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← 148 F.2d 857 - Dorsey v. Gill

Dorsey v. Gill’s Empirical Analysis

148 F.2d 857 · 1945

Citation profile

206
cited by 206 later decisions
8
cited 8 times by the Supreme Court
12
states following
October 2010
most recently cited

123 federal appellate · 13 district · 21 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 206 later decisions (8 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2010 · most notably Browder v. Director Department of Corrections of Illinois (1978), Brown v. Allen (1953)

123 federal appellate · 13 district · 21 state decisions — followed in 12 states

74019451950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 191 · 28 U.S.C. § 454 · 28 U.S.C. § 455 · 28 U.S.C. § 459 · 28 U.S.C. § 461

Relies on Glasser v. United States · Johnson v. Zerbst · McNabb v. United States · Adams v. United States Ex Rel. McCann · Mooney v. Holohan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 206 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““* * * Everyone who is acquainted with the realities of practice knows the desire of some convicted persons to have their cases tried over again and their frequent repudiation of counsel after their hopes for acquittal or for lenient punishment have failed to materialize. It is easy for such a person to rationalize his own wishful thinking — together with hopeful comments of counsel — into a structure of promises, coercion and trickery; to assume incompetency and disinterest or worse, upon the part of counsel. But mere general assertions of incompetency or disinterest do not constitute a prima facie showing required by the statute to support a petition for habeas corpus. District attorneys and assigned counsel are officers of the court; licensed to practice, upon proof of character and fitness to perform professional duties. There is a presumption of proper performance of duty by each of them, which requires much more than the allegations of the present case to set the procedure of ha-beas corpus in motion.” (Emphasis supplied)”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “Section is new, and is inserted for the purpose of construction. Chapter 153 of Title 28, United States Code, also relates to habeas corpus and applies to Federal courts generally, including the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Upon the reenactment of the provisions carried into this chapter, they will constitute a later enactment than Title 28, United States Code, which was enacted in 1948. Considering the local character of the provisions carried into this chapter, there should not arise, as a general rule, even without this section, any question of conflict. However, this section is inserted as a precautionary measure.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Administrative inconvenience, even occasional abuse of the facilities of the courts, is but a small price to pay for the precious right of access to the courts guaranteed under our system of government to all who claim to be wronged.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.