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147 Mass. 212

Sherry v. Perkins

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1888-06-19

Bill in equity, filed April 20, 1887, alleging that the first-named plaintiff was engaged in the business of manufacturing boots and shoes in Lynn, and that he had admitted the other plaintiffs, who were in his employment as operatives, to share in the profits of the business; that there was a voluntary association in Lynn called the Lasters’ Protective Union, composed of persons engaged in lasting boots and shoes, of which the first-named defendant was the president, and…

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““The wrong is not, as argued by the defendant’s counsel, a libel upon tile plaintiff’s business. It is not found that the inscriptions upon the banner were false, nor do they appear to have been in disparagement of the plaintiff’s business. The scheme in pursuance of which the banners were 'displayed or maintained was to injure, plaintiff’s business, not by defaming it to the public, but by intimidating workmen so as to deter them from keeping or making engagements with the plaintiff. The banner was a standing menace to all who were or wished to be in the employment of the plaintiff to deter them from entering plaintiff’s premises. Maintaining it was a eontin nous unlawful act, injurious to plaintiff’s business and property, and was a nuisance such as a court of equity will grant relief against.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cœur d'Alene Consolidated & Mining Co. v. Miners' Union

Relies on Walker v. Cronin · Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manufacturing Co.

Cited in Bouvier (1914)’s definition of “Labor Union” · Bouvier (1914)’s definition of “Picketing”

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1888-06-19

How this case has been cited

Cited by 69 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 1947 · most notably Truax v. Corrigan (1921), Samuel Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Company

5 federal appellate · 44 state decisions — followed in 16 states

2401888189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

W. Allen, J.

¶1The case finds that the defendants entered, . with others, into a scheme, by threats and intimidation, to prevent persons in the employment of the plaintiffs from continuing in such employment, and to prevent others from entering into such employment; that the banners with their inscriptions were *214used by the defendants as part of the scheme; and that the plaintiffs were thereby injured in their business and property.

¶2The act of displaying banners with devices, as a means of threats and intimidation to prevent persons from entering into or continuing in the employment of the plaintiffs, was injurious to the plaintiffs, and illegal at common law and by statute. Pub. Sts. c. 74, § 2. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555. We think that the plaintiffs are not restricted to their remedy by an action at law, but are entitled to relief by injunction. The acts and the injury were continuous. The banners were used more than three months before the filing of the plaintiffs’ bill, and continued to be used at the time of the hearing. The injury was to the plaintiffs’ business, and adequate remedy could not be given by damages in a suit at law.

¶3The wrong is not, as argued by the defendants’ counsel, a libel upon the plaintiffs’ business. It is not found that the inscriptions upon the banners were false, nor do they appear to have been in disparagement of the plaintiffs’ business. The scheme in pursuance of which the banners were displayed and maintained was to injure the plaintiffs’ business, not by defaming it to the public, but by intimidating workmen, so as to deter them from keeping or making engagements with the plaintiffs. The banner was a standing menace to all who were or wished to be in the employment of the plaintiffs, to deter them from entering the plaintiffs’ premises. Maintaining it was a continuous unlawful act, injurious to the plaintiffs’ business and property, and was a nuisance such as a court of equity will grant relief against. Gilbert v. Mickle, 4 Sandf. Ch. 357. Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551.

¶4Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf. Co. 114 Mass. 69, was a case of defamation only. Some of the language in Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley has been criticised, but the decision has not been overruled. See Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf. Co., ubi supra; Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 142; Saxby v. Easterbrook, 3 C. P. D. 339; Thorley's Cattle Food Co. v. Massam, 14 Ch. D. 763; Thomas v. Williams, 14 Ch. D. 864; Day v. Brownrigg, 10 Ch. D. 294; Gaskin v. Balls, 13 Ch. D. 324; Hill v. Davies, 21 Ch. D. 798; Hermann Loog v. Bean, 26 Ch. D. 306.

¶5Becree for the plaintiffs.

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