Johnson v. Structured Asset Services, LLC’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 52 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “n. Any and all restrictions on the ability to pledge the Collateral were included in the Release and/or Annuity solely at Borrower’s request and for Borrower’s benefit and not for the benefit or protection of any other person. Any such restriction was included by Borrower as a precautionary measure in order to assure the Borrower of certain favorable tax treatment under Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) Section 104(a)(2). Whether or not such precautionary measure was necessary, Borrower now decides to forego said favorable treatment. Borrower acknowledges that all income realized by Borrower after closing upon any investment or use of the Loan Amount (unless exempt under a separate Code provision (e.g. interest earned on municipal bonds)) may be taxable to Borrower under the Code and that this transaction may result in an increase in the amount of income taxes paid by Borrower to the Internal Revenue Service. For the benefit of Lender, Lender’s Assignee and/or their successors and assigns, the Annuity Owner and on behalf of Borrower and Borrower’s estate, heirs, beneficiaries, executors, administrators, and legal representatives, Borrower hereby WAIVES AND RELEASES all rights of Borrower in, to, or under, such restrictions on the ability to pledge, if any.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Coffey v. Singer Asset Finance Co., LLC

2. “In order to establish a waiver of rights under a contract, there must be proof of an intent to relinquish a known right. Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 580 , 19 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 138 (1976); see also Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hamburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ). A party’s express renunciation of a known right can establish a waiver. Tenneco, Inc. v. Enterprise Products, Company, 925 S.W.2d 640, 643 , 39 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 907 (Tex.1996); see also Texas Development Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 119 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no writ). A party’s silence or inaction for a period of time long enough to show an intention to yield the known right, is also enough to prove a waiver. Tenneco, Inc., 925 S.W.2d at 643 ; see also Texas Development Co., 119 S.W.3d at 884 . An anti-assignment clause can be waived and the laws governing the waiver of contractual rights apply. See generally Texas Development Co., 119 S.W.3d at 884 ; University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston v. Allan, 777 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1989, no writ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Settlement Capital Corp. v. Allstate Life Insurance (In Re Jack)

3. “The Texas Structured Settlement Protection Act is a paternalistic statute: it requires disclosures and court approval before any transfer of structured settlement payment rights ... [W]e are mindful of the public purpose and philosophy underlying the statute: to protect the recipients of structured settlement payments who are in need of cash from exploitation by factoring companies.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 442 N.J. Super. 393 - In re Keena