p>6. The court did not err in overruling the exceptions to the finding of the auditor sustaining the demurrer to the cross-petition of the depositors, setting up that the notes relied upon by the creditor banks were renewals taken at a time when the debtor bank was insolvent, and setting forth circumstances to show that the creditor banks had notice of this.</p> <p>7. Section 2354 of the Civil Code, giving a lien to creditors of a bank for collections on collaterals, is not void because violative of par. 2 of sec. 1 of art. 1 of the constitution of the State of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6358), which provides that protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government, and shall be impartial and complete.</p> <p>8. Nor is § 2354 unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the due-process clause of the constitution of this State; nor on the ground that no provision is made for asserting and foreclosing the lien, and that there is no time fixed by the statute as to when the lien shall begin, or when it shall operate. It is not necessary that the section should contain in itself a prescribed procedure for the enforcement of a lien; and the limitation as to when the lien shall begin and operate can be established by the application of other provisions of the Civil Code, upon a kindred subject.</p> <p>9. The court below properly refused to approve the auditor’s conclusion of law as to the manner and extent of participation in the dividends, as the auditor’s finding upon this subject is not in accord with the ruling made by this court in the ease of Citizens <& Southern Banh v. Alexander, ante, 74,</p> <p>10. The court erred in overruling the finding of the auditor which held that the holders of collaterals were entitled to certain specified expenses necessarily incurred in realizing upon the collaterals.</p>

<p>Action for damages ex contractu. Before 'Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. April 10, 1916.</p> <p>Tye, Peeples & Tye, for plaintiff in error in main bill of exceptions.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus. Before Judge Summerall. Chatham superior court. January 5, 1917.</p>

<p>1. A contract of life insurance, as expressed in the policy issued by a company to an individual, may be supplemented by a subsequent contract between the parties, expressed in a promissory note given by the insured to the insurer for a premium on the policy and providing for a termination of all rights under the policy for non-payment of the note, although the policy contain no such provision.</p> <p>2. A participating life-insurance policy provided for payment of premiums in cash annually in advance, and that non-payment of any premium when due, or within a specified pez'iod of grace, should cause the policy to cease and tezzminate,. except as elsewhere provided in the policy. It also provided that non-payment at maturity of any ziote or other obligation that might be accepted for the first premium should render the policy null and void, but contained no such stipulation or reference to the taking of notes for other premiums. On the basis of the resezwe value of the policy, another clause provided' that after premizzms had been paid for two years, if the insured should defazzlt in the payment of a premium he should have, at the time of the default or within the .pez'iod of grace thereafter, one of several options, the first being the right to extended non-participating insurance without cash value for the fzzll amount of the policy for a limited period; and if the insured shozzld fail to declare an election between the options, the first should apply and the others wozzld be considered waived. • The premiums were dzzly paid for two years. The third premium was not paid in cash, but at the time it was payable the company accepted the nonnegotiable promissory note of the inszzred for the amount of the premium, the note being payable six months after date. The note contained the further clause; “I understand and hereby agree that neither this note, nor any extension thereof, is given or accepted as a payment of said premium. And I agree that the zion-payment of this note, or any extension thereof, at maturity, shall ipso facto lapse said policy, and there will be dzze the proportionate part of the face of this note, with interest, that the time from the date to the maturity of this note, or any extension thereof, bears to the whole time covered by said premium. I also agree that upon non-payment of this note, or any extension thereof, if said policy should have any reserve value, the company may charge the proportionate part of this note, or any extension thereof, that may be dzze as above provided, against such reserve valzze, and any extezzded inszzrance value it may have shall be accordingly reduced.” The company dzzly isszzed a receipt for the note, which contained a clazzse to the effect that the policy “is contimzed in foz’ce until the maturity of said note or any extension thereof. On payment of note on or before matzzrity the company’s regzzlar premium receipt will be delivered to Carey H. Tyler [the inszzred]. The non-payment of said note, or any extension thereof, at maturity, will ipso facto lapse said policy and terminate all rights thereunder, except as otherwise expressly provided in said note.” Held, that the stipulation quoted from the note and assented, to in the receipt was supplemental to the original contract expressed in the policy, and was valid. For non-payment of the note, under the terms expressed, the insurer could charge premiums for the time of the note, and in payment thereof deduct from the value of the reserve of the policy and apply any balance of the reserve to extended insurance as provided in the first option in the non-forfeiture clause of the policy, and after the extended insurance was exhausted the company could declare the policy void. Under the circumstances, the company could retain the note as evidence, without losing its right to terminate the policy in the manner indicated.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Terrell. Carroll superior court. February 5, 1917.</p>

Petition for mandamus. Before Judge Kent. Chatham superior court. December 14, 1916. W. T. Daniels and E. 0.

<p>Injunction and receivership. ' Before Judge Searcy. Fayette superior court. November 18, 1916.</p>

<p>1. Where during the trial of a case a motion .to declare a mistrial was made by counsel for the plaintiffs, who stated to the court and offered to prove that certain, jurors trying the ease had during the trial accepted hospitality from a brother of one of the defendants by eating supper and breakfast with him at his home, and also offered to make proof that such brother had talked to one of the jurors about the case, it was error to-'refuse to declare a mistrial.</p> <p>(a) Exceptions to the overruling of a motion for a mistrial can be taken advantage of by a motion for new trial, although no exceptions pendente litó were filed.</p> <p>2. The general rule, is that where exceptions of fact to an auditor’s report are submitted to a jury, the report of the auditor is to be taken as prima facie true, and the burden of overcoming it rests upon the party making the exceptions. Where such rule is correctly given in charge by the court, it is not error requiring a reversal for the court later to instruct the jury that he will give them in charge “the principles of law applicable to the case, as if it were an original case before you and originally for trial,” where such instruction given involves the very principles for which the plaintiffs are contending.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Searcy. Pike superior court. January 6, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Patterson. Cobb superior court. November 2-4, 1916. This suit was brought by Mrs. Catherine V. Moss against her husband, Daniel J. Moss, to recover permanent alimony. The petition alleged that the plaintiff and the defendant were living in. a bona fide state of separation, and there was a prayer to enjoin the husband from disposing of any of his property.

Petition for construction, etc. Before Judge Pendleton. Eulton superior court. December 23, 1916. (See ante, 154.) The Trust Company of Georgia, as executor of the will of Thomas Egleston, deceased, filed a petition for construction of the will, and for general direction. William Egleston filed his intervention.

<p>Appeal from probate of will. Before Judge Searcy. Pike superior court. January 6, 1916.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Eite. Catoosa superior court. December 20, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Hardeman. Chatham superior court. January 37, 1917.

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court. February 3, 1917. (See 18 Ga. App. 444, 89 S. E. 392.)</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Eite. Bartow superior court. ■December 23, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Patterson. Forsyth superior court. December 28, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable" petition. Before Judge Munro. Taylor superior court. December 27, 1916.</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Kent. Twiggs superior court. January 11, 1917. Miss E. G. Beckham and others filed their petition against the tax-collector of Twiggs county and a bailiff, to enjoin the collection of a local tax for public schools under the act of the General Assembly embodied in the Civil Code of 1910, §§ 1531-1535. A temporary restraining order was granted, and upon the hearing the judge dissolved the restraining order and denied the injunction.

<p>Writ of error; from Liberty superior court.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. March 3, 1917. '</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. January 23, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Summerall. Charlton superior court. March 2é, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Tarver. Catoosa superior court. March 10, 1917.</p>

<p>Receivership and intervention. Before Judge Ellis. Fulton superior court. November 3, 1916.</p> <p>A petition was filed against a corporation by certain of its stockholders, praying for injunction and receiver; and receivers were appointed. An ancillary proceeding filed by the receivers, to make . certain parties defendant to the pending litigation, was dismissed by the court. A number of interventions were allowed, making parties plaintiff certain creditors of the corporation, who sought the payment of their various debts against the corporation or its receivers. As a result of the final verdict and decree in the original suit, the claims of all the intervening creditor plaintiffs (except the claim of the trustee for the holders of bonds issued by the corporation) were settled in full, and they have no further interest in the litigation. Later the trustee just mentioned filed an intervention to foreclose a mortgage upon all of the property of the defendant corporation, for the purpose of having paid certain bonds of the corporation, with interest and attorney’s fees. This intervention was allowed. The original cause was referred to an auditor, who filed a report to the effect that he had not heard evidence upon the issues involved, for the reason that all parties to the original suit had settled their differences and had taken a consent verdict and decree. This verdict and decree provided for the sale of all the property and assets of the defendant corporation, and for the distribution of all the proceeds of the sale in the manner agreed upon. Accordingly the receivers did sell all of the assets of the defendant corporation for $80,500, and the sale was ratified by the court. The proceeds of the sale were distributed and paid out as provided by the verdict and decree, “except a small sum.” After the payment of all the obligations which were declared by the verdict and decree to be superior to the bonds, there was cred.ited to the bondholders about $25,000, leaving outstanding and unpaid the balance of the amount due to them, as fixed by the-verdict and decree.</p> <p>Subsequently Mary T. Sharp and others presented a petition to .the judge of the superior court, asking to have made parties certain named persons who were parties plaintiff to the' original action; alleging that the board of directors and officers of the defendant corporation, naming them, had defrauded the corporation and petitioners by illegal disposal of the stock of the corporation; and praying that the receivers of the corporation be prdered to take charge of the prosecution of this intervention, that funds in their hands, received from the sale of the property of the corporation, be set aside in a sufficient amount to pay the cost of the litigation, that judgment be rendered against the directors and officers of the corporation for. the face value of the stock, with interest, to be distributed to the intervenors and all other stockholders similarly situated, and that one of the receivers named be discharged by reason of charges made against him in the intervention. A rule nisi was granted; and the parties thus proceeded against, as well as the trustee, showed cause by answers in the nature of general demurrers setting forth why the intervention should not be allowed, alleging, among other things, that the original action in which the petitioners were seeking to intervene had been disposed of by verdict and decree, that parties to the original suit could not be made, nor could new and distinct issues between new and distinct parties be tried. An amendment was offered, enlarging and amplifying the allegations of fraud committed by the officers and directors of the corporation, and praying that judgment be rendered against them and each of them in the sum of $400,000, together with interest, in favor of the receivers, for distribution to creditors and intervenors and all other stockholders or others similarly situated and entitled. The demurrers and motions to dismiss the intervention were overruled, and the receivers were authorized and directed to bring suit as prayed for. Exceptions were taken to these rulings, to the order allowing the intervention, to the order overruling a motion to revoke the order allowing the intervention, and to that part of the judgment which is as follows: "It being the opinion of the court that .there are no funds in the hands of the receivers properly available to pay costs and fees as prayed to be allowed for bringing these suits, it is ordered that upon depositing with the clerk of this court a sum sufficient to meet the court costs which may accrue under this additional litigation, and any arrangement satisfactory to the intervenors and their counsel shall be made between them, by which counsel for the intervenors will bring the suits, then the receivers are authorized and directed to bring the suits, as prayed for.”</p>

<p>Action for damages; from Gordon.</p>

Ejectment. Before Judge Cox. -Decatur superior court. December 29, 1916. John E. Donalson brought ejectment against Mrs. Arkansas' Yeates, James S. Yeates, and Jesse Yeates, to recover land described as lots numbered 264 and 265 in the 14th district of Decatur county. The defendants pleaded not guilty; and specially that the deed from Mrs. Arkansas Yeates to John E. Donalson, upon which the plaintiif relied, was void as having been obtained by duress.

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Cox. Decatur superior court. December 29, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Colquitt superior court. January term, 1917. Bertha Monroe and others, as the children of Josephine Carlton, deceased, with their father, J. D. Carlton, filed their petition against Mrs. S. L. E. Gregory. They alleged as follows: Josephine Carlton was the adopted daughter of Samuel Gregory.

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Brand. Clarke superior court. January 16, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Jones. Hall superior court. December 27, 1916.</p>

<p>Where the mayor and council of a town procured lights from an electric-light plant, for the purpose of lighting its streets, at a given price per month, and at the end of the year there was a balance due to the lighting plant for furnishing such lights, and where during the same year taxes were lawfully levied against the citizens of the town for the purpose of paying the light bill, but were not collected and paid into the treasury by the end of the year in which the contract was made and the lights furnished, and the mayor and council gave a demand note for the amount thus due on February 1st of the year following, before the taxes were collected, the giving of such note as evidence of the amount due is not in violation of art. 7, sec. 7, par. 1, of the constitution, which provides that no municipality shall incur any new debt, except for a temporary loan or loans to supply casual deficiencies of revenue, not exceeding one fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of taxable property therein, without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters thereof at an election held for that purpose according to law.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. December 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Under the facts of this case it was erroneous to grant an interlocutory injunction.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Summerall. Coffee superior court. February 7,-1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Munro. Taylor superior court. December 26, 1916.</p>

<p>Exceptions to auditor’s report; from Early superior court. Motion to dismiss the writ of error.</p> <p>W. F. Averitt, Mary Gray, and T. J. Averitt brought their petition against W. 0. Hilton and A. C. Spence, returnable to the October term, 1911, of the superior court; and the same plaintiffs brought another petition against A. L. Harris and A. D. Averitt, returnable to the April term, 1912, of the same court. At the October term, 1912, counsel representing the respective parties entered into an agreement reciting that whereas the parties in the above-stated cases are asserting divers claims of title to the Abner Averitt plantation, consisting of lots of land 186, 187, 174, and 175, in Early County, and the settlement of the disputes in said cases would settle only the title and interest of such parties to the lots of land 186, 174, and 175, and it is the desire and to the interest of all the parties, as well as of two other, claimants, Maude Simpson and E. C. McAllister, that the title to all the lands composing the Abner Averitt plantation be disposed of and settled in one suit ás early as possible, it is agreed that all the foregoing matters be submitted to an auditor, with all powers conferred upon him necessary to carrying out the wish' of the parties as above stated; and that he have authority to allow amendments to the pleadings, make new parties, and pass upon all demurrers -and questions of law and fact. Under this agreement it was ordered by the court that the two cases be reférred to an auditor, who was to hear and determine all questions of law and fact arising 'in the eases. T. B.'Harris, Maude Simpson, and E. C. McAllister filed their separate interventions, setting up the titles claimed by them. The auditor heard the cases under this order, -and -in due time made his report.' W. E. Averitt’ and T. J. Averitt filed exceptions of law and fact to the report. The exceptions filed by T. J. Averitt were afterward dismissed for want of prosecution. All the exceptions filed by W. E. Averitt were overruled; and he excepted to this ruling, and to the decree rendered (which was in accordance, with the rulings in the auditor’s report), on the grounds that it was contrary to the law and the evidence, and that it was erroneous for all the reasons stated in the exceptions of law and fact which had been overruled. All the defendants to the original petitions and the intervenors were named as defendants in the bill of exceptions. When the case was called for hearing in this court the defendants moved to dismiss the writ of error, on the ground that the plaintiff had sought to bring up for review, in a single bill of exceptions, the judgments rendered in two distinct suits and causes of action against different defendants.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Worrill. Miller superior court. April 24, 1917.</p>

<p>1. While a strict bill of interpleader involves two suits, a petition in the nature of a bill of interpleader does not necessarily involve two sets of pleadings, though the better practice might be to require them. Consequently, where a petition was filed by a trustee in whose hands there was a fund for distribution, which it was alleged was claimed by all of -the defendants, and the prayer was, for an order requiring the defendants to interplead, and each of the defendants answered the petition, either admitting all of its allegations or setting up such facts as required the granting of the order of interpleader, and each asserting a claim to the fund in the hands of the trustee; and where each defendant, independently, 'either admitted the allegations of the petition for interpleader, or expressly averred such facts as to create an issue between the eodefendants as to which was entitled to the fund, and the case was tried on the issues thus raised, it was not error, under the facts of this case, to decline to enter a decree or direct a verdict for two of the defendants on their motion upon the ground that the other defendants had not in their answers set up a claim to the fund, and that the answers of the movants were vei-ified, and, in the absence of such opposing claim by the codefendants, were to be taken as proved.</p> <p>(a) The codefendants did by their pleadings set up a claim to the income from the fund in the hands of the trustee.</p> <p>('&) An amendment to the pleadings can be made at any time before verdict. The amendments in the present case, whether taken as amendments or as original pleadings, were in time, and there was sufficient basis to amend.</p> <p>(o) It was not error to refuse to dismiss the motion for .a new trial.</p> <p>2. The evidence on the issue of fact whether the minor ward was the child of testator’s son Marion was conflicting, and the court did- not err in refusing to .direct a verdict.</p> <p>3. The verdict was not required under the law and the evidence, and the court did not err in the first grant of a new trial.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Littlejohn. Macon superior court. November 4,1916.</p>

<p>’ Petition for injunction. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeff Davis superior court. January 3, 1917.</p> <p>'■ • The Merchants & Planters Bank and T. R. Knight brought an action against the Citizens Bank of Hazlehurst and others, and alleged .-substantially as follows: T. R. Knight is a resident, citizen, and taxpayer of Jeff Davis county, and plaintiffs bring this petition on behalf of themselves and other citizens situated as they are. On January 1, 1915, Otto Middleton, 'a resident of-’the county, having been elected as treasurer, had in his hands'a‘large amount of money as a sinking' fund belonging 'to the ebunty. Hé is made a party defendant, as are also the Citizens Bank of Hazier hurst and W. E. Beagin as tax-collectpr. At the 1916 session of-the General Assembly a law relative to a county depository was enacted (Acts 1916, p. 453). Section 2'of the act is as follows-. “Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that' it shall be the duty of the ordinary, clerk of the superior court, and the tax-collector of said county to select, appoint, and designate ón' the first Monday in January, 1917, and on the first Monday in January every four years thereafter, some solvent chartered banker banks in said county, to receive all county funds of'said;, county,-and to disburse the same as the law now requires county funds to 'bp disbursed by county treasurers; provided such.officers-)!herein named shall select such bank or banks only' after calling for. fcompetitive bids, and such bank or banks only shall be selected as. shall-make the best and most advisable bid for the office .of county depository; When such bank or banks have been selected as su.ch county -depository, which shall be for a term of four years, to begin - on the first day of January, 1917, and end on the first day Of January, 1921, and on said dates every four years thereafter, said bank'.or banks shall give good and sufficient bond in, such sum as, may He fixed by said officers, and with such security as said officers m&y approve, said depository having the option to tender as 'surety- on the bond either some'solvent surety or guaranty company,-or nót less than'two good solvent individuals whose property is'worth the amount of said bond, above all liabilities and exemption of -'évéry kind whatever. Said bank or' banks shall not receive- aüy;; compensation for holding the office of county depository, and. shall pay to the County of Jeff Davis such Sums for the privilege of ¡acting as county depository as may be determined by said, .officers- pjjj ;thé eonipétitive bids aforesaid.” Hnder this act all three of. the,-officers therein designated should select a county depository fh receive and disburse all moneys belonging to the county. ■ At the last- general election in the State and in Jeff Davis county J. .C. Watkins was elected ordinary, but under the laws he could not- begin the duties of his office until he had’qualified and given bond; which is to be approved by the judge of the superior court; and until that' is done he can not perform any duties as ordinary, and any attempt to perform such duties would be illegal and void. The judge of the superior court did not approve and accept the bond of Watkins, the ordinary-elect, and did not deliver to him his commission as issued by the authorities of the State of Georgia on January 1, 1917, and did not accept and approve the bond until January 2, 1917. Though Watkins was not ordinary, he and the clerk ánd the tax-collector, all met and received bids from three banks. The Citizens Bank of- Hazlehurst made a bid of six per cent, interest per annum for the sinking fund, and one per cent, per annum interest for the daily deposits, and offered to loan 'the county moneys it should need, at the rate of six per cent, interest per annum. The Bank of Hazlehurst offered four per cent, interest per annum for the sinking fund, and four per cent, per annum interest for the daily deposits, but offered nothing on money to be borrowed, which is not required by the legislative act. The Merchants & Planters Bank offered to pay six per cent, interest per annum on the sinking fund and three per cent, interest per annum on the daily-balances, to loan the county such funds as if needed from time to time, at six per cent, interest, per annum, and to give security in terms of the act. Notwithstanding these offers, the two officers and Watkins selected and designated the Citizens Bank of Hazlehurst as the county depository. The law is mandatory upon the three officers to select the bank as depository which makes “the best and most advisable bid” as the county depository; and by proper construction the words of the act, “best and most advisable bid,” mean the highest bid, the bid- that would bring'to the county and the taxpayers thereof the greatest revenue from interest. The bid made by the Merchants & Planters Bank was the “best and most advisable bid,” and the failure to select that bid is not only in violation of the act, but it damages the taxpayers of the county in the loss of two per cent, interest on several thousand dollars per annum. Thé participation by Watkins in the selection of a depository was illegal, as he was not the qualified ordinary of the county, but Henry- Cook was the qualified ordinary, was present, and was not disqualified for any reason from acting. The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law; and they pray that the treasurer and the tax-collector be enjoined from paying over to the Citizens Bank of Hazlehurst, as county depository, any" funds belonging to the county, and that the Citizens Bank of Hazlehurst be enjoined from receiving any of such funds as county depository. On presentation of the petition the judge refused to sanction it and to grant a restraining order anda rule nisi;'and the'plaintiffs excepted.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Munro. Muscogee superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Calhoun superior court. December 29, 1916.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. Pecember 22, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Eulton superior court. October 31, 1916. , The plaintiff brought his petition against Young and Mrs. Young. The. material allegations of the petition are in substance as follows: The plaintiff was negotiating for the purchase of a machinery plant from one Sterchi upon terms that would make the purchase profitable and advantageous to petitioner.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Eulton superior court. January 13, 1917.</p>

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Summerall. Coffee superior court. December 30, 1916. George White was indicted for the offense of murder, it being charged that he feloniously killed Thomas Daniels by shooting him with a pistol. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, with a recommendation, and the defendant made a motion for a new trial, which Was overruled.

<p>Equitable petition. ’ Before Judge Brand. Clarke superior court. January 30, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for rape. Before Judge Graham. Pulaski superior court. January 16, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Bartlett. Polk superior court. December 18, 1916.</p>

<p>Garnishment. Before Judge Harper. City court of Americus. July 18, 1916.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Munro. Taylor superior court. December 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Jones. Hall superior court. January 26, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court. February 3, 1917.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus. Before Judge. Eason. City court of McBae. February 19, 1917. ■_</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Brand. Clarke superior court. January 20, 1917. An equitable action was instituted in the superior court of Clarke County. The defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court, on the ground that at the time of the institution of the suit he was not a resident of the county, but resided in Hartford County, Connecticut. The case was tried upon this issue alone; and upon evidence submitted the jury returned a verdict against the plea.

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Howard. Marion superior court. January 30, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Crum. Wilcox superior court. February 37, 1917.

<p>• Interpleader. Before Judge Hammond. Bichmond superior court. February 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition to construe will, etc. Before Judge Smith'. DeKalb superior court. March 5, 1917.</p>

<p>Certiorari; from Coweta superior court.</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Summerall. Clinch superior court. March 31, 1917. Viola Browning and B. F. Guest filed their petition to enjoin the sheriff and others from dispossessing them. of certain described land. The trial judge refused to grant a temporary injunction, and the plaintiffs excepted.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Harrell. Dougherty superior court. April 6, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Jones. White superior court. March 24, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Sheppard. Effingham superior court. April 16, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Wright. Floyd superiqr court. April %, 1917.</p>

<p>Fayette superior Complaint for land. Before Judge Searcy, court. March. 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Accusation of misdemeanor. Before Judge Bourke. City court of Savannah. April 21, 1917.</p>

<p>' Intervention. Before Judge Jones. Eabun superior court. February 28, 1917.</p>

<p>1. The amendment to the charter of the Town of MeCaysville (Acts 1914, p. 1048) 'is not repugnant to the due-process clauses of the State and Eederal constitutions. But the charter provision that when improvements are contemplated by the mayor and general council, on sidewalks bounding property of landowners who are non-residents, service of notice, hearing, etc., shall be deemed sufficient when it is made to appear that the notice or writ has been deposited in .the post-office of another named town, prcqjeiTy stamped and addressed to the owner of the land at liis most notorious place of abode, or his place of business, is not complied with by serving the husband of the non-resident owner personally with a copy of the writ or notice; and the landowner is not bound by such service, in the absence of evidence of authority on the part of the husband to accept-such service for the wife, or of a ratification of such service by her.</p> <p>Provisions of a municipal charter relating to taxation by assessment must be strictly pursued. Where a charter provided for service on a non-resident landowner,, preliminary to a hearing before the mayor and council, of notice that such landowner should pave sidewalks abutting on her property, and, failing to do so, that the municipality might tax the cost of the improvements against her, absence of proof of service upon her as provided by the charter would render void the action by the mayor and council in assessing the cost of such improvements against the owner; and in such ease a court of equity should enjoin the sale of the owner’s property for the purpose of paying for such improvements.-</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. May 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. ‘ Before Judge Cobb. Jackson superior court. April 21, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Hodges. Elbert superior court. May 28, 1917.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Howard. Marion superior court. April 24, 1917. -</p>

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Morris. Cherokee superior court. June 4, 1917.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Tarver. Gordon superior court. May 5 1917.</p>

Ejectment. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court.May 25, 1917. J. P. Carter, brought ejectment, and undertook to establish his title to the land by showing one Blanton to be the common grantor ■ of himself and the defendant. He introduced a deed from Blanton to the defendant,-dated October 23, 1911, and purporting to convey the land in'controversy.

<p>1. Toaviis and villages in this State, incorporated by the superior courts under the' provisions of the Political Code of 1895, §§ 685-710, are authorized, through .their mayors and councils, to levy, assess, and collect taxes on businesses or occupations, .for the purpose of raising revenue for corporate purposes.</p> <p>2. Other assignments of error are fully dealt with in the opinion.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Harrell. Eandolph superior court. June 11, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder; Before Judge Summerall. Charlton •superior court. June 15, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Graham. Appling superior court. May 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Forfeiture of recognizance. Before Judge W. H. Hammond. City court of Tliomasville. June 31, 1916.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Cox. Grady superior court. December 13, 1916.</p>

<p>The Court of Appeals certified the following questions (in case' No. 7296):</p> <p>“1. In a case tried in the city court of Savannah a second new trial was granted the same party upon the sole ground that the evidence strongly preponderated in his favor, and in the order granting the new trial the judge of that court declared unconstitutional so much of the act approved August 13, 1915, relating to the city court of Savannah (Acts 1915, p. 123, Section 5), as provides: 'No second new trial shall be granted in any case except for errors of law, or where there is no evidence to support the verdict.’ This ruling was made upon oral 'argument only of counsel for the movant, there being no pleadings in which the constitutionality of the act in question was attacked. The losing party excepts to the grant of the second new trial. Conceding that the evidence supports the verdict and that no error of law appears, has the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to hear and determine this ease, or does it 'involve the construction of the constitution of the State,’ or is it a case 'in which the constitutionality of any law of the State of Georgia . . is drawn in question,’ in contemplation of the amendment to the constitution, ratified November 7, 1916, relating to the jurisdiction of thq Supreme Court ?</p> <p>“2. May an employee of a railway company engaged in interstate commerce maintain a joint action against the company and its engineer, under the Federal 'employer’s liability act’ of 1908, where concurring negligence of the interstate carrier and its engineer in the course of interstate commerce is alleged as the cause of the injury to the plaintiff, and where also a violation of the 'safety-appliance act’ of Congress is charged against the carrier?”</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Fite. Murray superior court. December 20, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for direction. Before Judge Munro. Talbot superior court. December 16; 1916.</p>

<p>Attachment for contempt. Before Judge Howard. Muscogee superior court. January 24, 1917.</p>

<p>Eeceivership and .intervention. Before Judge Munro. Taylor superior court. November 5, 1916.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Hammond. Burke superior court. February 1, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Tarver. Bartow superior court. February 17, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Harrell. Grady superior court. March 14, 1917.</p>

<p>■; Equitable petition. Before Judge Worrill. Terrell superior court. March 3, 1917.</p>

<p>The court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendants.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hammond. Jefferson superior court. April 7, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. 'Before Judge Tarver. Dade superior court. April 14, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction and receivership. Before Judge Thomas. Thomas superior court. February 17, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Fulton. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Searcy. Fayette superior court. May 12, 1917.</p>

<p>- Money rule. Before Judge Graham. Johnson superior court. April 28, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Wrigbt. Floyd superior court. May 11, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. ’ Bibb superior court. May 30, 1917.</p> <p>The petition is against the defendant as executor, and seeks a judgment against him as such, generally against the estate of the testator, and specially against certain land described in a deed executed by “T. B. Hendricks, Executor,” and dated February 6, 1897, being a simple warranty deed, absolute on its face, and reciting a consideration of $2100. It is alleged, that, at the time the deed was given, the defendant as executor was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $2100, loaned to him to carry on the business and operate the farms of the estate; that the deed was executed to secure this amount (represented by two notes); that it was orally agreed that the deed would secure all further sums that might be advanced to the defendant by the plaintiff for the same purpose; that at sundry times other sums were advanced, for which notes were given; that the plaintiff paid certain taxes due the State and county for seventeen years; that as to all these items of indebtedness, except the taxes, T. B. Hendricks gave his notes under seal; and that on the 29th day of September, 1915, the defendant acknowledged the correctness of the entire indebtedness, and thus revived any of the items that otherwise might have been barred by the statute of limitations. The testatrix in her will “appointed her husband, Thomas B. Hendricks, as her executor, with full and ample power to take charge of her entire property, personal and real, to manage it as his discretion seemed best to him, to sell and reinvest the proceeds of any sale of both personalty or realty as he deemed best, and all sales of both personal and real property to be solely in the discretion of her said executor-at private or public sale, or in such manner and on such terms as he saw fit to adopt relative to any and all her property, without any order from the court of ordinary for such sales or reinvestment; that her said executor was to be left in the management of hert said estate to his own discretion, and should not be compelled to make returns of his acts and doings in the premises; she reposing entire confidence in his judgment and discretion to manage the property to the best interest of his and her children, without any interference by the court, or order or direction therefor. She therefore gave him to manage without restriction all her said property, leaving it with him when and how to divide it among their children, or to keep it together as long as he lived, . . that her said executor should not be made to account for the management and disposition of her property, or the proceeds thereof, but should have absolute and untrammeled control of her estate during his life without liability therefor; and . . that her husband . . be the guardian of the person and property of all of her said children-.” The plaintiff prayed for a decree in her favor, and that the deed be foreclosed as an equitable mortgage, etc.</p> <p>The defendant demurred to the petition, on the following grounds: (1) No cause of action. (2) That the notes show this to be the individual undertaking of T. E. Hendricks. (3) That the deed is invalid, as it is alleged it was to secure individual notes of T. E. Hendricks. (4) That the deed is the deed of T. E. Hendricks individually; but even if it was more than that, it could not by parol be shown to be intended to secure future indebtedness. (5) That the alleged debts are shown to be barred by the statute of limitations. (6) That the petition does not show with sufficient definiteness in what way or for what specific purpose, in keeping the estate together and operating the farms of the estate, the money was furnished and used. -</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Tarver. Bar-tow superior court. March 31, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Hodges. Clarke superior court. May 26, 1917. :</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Grabam. Sumter superior court. June 1, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Graham. Dodge superior court. November 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Bell. Eultou superior court. March 12, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. December 15, 1916. On the first day of August, 1911, in tbe superior court of Fulton county, a suit was filed against Mrs. M. B. Crawford. James M. Crawford, a brother, three sisters, and the children of a deceased brother, were named as plaintiffs in the suit.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Eite. Bartow superior court. December 9, 1916.</p>

<p>Motion to amend decree; from Muscogee.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Tarver. Walker superior court. February 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Walker. Glascock superior court. April 13, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Hardeman. Washington superior court. June 18, 1917.</p>

<p>The court did not err in giving to the jury the charge complained of; nor in the refusal to charge: nor in ruling out evidence, as complained of. The evidence authorized the verdict.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. November 20, 1916.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. ‘ Before Judge Hardeman. Washington superior court. September 26, 1917.</p>

<p>Motion for new trial. Before Judge Worley. Franklin superior court. November 21, 1916.</p>

<p>Mortgage foreclosure. Before .Judge Cox. Dougherty superior court. November 25, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Munro. Muscogee superior court. December 28, 1916.</p>

<p>Probate of will. Before'Judge George. Dooly superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Smith. DeKalb superior court. March 3, 1917. ■ ■■</p>

<p>Trover. Before Judge Mathews. Houston superior court. February 1, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Littlejohn. Stewart suj -*.or court. March 2, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Crum. Wilcox superior court. March 20, 1917. Brown brought a petition seeking injunction against Doster and others, commissioners of roads and revenues of Wilcox County, and Smith, agent of the county in charge of the .convicts engaged in building public roads; and alleged as follows: The defend- ants are about to lay out a new road which would have the effect of changing the public road from Abbeville to Bochelle.

<p>The trial court erred in dismissing, on general demurrer, the intervention of the plaintiffs in error.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Walker. Lincoln superior court. April 3, 1917. (See 144 Ga. 45.)</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Wright. Chattooga supe-, rior court. March 13, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Thomas.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Cobb. Gwinnett superior court. April 28, 1917.</p>

<p>Mortgage foreclosure. Before Judge Littlejohn. Stewart superior court. May 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus. Before Judge'Hill. Fulton superior court. May 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Douglas.</p>

<p>Indictment for rape. Before Judge Wright. Walker superior court. June 9, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Fulton.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. January 30, 1917.</p>

<p>.Equitable petition. Before Judge Fite. Gordon superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Action for specific performance. Before Judge Mathews. Houston superior court. April 3, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. April 23, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. January 3, 1917.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Hammond. Baldwin superior court. April 18, 1917.</p>

<p>'Indictment; from Quitman superior court.</p>

<p>Intervention;-from Fulton superior court.</p>

<p>1. Where one institutes a habeas-corpus proceeding, and the defendant answers but prays for no affirmative relief, the dismissal of the petition by the plaintiff disposes of the whole case; and a plea of res adjudicata to a subsequent habeas-corpus proceeding by the same plaintiff, based on the former suit, is not sustainable.</p> <p>2. None of the rulings require a reversal of the judgment.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Dougherty superior _ court. ' December 6, 1916.</p>

<p>Attachment for contempt. Before Judge Park. Johnson superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge. Cox. Dougherty superior court. December 30, 1916. Sam Farlcas' died testate on September 13, 1915, leaving an estate consisting of- realty and personalty of the estimated total value of $365,335.40. He left surviving eight children.

<p>. Claim. Before Judge Brand. Jackson superior court. November 17; 1916.</p>

<p>Accusation of misdemeanor. Before J.udge Hicks.' City court of Dublin. October 9, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. ■ Before Judge Hardeman. Emanuel superior court.' January 8, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Morris. Forsyth superior court. March 30, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Howard. Harris superior court. May 28, 1917. J. H. Lynch, and others, as citizens and taxpayers of Harris county, filed an equitable petition against L. W. Stanford and J. C. Blanton, as members of the board of education of the county.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Howard. Harris superior court. May 28, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Coffee superior court.</p>

<p>Partition. Before Judge Hardeman. Screven superior court. June 20, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court. November 33, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hardeman. Bullocli superior court. October 6, 1916.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Thomas. Thomas superior court. December 3, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. November 16, 1916.</p>

<p>The intervention of plaintiffs in error did not set forth a cause of action, and the general demurrers were properly sustained.</p>

<p>The Court of Appeals asked for instructions from the'Supreme Court upon the following questions (Cases 8070, 8071) :</p> <p>“The Board of Drainage Commissioners of Haynes Creek District was duly created a body corporate under and by virtue of the provisions of the act of 1911 (Acts 1911, pp. 108 to 132, inclusive; Park’s Annotated Code, §§.439 (a) et seq.). A, not a petitioner for the creation of such drainage district, owns land within the district, and is served with a summons as required by the .act (Park’s Annotated Code, § 439 (b)). No damage is awarded him by the engineer and the viewers; and no appeal is taken by him to their report, as provided in the act. The district is duly established in strict compliance with the provisions of the act.</p> <p>“1. In such case may A prosecute his common-law action on the case for the value of his land taken, and for any inconvenience imposed, because of the construction of the improvements by the board of drainage commissioners, after the district has been- established, laid out, and the improvements completed; or are the remedies provided in the act exclusive of'all other remedies ?'</p> <p>“2. In such case may A maintain against the board of drainage commissioners, as a body corporate, an action for damage for the negligent construction by the board of drainage commissioners of the improvements authorized to be made by it, where his lands lying within and without the drainage district have been damaged by acts of negligence and negligent omissions on the part of the board and its contractor in making the improvements in the district?”</p>

Injunction. Before Judge Crum. Ben Hill superior court. February 10, 1917.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Graham. Telfair superior court. February 27, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Hammond. Baldwin superior court. March 5, 1917.</p>

App. SB). - Crawford and Culpepper, as receivers of the Bank of Whigham, a banking corporation chartered under the laws of Georgia since the act of 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 70), filed suit against Swicord, a stockholder in -said insolvent bank, on his statutory liability to depositors.

<p>Writ of error; from Bibb superior court.</p>

<p>Authority is vested in the mayor and aldermen of the City of Jackson, under its charter, to provide for th'e registration of voters prior to any municipal election. An election on the question of issuing school bonds was held without providing any system of registration; and therefore no means existed for determining whether two thirds of the qualified voters did in fact cast their votes in favor of the issuance of the bonds. The judgment of'the trial court validating the issuance of such bonds was erroneous.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Madison superior court.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Jones.. White superior court. June 18, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Grady superior court. December 13', 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Harrell. Decatur superior court. January 6, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error;.from Cobb superior court.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Stephens superior court.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. December 8, 1916.</p>

<p>Appeal from probate of will. Before Judge Brand. Banks superior court. January 20, 1917.</p> <p>This was a proceeding to probate the will of A. M. Chandler in solemn form. A caveat was filed; and the issue was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and his judgment was in favor of the propounder. The facts are not in dispute. A. M. Chandler executed his will on November 21, 1885, and died on November 24, 1915. On June 19, 1886, a child (now Mrs. Lillian Meadows) was born to A. M. Chandler. The controlling question is whether the birth of this child revoked the will. So much of the will as is material to the determination of this question is found in the following items:</p> <p>“Item 2. I desire, devise, and direct that at my death that all of the lands that I may die in possession of, without reference to locality or number of acres, be for the benefit, use, and maintenance of my wife, Luisa J. Chandler, and all of the minor children left with me at my death, subject to the following, to wit: the lands named to be worked or-rented especially for the support of my wife and the education of my minor children until the youngest of them becomes of age; then to be sold and equally divided between my wife and all my children.</p> <p>“Item 3. I .desire and direct that all of the personal property that I may have at my death to be used for the same purposes named in the second clause of this my last will, subject to the advancements made by me to my children in my lifetime, to wit: an itemized account of all advancements made so as to make'them as near equal as possible as they become of age.</p> <p>“Item 4. I desire and direct that all of my minor children be sent to school 'at the close of working the crops, until gathering time, until the boys become 18 years of age; then to be sent to school for two years; then set free to act for themselves; the girls to have horse instead of two years’ schooling.</p> <p>“Item 6. In the event of the death of my wife before the last one of my minor children becomes df age, the property named in the second and third clause of my will to remain the same until the last arrives of age, so that they may be supported and educated as directed by me in this my last will.”</p> <p>. A book shown to have been kept by the testator and in his handwriting was put in evidence. On the book appears this sentence: “A list of the itemized accounts of the advancements made by A. M. Chandler to my children, their names being entered on the following pages.” On the following pages appear the names of all his children, followed by the dates of birth and the amount of cash or personal property' advanced to each. The name of Lillian Chandler appears in this list as one of testator’s children, with the entry, “was born June 19, 1886;” and an advancement of $500 is charged to her. The widow of the testator was permitted to testify as follows: “Before my husband made'his will he knew that I was with child. He talked with me about it.” To this evidence counsel for the caveators objected upon the grounds that parol evidence of the intention of the testator is incompetent, and that such communications between husband and wife are inadmissible on the ground of public policy.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. March 2, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. December 11, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Berrien superior court. March 21, 1917. On July 3, 1906, E. A. Shaw executed and delivered to the Mas-see & Eelton Lumber Company a lease conveying timber of a certain description on a described tract of land.

<p>Writ of error; from Berrien superior court.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hardeman. Screven superior court. April 18, 1917.</p>

<p>Appeal from probate of will. Before Judge Tarver. Murray superior court. May 26, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cobb. Walton superior court. May 24, 1917.</p>

<p>Exile for contempt. Before Judge Crum. Ben Hill superior ■ court. June 16, 1917.</p>

<p>Habeas corpus. Before Judge Hill. Fulton superior court. May 81, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Summerall. Ware superior ■court. May 9, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. July 19, 1917.</p>

Petition for injunction. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court, March 31, 1917. Shewmake Brothers Company, a corporation, failed to return certain of its property for State and county taxation for the years 1914 and 1915. In 1916 the tax-collector of Laurens county gave the company written notice to-make returns'of its taxes for the years named. In response the secretary and treasurer of the company made returns of the company’s property for taxation as for 1914 and 1915.

<p>Validation of municipal bonds. Before Judge Harrell. Calhoun superior court. May 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Cox. Dougherty superior court. September 29, 1916.</p>

<p>Accusations of misdemeanors. Before Judge Guerry. City court of Macon. 'November 28, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Searcy. Cobb superior court. April 35, 1917. B. G-.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. January. 31, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for mandamus. Before Judge Wright. Floyd superior court. April 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. April 27, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior ' court. Juné 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. November 17, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition ior injunction. Before Judge Hardeman. Emanuel superior court. February 24, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction; from Fulton. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Hammond. Chatham superior court. December 16, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge George. Wilcox superior court. November 22, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Freeman. Coweta superior court. December 30, 1916.</p>

<p>Certiorari to Court of Appeals (19 Ga. App. 264, 91 S. E. 441).</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. March 10, 1917.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. March 31, 1917.</p> <p>Mrs. J. D. Eordham and others brought ejectment against Mrs. Mary Duggan. The plaintiffs based their case upon the contention that they were the heirs of John Perry Jr. Upon the death-of John Perry, J. J. Bowen was appointed administrator of his estate, and sold the reversionary interest in the land in controversy, on December 8, 1879, at administrator’s sale to Joel T. Coney for $1220. On May 30, 1882, Coney sold the same land back to J. J. Bowen for $1660. The present suit was filed on April 6, 1915. Cynthia, the wife of John Perry, and dowress in the land, died in 1908, dower having been assigned to her in the lands under proceedings regularly instituted in 1879. Bowen, administrator of John Perry, obtained an order from the court of ordinary upon petition reciting that the sale was necessary for the payment of debts and for division. Upon the trial the plaintiffs offered an amendment alleging, that the order granting leave to Bowen, administrator, to sell the dower estate of Mrs. Cynthia Perry was procured by fraud, which consisted of a scheme to obtain title to all the lands belonging to John Perry’s estate; that J. T. Coney, a relative, entered into the scheme to assist him in carrying it out; that at the time of making application for leave to sell it was not necessary to sell any of the land in order to pay debts, nor was it necessary to sell it in order to divide the estate among the heirs; that the land was in fact sold to Bowen himself; that, in pursuance of the fraudulent scheme it was cried off to J. J. Bowen by the auctioneer for the sum of $1200, but in order to effectuate the scheme the land was deeded by the administrator to Coney, in 1879, and subsequently deeded back in 1882 to Bowen, who remained .in possession of the land; and that a certain deed from Cynthia Perry to ten acres of land, dated June 12, 1880, ought also to be delivered up and canceled, because it was obtained by fraud. The court refused to allow the amendment, and directed a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs excepted.</p>

<p>Claim. Before Judge Harrell. Baker superior court. April 14, 1917.</p> <p>B. H. Askew obtained a fi. fa. based on a mortgage given by Thomas Babón on a certain tract of land twenty years previously, and duly recorded. The fi. fa. was levied on the land, and a claim was filed by W. F. Amos, who claimed to have purchased the land from Rabón about eight years before the levy. The claim was in the usual form, without any supplemental or equitable pleadings. Amos on the trial sought to show that Askew was estopped from enforcing his fi. fa. against the land, because he (Askew) had stated to him (Amos) before he bought the land that there was no lien against it; and that Amos had bought it on the faith of áskew’s statement. Askew denied that the mortgage had been paid, or that he had made such statement with reference to the lot of land levied on, insisting that the lot he had stated he had no lien upon was an entirely different lot. Much of the evidence to the above effect was objected to by Askew, on the ground that there were no pleadings to authorize a defense of payment, or of estoppel; and the objections were overruled. The jury returned a verdict for the claimant. The plaintiff made a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and he excepted.</p>

<p>Intervention. Before Judge Crum. Ben Hill superior court. May 5, 1917.</p>

<p>Temporary alimony, etc. Before Judge Sheppard. Evans superior court. November 17, 1916.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. February 15, 1917.</p>

<p>Intervention. Before Judge Worrill. Early superior court. February 2, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. April 11, 1917. W. E. Waits brought his petition against G. B. Powell, A. E. Calhoun, and Lowry Arnold, in which he sought injunctive and other equitable relief.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Eve. Turner superior Court. April 4, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court. April 21, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Sheppard. Liberty superior court. March SO, 1917.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Wright. Chattooga superior court. March 13, 1917.</p>

<p>1. The superior courts of this State have the power to correct errors in inferior judicatories by writ of certiorari, which shall issue only on the sanction of the judge.</p> <p>2. Relatively to the superior court of the Eastern Judicial Circuit, the city court of Savannah is an inferior judicatory, both as to, civil and criminal jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. The writ of certiorari when granted acts as a supersedeas of the judgment until the final determination of the writ.</p> <p>4. Under the facts of this case tlie court did not err in sustaining the writ of habeas corpus, and in discharging the defendant from custody.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Jeff Davis. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Mathews. Houston superior court. May 15, 1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Smith. DeKalb superior court. June 4, 1917.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Glynn. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hammond. Chatham superior court. December 6, 1916.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Walker. Lincoln superior court. August 2, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court. December 16, 1916.</p>

<p>Complaint.. Before Judge West. City court of Athens. November 19, 1915.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Brand. Clarke superior court. January 20, 1917.</p>

<p>1. Where the owner of a vacant city lot entered into a written contract to bnild a storehouse with one who was to become the tenant of the owner, and the contract provided that “It is mutually agreed that any fixtures, additions, or improvements made, added to, or installed in said demised premises by lessee during its occupancy thereof shall be and remain its property, and it shall have the right to remove same at any time, provided any damage occasioned by such removal shall be repaired by lessee at its expense;” and where the landlord and the tenant afterward entered into á supplemental contract, before the main storeroom was completed, which provided that the tenant should furnish the sum of $4,000, for which the landlord agreed to erect, at the same time the main storeroom was constructed, an addition as a “smokehouse,” to be constructed in a specified way, such' addition being necessary for the use of the tenant as an accessory to its “packing-house business,” and such addition was m.ade along with the building of the main room; and where the tenant Went into possession of the premises on completion of the building and used the main room and the “smokehouse” (which was and could be used by the tenant only for smoking meat) until just before the expiration of the lease, when the tenant removed the “smokehouse,” it was error, on the trial of a suit brought by the landlord to recover damages for the removal, for the court to instruct the jury: “I charge you as the law of the case, under the facts that are in evidence, that [the tenant] did not have a legal right to remove the smokehouse; that under the facts in evidence, and under the law, that the smokehouse was the property of [the landlord], and therefore when [the tenant] moved the smokehouse, were without and beyond their legal rights in doing so; and the only question therefore left in the case is, what amount [the landlord] was damaged in a legal sense, what damage is he entitled to recover in this suit by reason of the removal from the premises of that structure, or that part of the structure known as the smokehouse.”</p> <p>{a) Such smokehouse was a “trade-fixture,” and could be removed as such.</p> <p>(6) Giving the two contracts a reasonable construction, it was the intention of both parties that the smokehouse was to be treated as a trade-fixture, and that it could be removed by the tenant before the expiration of its term.</p> <p>(c) The landlord can recover of the tenant such structural damages, if any, as accrued to the main building by the removal of the trade-fixture by the tenant.</p>

<p>Certiorari to Court of Appeals (Case 7646, 19 Ga. App. 453).</p>

<p>Injunction and interpleader. Before Judge Wright. Floyd superior court. March 29, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. April 10, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Kent. Pulaski superior court.' March 31, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction and receivership. Before Judge Crum. Wilcox superior court. April 7, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Kent. Laurens superior court. April 30, 1917.</p>

<p>1. Where a deed is signed with the name of a domestic corporation and by its president and secretary, and. its corporate seal is affixed, and only the signature of the secretary is properly attested, that signature with the seal afford prima facie evidence that the deed has been duly-executed by authority of the corporation. A deed so signed, sealed, and attested is admissible to record, and such record is notice to subsequent purchasers of the property conveyed by the deed.</p> <p>'2. Under the facts, of this case the court did not. err in not submitting to the jury the question of prescription as a basis of defense. Prescription, under the evidence, was not well founded.</p> <p>3. The evidence demanded the verdict. Therefore the fact that one of the jurors who tried the case was related to one of the parties within the prohibited degrees will not require a new trial.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Worrill. . Miller superior court. May 19, 1917.</p> <p>W. A. Pickron and, others, as the children of Mrs. Kitty Pickron and her only heirs at law, brought their petition against Mrs. Sallie Pickron as administratrix of S. L. Pickron, and against B. A. Phillips, alleging as follows: Mrs. Kitty Pickron owned a certain house and lot in Early county, of the value of $1500. In the fall of the year 1901 she consented to swap this property to B. A. Phillips, for the south half of lot of land 40 in the 13th district of Miller county, “which said trade and exchange was consunamated on October 25, 1901; and that the husband of the said Mrs. Kitty Pickron, S. L. Pickron, acted for her in the consummation and negotiation of said trade and exchange.” Mrs. Kitty Pickron was illiterate and could not read or write, and entrusted to her husband the making of the exchange of the two pieces of property and “to have the deeds to the said land in Miller county made to her and at her death to her children; but, instead of doing so, the said S. L. Pickron had the defendant B. A. Phillip's to make the deed to said land in Miller county, above described, to himself; . . and that as soon as the said Mrs. Kitty Pickron discovered that the deed was not made to her, she at once protested, and S. L. Pickron promised her that he would make a deed to her to said land, and afterwards told her that he had done so, causing Mrs. Kitty Pickron to believe that the title to said-land was in her, which she relied upon and continued to believe as long as she lived.” While the deed to the Miller county property recites a consideration of $470 paid, S. L. Pickron paid nothing to the grantor, but the sole consideration was the deed of Mrs. Kitty Pickron conveying to Phillips the Early county property, of which she was the sole owner, and in which her husband had no interest. Petitioners, as the heirs at law of their mother, have the legal as well as the equitable title to the Miller county land, and they are now in possession of 62% acres of said land. Mrs. Kitty Pickron died in 1903, and thereafter S. L. Pickron remarried. He died in 1916, and after his death his widow, Mrs; Sallie Pickron, and her children moved away from the land, leaving petitioners in possession thereof; “but before the death of S. L. Pickron he sold to one of your petitioners, J. C. Pickron, 62% acres of land, which was paid for by the said J. C. Pickron to the said S. L. Pickron, and the said J. C. Pickron was immediately put in possession of the same and continued in possession up to the present date.” Mrs. Sallie Pickron was appointed administratrix upon the estate of S. L. Pickron; and she, alleging that the 62% acres of land “is the remaining one half after selling the land above referred to” to J. C. Pickron, has applied for an order to sell said land for the purpose of distribution among the heirs of S. L. Pickron, which order has been granted by the ordinary of Miller county, and the land is advertised to he sold on the first Tuesday in February, 1917. Petitioners are in adverse possession, claiming title to the land, and the administratrix is seeking to sell it without first recovering possession thereof. There was no administration upon the estate of Mrs. Kitty Pickron, and she died intestate; and there is no guardian for the minor plaintiffs, for whom S. B. Pickron sues as next friend. Petitioners pray: for process; that the deed from Phillips to S. L. Pickron be delivered up and canceled, “or that the same may be reformed by making Mrs. Kitty Pickron, or your petitioners as her heirs at law, the grantee therein; that the title to said land described in said deed be decreed in your petitioners as the heirs at law of Mrs. Kitty Pickron, deceased, and not in S. L. Pickron;” that Mrs. Sallie Pickron be enjoined from selling the land; and for general relief. The defendants filed demurrers, general and special, to the petition, which were overruled, and the defendants excepted.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. May 8, 1917. In the superior court of Fulton county James R. Brown, on July 8, 1914, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, filed his petition in equity against the Empire Life Insurance Company. He prayed for injunction, receiver, and other equitable relief against the defendant. Various amendments to the petition were filed, and demurrers and answers were filed hy the defendant.

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Thomas. Brooks superior court. May 16, 191T.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Sheppard. Effingham superior court. May 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition; intervention. Before Hal Lawson, judge pro hac vice. Ben Hill superior court. May 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Walker. Wilkes superior court. June 4, 1917.</p>

■ Equitable petition; intervention. Before Judge Ellis. Eulton superior court. May 7, 1917. The Whitney Company (incorporated 1902) entered into a contract with the Empire Life Insurance Company to construct an office building for the latter company at Augusta, Georgia.

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. June 23, 1917.</p>

<p>For the reasons stated in the opinion, the court erred in rejecting the evidence as complained of, and in granting a nonsuit.</p>

<p>Claim. Before. Judge Pendleton. Milton superior court. August 22, 1917.</p>

<p>. Motion to set aside judgment. Before Judge Hammond. Burke superior court. October 11, 1917.</p>

<p>Attachment for contempt: Before Judge Munro. Taylor superior court. November 11, 1916.</p>

Equitable petition. . Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. March 6, 1917. Barnes Construction Company filed a petition seeking equitable relief, the appointment of a receiver, and the establishment of the ■ priority of certain liens, and named B. T. Adams and the Missouri State Life Insurance Company as defendants. Lawton, Jordan-& Company, a corporation, having been adjudicated a bankrupt, was not named as a defendant.

<p>Attachment for contempt. Before Judge Smith. Clayton superior court. March 2, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Hammond. Columbia superior court. May 7, 1917.</p>

<p>Actions to recover land. Before Judge Ellis. DeKalb superior court. May 3, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Worley. Oglethorpe superior court. November 25, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Freeman. Troup superior court. December 9, 191.6. W. B. Meetze died in September, 1912.

Appeal. Before Judge Freeman. Troup superior court. December 29, 1916. On August 22, 1914, J. Wid Freeman, through his attorneys, filed his petition, to the court of ordinary of Troup county for pro-hate in solemn form of the last will and testament of James G. Young, who had died on August 20, 1914. Citation was duly issued, and order for service granted. The heirs of the testator were his wife and eight children.

<p>Quo warranto. Before Judge Wright. Floyd superior court. April 28, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. April 28, 1917. In 1890 Mrs. Mary E. Shi, upon application, was appointed administratrix of the estate of her husband, T. F. Shi. Permanent letters of administration were issued to her, and she gave bond as administratrix, with D. G-. McCowen as surety. The administratrix and four children were the distributees of the estate.

Complaint for land. Before Judge Hammond. Richmond superior court. June 20, 1917. A testatrix died in 1868. She bequeathed a certain lot of land ■ in the city of Augusta to a trustee for the use of Julia Euphemia Brooks (afterwards Graham) during life, with remainder over to her children, but if she should die without leaving child or children, then in trust for other designated persons and their children.

<p>Writ of error; from Fulton. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Equitable petition; intervention. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeff Davis superior court. December 15, 1'916.</p> <p>The State of Georgia through its attorney-general filed its petition against the Farmers State Bank, a banking corporation of Hazlehurst, Jeff Davis County (hereinafter referred to as the State Bank), showing that on February 3, 1914, this corporation placed ■its affairs and assets under the control of the State Bank Examiner. It was alleged in the petition that after investigation it was ascertained that the banking corporation could not resume business and liquidate its indebtedness. The appointment of a receiver was prayed; and accordingly Haynes was appointed as receiver. Subsequently A. P. Hilton, as receiver of the Bank of Rentz, presented his intervention, which he was allowed to file, and in which certain ■ alleged indebtedness of the Farmers State Bank to the Bank of Rentz was shown, it being evidenced by notes (copies of which were attached to the intervention) aggregating about $11,000; and judgment was prayed for their amount. They purported to have been executed in the name of the State Bank by George F. Armstrong Cashier. The receiver of the State Bank demurred to the intervention, and the demurrer was overruled. By plea and answer it was alleged, that the notes were not the acts of the State Bank, for that George F. Armstrong was not authorized to execute them for and on behalf of the bank; that they were without consideration; that the Bank of Rentz paid no consideration therefor, and the State Bank had received no benefit therefrom. The issues thus made were referred to an auditor, who heard the case and, on November 13, 19Í6, filed his report containing his findings of law and of fact, together with the evidence taken in the case. Within twenty days from the filing of this report the intervenor filed exceptions of law and fact, which were overruled. The intervenor made a motion to recommit, which the court denied. He made a motion for a continuance,, and this also was'Overruled. He insisted that his exceptions of fact should be tried by a jury; the court ruled adversely to this contention, and, after the hearing, overruled all of the exceptions of law and of fact. To these rulings the intervenor excepted; and he assigned error upon the overruling of certain specified exceptions to the auditor’s report.</p>

<p>Certiorari to Court of Appeals (Case No. 8243, 19 Ga. App. 495).</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Park. Hancock superior court. February 17, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. March 19, 1917.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Worrill. Early superior court. April 2, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Park. Oreene superior court. April 28, 1917. The administrators of L. J. Boswell filed an equitable petition in Greene superior court, against the administrator of B. P. Boswell, the S. M. Whitney Company, a copartnership, the GeorgiaElorida Trust Company, a corporation, and George K. Johnson and John W. Hamer, trustees, the last two being non-residents of the State.

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Jones. Habersham superior court. May 4=, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction and receivership. Before Judge Graham. Pulaski superior court. June 14, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition to construe will. Before Judge Bell. Fulton superior court. May 25,- 1917.</p>

<p>1. The demurrer to the petition, raising the question of the jurisdiction of the superior court of the county in which the suit'was brought, was properly overruled.</p> <p>2. The court erred in ruling that the defendant, the administrator whose removal was sought by the petition, was incompetent to testify to transactions between himself and the intestate.</p> <p>3. No valid reason for the failure to produce the originals of certain recorded mortgages and notes having been shown by the party offering them, the court erred in admitting certified copies of the documents in evidence over the objection that the originals were the highest and best evidence and should be produced.</p> <p>4. The application for appointment of the- party whose removal from the office of administrator is sought does not show on its face a want of jurisdictional facts, so as to authorize the court to hold that his appointment was void as a matter of law. Whether or not he was in fact a creditor and therefore qualified to act as administrator may be made to appear on the next trial.</p>

<p>1. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the court to give to the jury the definition of a principal in the second degree, and in doing so the court did not charge in such way as to mislead or confuse the jury.</p> <p>2. “Statements made by a defendant charged with murder, that he did the killing charged because of certain facts which if true furnished no legal excuse or justification therefor, amount to a confession.” The statements made by the defendant in the present case were of that character.</p> <p>3. On the hearing of a motion for a new trial, one of the grounds being alleged incompetency or disqualification of one of the jurors trying the case, on account of alleged bias and prejudice against the accused, the judge is the trior of that issue; and where in such case the evidence is conflicting, his discretion in refusing a new trial on that ground will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly abused. Such discretion was properly exercised in the present case.</p> <p>4. The other grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit, and the court did not err in overruling the motion.</p>

<p>Petition for mandamus. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. July 17, 1917.</p> <p>This ease was submitted to the court below upon an agreed statement of facts, substantially as follows: On May 1, 1913, the plaintiff loaned Shelby Smith $300. Smith executed a-promissory note in the usual form, which recited the pledge of certificate No. 15 for three shares of the capital stock of the East Atlanta Bank as collateral, and executed on the back of the certificate a blank power of attorney authorizing transfer of the stock on the books of the bank. This loan was renewed from time to time, the last note therefor being dated August 33, 1914. Smith was indebted to plaintiff on two other promissory notes which were not secured. Plaintiff sued Smith and procured judgment in the city court of Atlanta for the aggregate amount due on all three of the notes. Fi. fa. issued and was levied on the three shares of stock above referred to. After the pledging of this stock by Smith with plaintiff, but prior to the time of suit and judgment, Smith became indebted to East Atlanta Bank, which indebtedness has not been paid. At the sheriff’s sale of the stock under the fi. fa. above referred to, East Atlanta Bank gave notice to all bidders of the fact that Smith was indebted to it in an amount exceeding the par value of the stock, and that it claimed the purchaser would take such stock subject to its lien under the following by-law: “This bank reserves a first lien on the shares of its stock to the extent of any indebtedness to this bank by its stockholders, whether such indebtedness is due or to become due, and whether the stockholders be makers, endorsers or guarantors.” With this notice plaintiff bid the stock in at $40 per share and had the amount of its bid credited upon its fi. fa. against Smith. Plaintiff. demanded of East Atlanta Bank the transfer of said stock on its books, which was refused. It then applied to the superior court for writ of mandamus to compel the transfer, which was denied, to which ruling it excepted.</p> <p>Defendants contended, that, the debt secured by the pledge of the stock having been merged in the judgment with other indebtedness, and the judgment having been procured after the time when its by-law lien attached, plaintiff was not entitled to a transfer of the stock until the indebtedness of Smith to East Atlanta Bank had been discharged. ✓</p>

<p>Complaint. Before Judge Bartlett. Haralson superior court. July 2, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction, etc. Before Judge Mathews. Appling superior court. August 1, 1917.</p>

<p>Where an illegitimate child is received, when an infant, by the putative father into his home under a contract with the mother to adopt the child and make him an heir at law, and where the father recognizes the child as his son until and after the child’s majority, and the child fully performs all the duties of a son to the father, but the contract does not amount to a legal adoption, and no steps are taken by the child in his lifetime to have the contract specifically enforced, his heirs at law (he having predeceased the father) can not maintain a petition in equity to have the contract specifically performed and to recover the estate of the father, consisting wholly of personalty. The right of action as for a breach of contract or the specific performance of it, if any, on the death of such adopted child, vests in and passes to his personal representative, and not to his heirs at law.</p>

<p>Writ of error; from Fulton. Motion to dismiss.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Crum. Irwin superior court. July 21, 1917.</p>

<p>Injunction. Before Judge Wriglit. Floyd superior court. October 17, 1917.</p>

Equitable petition. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. November 28, 1917.

<p>Temporary alimony, etc. Before Judge Hodges. Oglethorpe superior court. July 2, 1917.</p> <p>Fred Long filed a libel for divorce against his wife, Millie Long, based upon the charge of the commission of the offense of adultery by the wife. The prayers were, for a total divorce, and for the custody of the child of the marriage. The wife filed an answer and cross-petition, denying the allegation that she had been guilty of adultery and other misconduct, and praying.that she be awarded the custody of the child and be allowed temporary and permanent alimony and attorney’s fees. The petition for temporary alimony and attorney’s fees came on for a hearing on June 23, 1917, when, after hearing evidence, the court refused the temporary alimony and attorney’s fees, but allowed the wife to retain custody of the child until the first day of the September term, 1917, of the superior court, and ordered the plaintiff to pay to the ordinary of the county the sum of $10 per month for the support of the child up to the named date in September. The defendant excepted to each of these rulings.</p>

<p>Questions certified by Court of Appeals (Case No. 7980).</p> <p>The rulings announced in the headnotes were made in answer to questions (hereafter stated) propounded by the Court of Appeals, involved in the case upon the following facts: .“The action was one brought against a sheriff and his bondsmen, wherein it was shown: that in a suit by Mattie E. Eahn against Charles W. Eahn, for divorce and alimony, both temporary and permanent alimony were allowed, and that, contemporaneously with the filing of the petition for divorce and alimony, the writ of ne exeat was granted in the following order of the court, to wit: ‘The foregoing' petition appearing to be duly' verified, and it further appearing that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law, and that the departure of said defendant will immediately occur unless he' is stayed, it is considered, ordered, and adjudged that the writ of ne exeat respublica be and the same is hereby granted, and said defendant is hereby stayed from departing beyond the jurisdictional limits of this court until it is further ordered herein. . . Let bond in the penal sum of $720 be taken from the defendant in terms of the statute;’ that upon the granting of this order the clerk of the court issued a writ directed to the sheriff, requiring him ‘to arrest the body of said Chas. W. Eahn, and, being arrested, to safely keep him until he enters into bond and security, in the said sum of $720, not to depart the State without the order of said court, and conditioned to pay any judgment that may be found against him in favor of his wife, Mattie E. Eahn; in default thereof, to confine him in the common jail of said county, according to the statutes in such cases made and provided;’ that in response to this writ- the sheriff ‘did not require said defendant Eahn to give the ne exeat bond as directed by the judge of said superior court, but did arrest the said defendant, and, after having him in his custody, did permit him to escape and remain away from the jurisdiction of said court from the 27th day of August, 1913, until this date,’ and, ‘because of the fact that the said defendant, Charles' W. Eahn, was not required to execute the ne exeat bond as ordered, and because of the fact that he was permitted to escape- and go beyond the jurisdiction of this court and so to remain, that his wife and child have been unable to force him to comply with the judgments of said court granting temporary and permanent alimony, but the said [sheriff] W. A. Jaudon was informed, on the 30th day of September, 1914, that said defendant Kahn was at Soperton in this State, working with his brother W. A. Kahn, that he was then advised to arrest him and lodge him in jail in obedience to the writ of ne exeat in said case, but so to do said Jaudon wholly failed and refused, and still does fail and refusebut no averment was made as to any negligence on the part of the sheriff in permitting the escape, nor was there any allegation showing that the husband owned property of' any sort, or that he would have been able to pay any portion of the alimony decreed against him had he been confined as required,. nor was there any averment showing money loss suffered by reason of the act complained of, except as already set forth. The petition was dismissed on general demurrer.</p> <p>"1. (a) Could the writ issued, under the facts alleged in that proceeding, have lawfully required a bond for appearance only?</p> <p>"(b) If, under the averments made, the writ was irregular, in that it required the taking of a bond not only, for the personal appearance of the husband, but conditioned also upon the payment of the judgment in the suit for alimony, could the husband have been lawfully arrested thererinder?</p> <p>“(c) If the writ was irregular for the reason stated, could the sheriff in this suit avail himself of such irregularity, or is he bound by its requirements?</p> <p>“(d) Does the fact that it appears that the husband did not remove himself beyond the limits of the State affect the rights of the plaintiff? .</p> <p>“ (e) In a suit of this character, are the damages to be measured by the loss sustained; and if so, does the fact that the petition fails to show that any property was or had been owned by the husband render it subject to general demurrer?</p> <p>“2. Has the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to pass upon the writ of error herein, under the amendment to section 2 of article 6 of the constitution, adopted in 1916, providing that 'The Court of Appeals shall have jurisdiction for-the trial and correction of errors of law from the superior courts, and from the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah and such other like courts as have been or may hereafter be established in other cities, in all cases in which such jurisdiction has not been conferred by this constitution upon the Supreme Court, and in such other cases as may hereafter be prescribed by law;’ the amendment having first provided that ‘The Supreme Court shall have no original jurisdiction, but shall be a court alone for the trial and correction of errors of law from the superior courts, and the city courts of Atlanta and Savannah and such other like courts as have been or may hereafter be established in other cities, in all cases that involve the construction of the constitution of the State of Georgia or of the United States, or of treaties between the United States and foreign governments; in all cases in which the constitutionality of any law of the State of Georgia or of the United States is drawn in question; and, until otherwise provided by law, in all cases respecting title to land; in all equity cases; in all cases which involve the validity of, or the construction of wills; in all cases of conviction of a capital felony; in all habeas-corpus cases; in all cases involving extraordinary remedies/ etc.”?</p>

Injunction. Before Judge Pendleton. Fulton superior court. July 17, 1017. By an act of the General Assembly (Acts 1908, p. 555) the Board of Education of the City of College Park was created, and a system of public schools was authorized within its limits.

<p>Questions certified by Court of Appeals (Case No. 8299).</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Crum. Wilcox superior court. August 4, 1917.</p>

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Worrill. Decatur superior court. August 11, 1917.</p>

<p>1. A public officer takes his office cum onere, and so long as he retains it he undertakes to perform its duties for the compensation fixed, whether such duties be increased or diminished. He can not claim extra compensation for the performance of additional work within the line of his official duties, unless additional compensation is provided by competent authority.</p> <p>2. A member of the flood commission of the City of Augusta can not legally contract with the commission for the performance of duties which, as a member of such commission and as commissioner of public works for the City of Augusta and ex-officio city engineer, it is made his official duty to superintend and supervise on behalf of the city. Such a ■ contract is contrary to public policy and illegal. The court erred in refusing an interlocutory injunction.</p>

<p>Equitable petition. Before Judge Hodges. Madison superior court. July 25, 1917.</p>

Writ of error; from Clinch. Motion to dismiss. The judge’s certificate to the bill of exceptions in this case bears date March 28, 1917. The defendants in error were served on March 27, 1917. They moved to dismiss the writ of error on the ground, among others, that they were served before the certification by the judge, and that this was no such service as the law requires.

<p>Habeas corpus. Before Judge Hill. Fulton superior court. September 6, 1917.</p>

<p>Construction of will. Before Judge Terrell. Carroll superior court. October 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Question certified by Court of Appeals (Case No. 9440).</p>

Injunction. Before Judge Thomas. Colquitt superior court. May 26, 1917. On April 28, 1917, a distress warrant was issued in favor of W. H. Barber against Hutchings & Pinckard. This was levied on a stock of merchandise then in the possession of. the defendants and situated at Moultrie, Georgia.

<p>Ejectment. Before Judge Highsmith. Jeff Davis superior court. May 7, 1917.</p>

Writ of error; from Haralson. Motion to dismiss. On January 15, 1915, Mrs. N. I. Wood filed her petition against her husband, T. J. Wood, asking for temporary and permanent alimony and counsel fees. An order to show cause was granted, and the ease was set down for a hearing on February 22, 1915; and on that day after the hearing the court passed an order allowing certain sums as temporary alimony ahd the sum of $20 as counsel fees.

<p>Petition for direction. Before Judge Walker. Lincoln superior court. July 21,1917.</p>

<p>Complaint for land. Before Judge Mathews. Bibb superior court. August 6, 1917.</p>

<p>Questions certified by Court of Appeals (Case No. 9074).</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Ellis. Fulton superior court. July 13, 1917.</p>

<p>Petition for injunction. Before Judge Highsmith. Glynn superior court. October 12, 1917.</p>

<p>Motion for new trial. Before Judge Meldrim. Chatham superior court. May 24, 1917.</p>

<p>Indictment for murder. Before Judge Hill. Fulton superior court. November’ 10, 1917.</p>

<p>Partition, etc. Before Judge Kent. Twiggs superior court. November 1, 1917.</p>