147 Vt.
Volume 147 — Vermont Reports
141 opinions
- 147 Vt. 1Larose v. Agway, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 4Molesworth v. University of Vermont (1986)
- 147 Vt. 7In re J. R. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 11Harman v. Rogers (1986)
- 147 Vt. 20Russo v. Griffin (1986)
- 147 Vt. 26In re D. P. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 34In re J. R (1986)
- 147 Vt. 36In re L. S. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 41In re M. B. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 45State v. Begins (1986)
- 147 Vt. 49State v. Hoadley (1986)
- 147 Vt. 56State v. Knapp (1986)
- 147 Vt. 60State v. O'CONNELL (1986)
- 147 Vt. 67Bodenstein v. State (1986)
- 147 Vt. 70Weisburgh v. Mahady (1986)
- 147 Vt. 74Green Mountain Fence Co. v. Vigario (1986)
- 147 Vt. 77State v. Collins (1986)
- 147 Vt. 79In re Sparkman (1986)
- 147 Vt. 82In re Guardianship of L. B. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 85Merrimack Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Liv-Mar, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 90Rodrigue v. Biron (1986)
- 147 Vt. 93State v. Day (1986)
- 147 Vt. 98State v. Dreibelbis (1986)
- 147 Vt. 101In Re Estate of Hogg (1986)
- 147 Vt. 105International Collection Service, Inc. v. Gibbs (1986)
- 147 Vt. 108State v. Carroll (1986)
- 147 Vt. 116State v. Pratt (1986)
- 147 Vt. 120Poulin v. Ford Motor Co. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 128Chomicky v. Buttolph (1986)
- 147 Vt. 133State v. Tedesco (1986)
- 147 Vt. 140State v. Bushey (1986)
<bold>1. Criminal Law — Insanity Defense — Sanity Examination</bold> Under <cross_reference>13 V.S.A. § 4814</cross_reference>(a)(3), if trial court believes there is doubt as to defendant's sanity, it has authority to order sanity examination of defendant regardless of whether defendant has raised insanity defense. <bold>2. Criminal Law — Insanity Defense — Sanity Examination</bold> Title <cross_reference>13 V.S.A. § 4816</cross_reference>(b) does not differentiate between court-ordered sanity examination and one requested by defendant; it simply provides that psychiatrist's report shall be transmitted to trial court, state's attorney, and defendant's attorney; since statute contemplates that report of court-compelled sanity examination be sent to State, releasing report to State is not violation of statute. <bold>3. Constitutional Law — Self-Incrimination — Sanity Examination</bold> Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in compelled pretrial psychiatric examinations; however, since defendant did not show that his conviction was in any way product of psychiatric evaluation, he did not show due process violation. <bold>4. Courts — Contempt — Discretion of Trial Court</bold> Under existing criminal rule, V.R.Cr.P. 16.2(g), and at common law, trial court possesses discretion to cite and punish for civil contempt for violation of<page_number>Page 141</page_number> valid court orders; trial court did not abuse its discretion in threatening both defendant and counsel with unlimited imprisonment for contempt if defendant refused to attend compelled psychiatric examination, although more preferable method would be to exclude any testimony offered by defendant on issue of insanity as provided in V.R.Cr.P. 12.1(e). <bold>5. Evidence — Expert Opinion — Sanity</bold> Where defense expert's testimony did not concern expert's opinion regarding defendant's legal sanity, trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering jury to disregard defense expert's unresponsive answer; where State's expert did not testify as to his opinion regarding defendant's legal sanity but merely gave his approach to how he views issue of defining mental illness, trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony of State's expert. <bold>6. Criminal Law — Insanity Defense — Mental Condition After</bold> <bold>Offense</bold> Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding any testimony regarding defendant's mental condition during treatment after night of offense, for probative value of evidence of post-offense mental condition may have been outweighed by concerns listed in <italic>State</italic> v. <italic>Bevins,</italic> <cross_reference>140 Vt. 415</cross_reference>, 419, <cross_reference>439 A.2d 271</cross_reference>, 272 (1981); further, defendant failed to show he suffered prejudice from alleged error. <bold>7. Criminal Law — Conduct of Trial Judge — Prejudice to Accused</bold> Since defendant failed to show that trial judge's interruptions of defense counsel during his examination of witnesses and during closing argument resulted in any prejudice to him, trial court did not abuse its discretion or deny defendant due process. <bold>8. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Discretion of Trial Court</bold> Due process requires sentence to be based on activity for which defendant has been charged and convicted; further, judge may consider circumstances surrounding offense; since trial court sentenced defendant within limits of law, defendant showed no abuse of trial court's discretion.
- 147 Vt. 148Barretto Granite Corp. v. State (1986)
- 147 Vt. 151Tatro v. Lehouiller (1986)
- 147 Vt. 154Cleverly v. Cleverly (1986)
- 147 Vt. 160Roberts v. State (1986)
- 147 Vt. 174In re G. K. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 180In Re Pernicka (1986)
- 147 Vt. 186Merrill v. Town of Ludlow (1986)
- 147 Vt. 191Montgomery v. Town of Sherburne (1986)
- 147 Vt. 196Ploof v. Village of Enosburg Falls (1986)
- 147 Vt. 203Bevins v. King (1986)
- 147 Vt. 207Cabot v. Thomas (1986)
- 147 Vt. 215State v. Galvin (1986)
- 147 Vt. 218State v. Mitchell (1986)
- 147 Vt. 223State v. Norton (1986)
- 147 Vt. 236Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 247Bruntaeger v. Zeller (1986)
- 147 Vt. 256Packard v. State (1986)
- 147 Vt. 259President of Middlebury College v. Town of Hancock (1986)
- 147 Vt. 262Gorton v. Department of Employment & Training (1986)
- 147 Vt. 265Grievance of Byrne (1986)
- 147 Vt. 268Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc. (1986)
<bold>1. Labor and Employment — "At Will" Agreements — "Permanent"</bold> <bold>Employment</bold> Employment contract for indefinite term is "at will" agreement, terminable at any time, for any reason or for none at all; however, while term "permanent," when used in employment contract with reference to term of employment, normally means nothing more than indefinite employment, contract for "permanent" employment will not be considered terminable at will if employer has, by express language or clear implication, foreclosed his right to terminate except for cause. <bold>2. Labor and Employment — "At Will" Agreements — Personnel</bold> <bold>Manual</bold> Where termination provisions contained in defendant's employee handbook set up three-step disciplinary procedure for violation of listed rules, employee<page_number>Page 269</page_number> handbook could not be construed as being consistent with at-will employment relationship, although defendant reserved right to bypass steps in disciplinary process for repeated violations; thus, handbook foreclosed defendant's right to terminate without cause. <bold>3. Labor and Employment — Wrongful Termination — Damages</bold> Where plaintiff's employment was terminated without cause by defendant employer, evidence of plaintiff's past employment history, coupled with proof of company's operating history during post-discharge period, provided jury with conservative estimate of plaintiff's damages, which was clearly grounded in fact.
- 147 Vt. 273Spaulding v. Cahill (1986)
- 147 Vt. 276Eccomunity, Inc. v. Lussier (1986)
- 147 Vt. 280Grievance of Brileya (1986)
- 147 Vt. 286Chittenden South Education Ass'n v. Hinesburg School District (1986)
- 147 Vt. 295State v. Begins (1986)
<bold>1. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Due Process</bold> Although at criminal trial due process requires that defendant's guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt, lesser burden of proof is required at probation revocation hearing because probationer risks not absolute liberty but only conditional liberty dependent on following special probation restrictions. <bold>2. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — State's Burden of</bold> <bold>Proof</bold> In proving its case at probation revocation hearing, State may introduce evidence not otherwise admissible in criminal trial, as well as comment upon probationer's silence; if State presents any credible evidence indicating violation of conditions of probation, and probationer remains silent, State will necessarily have met its burden of proof by preponderance of evidence.<page_number>Page 296</page_number> <bold>3. Constitutional Law — Self-Incrimination — Probation</bold> <bold>Revocation Hearings</bold> Probationer's right to be heard at revocation hearing is due process right based on two broad policy objectives: (1) that such opportunity will enhance prospect for informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions, and (2) that opportunity to testify at revocation hearing will enhance chance of rehabilitating probationers or parolees by treating them with basic fairness; these policies are seriously undermined when probationer is deterred from taking advantage of right to be heard at probation revocation hearing by possibility of self-incrimination. <bold>4. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Self-Incrimination</bold> State's opportunity to coerce self-incriminating testimony by scheduling probation revocation hearing prior to criminal trial poses danger of abuse to judicial decision-making process; State should not be encouraged to schedule revocation hearing in advance of trial by being allowed to use at trial defendant's testimony at prior probation revocation hearing; thus, while State is free to move to revoke probation before trial, decision whether to postpone revocation hearing until trial remains within trial court's discretion. <bold>5. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Self-Incrimination</bold> When trial court finds it necessary to hold revocation hearing before criminal trial, probationer's testimony will be subject to exclusionary rule which will enable him to testify at revocation hearing without fear of subsequent self-incrimination at criminal trial; further, probationer must be advised that, if he wishes to take stand at probation revocation hearing, his testimony and its fruits will not be admissible against him at subsequent criminal trial on underlying offense.
- 147 Vt. 301Driver v. Driver (1986)
- 147 Vt. 303Smith v. Brattleboro Reformer, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 305Pfeil v. Rutland District Court (1986)
- 147 Vt. 310Sullivan v. R. E. Bean Construction Co. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 315Sampson v. Karpinski (1986)
- 147 Vt. 322State v. Bargo (1986)
- 147 Vt. 324State v. Brown (1986)
- 147 Vt. 330In re Sousie (1986)
- 147 Vt. 332Roy v. Poquette (1986)
- 147 Vt. 335In re John Campbell Realty, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 341Steinfeld v. Dworkin (1986)
- 147 Vt. 344In Re Ambassador Ins. Co., Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 349Solomon v. Atlantis Development, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 359In re Bassette (1986)
- 147 Vt. 365Dougherty v. Surgen (1986)
- 147 Vt. 367In Re H. A. Manosh Corp. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 371State v. Trombley (1986)
- 147 Vt. 378In re C. B. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 386State v. McQuillen (1986)
- 147 Vt. 390State v. Peters (1986)
- 147 Vt. 394Anderson v. State (1985)
- 147 Vt. 400State v. Harty (1986)
- 147 Vt. 403Grievance of Roy (1986)
- 147 Vt. 407Sullivan v. Sullivan (1986)
- 147 Vt. 410Derosia v. Duro Metal Products Co. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 418State v. Yudichak (1986)
- 147 Vt. 421State v. Cox (1987)
- 147 Vt. 426State v. Noyes (1986)
- 147 Vt. 430State v. Squires (1986)
- 147 Vt. 432Osborn v. Osborn (1986)
- 147 Vt. 436State v. Champlain Cable Corp. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 441Contractor's Crane Service, Inc. v. Vermont Whey Abatement Authority (1986)
- 147 Vt. 453Town of Wolcott v. Behrend (1986)
- 147 Vt. 461State v. Cardinal (1986)
- 147 Vt. 466DeGrace v. DeGrace (1986)
- 147 Vt. 472Trustees of Net Realty Holding Trust v. AVCO Financial Services of Barre, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 477Corey v. Furgat Tractor & Equipment, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 480Harlow v. Miller (1986)
- 147 Vt. 484State v. Robillard (1986)
- 147 Vt. 488Payne v. Rozendaal (1986)
- 147 Vt. 506State v. Higgins (1986)
- 147 Vt. 509Petition of Green Mountain Power Corp. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 519Grievance of Graves (1986)
- 147 Vt. 525Whitcomb v. Department of Employment & Training (1986)
- 147 Vt. 529Whittemore v. Cooley (1986)
- 147 Vt. 533Pfenning v. Department of Employment & Training (1986)
- 147 Vt. 538Furno v. Pignona (1986)
- 147 Vt. 548Chaker v. Chaker (1986)
- 147 Vt. 551Roy v. Town of Barnet (1986)
- 147 Vt. 552Stamper v. University Apartments, Inc. (1986)
- 147 Vt. 558Hinesburg School District v. Vermont NEA (1986)
- 147 Vt. 564Boynton v. Snelling (1987)
- 147 Vt. 567Ernest v. Abare (1987)
- 147 Vt. 570In Re Hydro Energies Corp. (1987)
- 147 Vt. 574Lynch v. Lynch (1987)
- 147 Vt. 578Pidgeon v. Vermont State Transportation Board (1987)
- 147 Vt. 584Sachse v. Lumley (1987)
- 147 Vt. 590Muir v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1987)
- 147 Vt. 596State v. Greenia (1987)
- 147 Vt. 599Fine Foods, Inc. v. Dahlin (1986)
- 147 Vt. 606Wroten v. Lamphere (1987)
- 147 Vt. 612State v. Forbes (1987)
- 147 Vt. 618Adams v. Town of West Haven (1987)
- 147 Vt. 621Perry v. Department of Employment & Training (1987)
- 147 Vt. 625Kingsbury v. Kingsbury (1987)
- 147 Vt. 627Mountainview Ass'n v. Town of Wilmington (1987)
- 147 Vt. 631State v. Hunt (1987)
- 147 Vt. 634Cross v. Department of Employment & Training (1987)
- 147 Vt. 637In re Kirkpatrick (1987)
- 147 Vt. 639Sutton v. Sutton (1987)
- 147 Vt. 641In re Buttolph (1987)
- 147 Vt. 645Bevins v. King (1986)
- 147 Vt. 645In re Currier (1986)
- 147 Vt. 646Goode v. State (1986)
- 147 Vt. 646Reed v. Bouchard (1986)
- 147 Vt. 647State v. Mason (1986)
- 147 Vt. 647In re Wheel (1986)
- 147 Vt. 647In re Alpen Associates (1986)
- 147 Vt. 648In re Foy (1986)
- 147 Vt. 648Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Whittemore (1986)
- 147 Vt. 649State v. City of Winooski (1986)
- 147 Vt. 649In Re Trust Estate of Archambault (1986)
- 147 Vt. 649Franklin-Lamoille Bank v. Wetherby (1986)
- 147 Vt. 650In re Connolly (1987)