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147 Mass. 15

Willard v. Lavender

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1888-05-04

Petition to the Probate Court by Joseph Willard and Charles Steere, counsellors at law, alleging that they were counsel for Lizzie H. Orrok, a minor; that they had rendered professional services in her behalf according to an account annexed to the petition; and praying that Stephen Lavender, the guardian of her estate, might be ordered to pay to them the amount of their account from the estate.

Relies on Brown v. Corey

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1888-05-04

How this case has been cited

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently January 2010

11 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Morton, C. J.

¶1The statute provides that, “in cases contested either before a probate court or before the Supreme Court of Probate, costs in the discretion of the court may be awarded to either party, to be paid by the other, or to either or both parties to be paid out of the estate which is the subject of the controversy, as justice and equity may require.” Pub. Sts. c. 156, § 85. After the decision in Brown v. Corey, 134 Mass. 249, this was amended by inserting after the word “ costs ” the words “ and expenses.” St. 1884, c. 131.

¶2The purpose of the amendment was to give the courts of probate power, in contested cases, to award to either party costs as between solicitor and client, and the expenses of the suit to be paid by the adverse party, or out of the estate, in the discretion of the court, in analogy to proceedings in equity on bills for instructions by executors or trustees. The statute does not apply to the ease at bar.

¶3The petitioners’ claim is a common law claim for professional services rendered by them for the infant ward. A portion of *17the claim is for services rendered in proceedings in the Probate Court, and a portion for services in independent proceedings in the Supreme Judicial Court. Their proper remedy is by a suit at law against the ward, or upon the guardian’s bond. Conant v. Kendall, 21 Pick. 36. Hicks v. Chapman, 10 Allen, 463.

¶4Their petition does not ask for an award under the statute to the ward, of costs and expenses, but is an independent proceeding in their own names to compel the guardian to pay their account out of the estate. The decree of the Probate Court does not purport to be a decree for costs and expenses in proceedings before that court, but is an adjudication that the guardian shall pay the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars in full for services rendered by the petitioners on account of the ward.

¶5The Probate Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, or to make such adjudication.

¶6The record before us does not disclose clearly the nature of the proceedings before the Probate Court, and we cannot now consider whether at their termination the Probate Court can make an allowance to the ward of costs and expenses, to be paid by the guardian out of the estate.

¶7Decree of the Probate Court reversed.

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