147 Md. App. 113 - State v. Riley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 18 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Let one critically different fact be established, however, and the burdens shift dramatically.... When the State has procured evidence of guilt via the disfavored or non-preferred modality of a warrantless search, it is the State that suffers the disincentive of a presumption of invalidity. It is the State that then must assume the burden of rebutting that presumption of invalidity and of proving that the warrantless search was somehow justified under one of the “jealously guarded” exceptions to the warrant requirement. The reversible tilt of the playing field is clear. If it is established that a search was pursuant to a judicially issued warrant but the record is utterly silent as to the justification for the warrant, the State enjoys a presumption as to its validity and the defendant, having failed to carry the burden of rebuttal, loses the nothing-to-nothing tie. If, on the other hand, it is established that the search was warrantless and the' record is utterly silent as to the justification for the wanuntless search, the defendant enjoys a presumption as to its invalidity and the State, having failed to carry its burden of rebuttal, loses that nothing-to-nothing tie.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 153 Md. App. 601 - Fitzgerald v. State

2. ““If at the time he or she is applying for a search warrant, a law enforcement officer believes that the circumstances under which the warrant will be executed justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, the officer should seek no-knock authorization from the warrant issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied that the request for a no-knock entry is reasonable, the judge should include in the warrant a mandate that, in substantially the following form, provides: ‘Good cause being shoum therefor, the executing law enforcement officers are authorized to enter the premises to be searched without giving notice of their authority and purpose.’ “Moreover, when they apply for no-knock authorization in a search warrant, law enforcement officers do not have to include in the affidavit the kind of search scene case-specific, particularized circumstances of exigency that they would have to establish during the suppression hearing if they did not have a no-knock provision in the warrant and made the no-knock entry determination on their own.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Carroll

3. “The principle controlling our decision is that neither the appellate court nor the suppression hearing court is authorized to make the decision on the merits .... That decision was delegated exclusively to the judge who was called upon to include that provision in the warrant. The limited after-the-fact review permitted either the circuit court or the appellate court requires that the reviewing judges transcend any personal opinion as to what they, coincidentally, might have decided on the merits and concern themselves exclusively with whether the warrant-issuing judge had some rational basis for reaching the decision he did. The focus ... should be only on the legitimacy of another judge’s prior decision in that regard.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 178 Md. App. 156 - State v. Jenkins