Marx v. Hanthorn’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

23 federal appellate · 9 district · 80 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 143 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It must be evident that the right to have one's controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right. These rules pertain to the remedies which the state provides for its citizens, and, generally in legal contemplation, they neither enter into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can they be regarded as being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to enforce. Like other rules affecting the remedy, they must, therefore, at all times be subject to modification and control by the legislature; and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those states in which retrospective laws are forbidden. * * * * * * Courts of high authority have held that mere rules of evidence do not form part of contracts entered into while they are in force, and that it is competent for the legislature to, from time to time, change the rules of evidence, and to make such change applicable to existing causes of action. " (emphasis ours)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stokes v. Leung · Brewer v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.

2. ““A statutory power to be validly executed must be executed according to the statutory directions. It is, no doubt, true that there may be provisions in tax laws that are made in the interest of the public, and which do not concern the taxpayer; and a failure to punctiliously observe them may furnish him with no just ground of complaint. But the well-established rule is, as above stated, that observance of every safeguard to the owner created by the statute is imperatively necessary. So, too, is the rule, when not modified by statute, that the burden of proof is on the holder of a tax deed to maintain his title by affirmatively showing that the provisions' of the law have been complied with.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Collier v. Goessling · Virginia & West Virginia Coal Co. v. Charles

3. ““It is competent for the Legislature to declare that a tax deed shall be prima facie evidence, not only of the regularity of the sale, but of all prior proceedings, and of title in the purchaser, but that the Legislature cannot deprive one of his property by making his adversary’s claim to it, -whatever that claim may be, conclusive of its own validity, and it cannot, therefore, make the tax deed conclusive evidence of the holder’s title to the land. Mr. Cooley sums up his examination of the cases on this subject in the following statement: ‘That a tax deed can be made conclusive evidence of title in the grantee we think is more than doubtful. The attempt is a violation of the great principle of Magna Charta, which has been incorporated in our Bill of Rights, and, if successful, deprive the citizen of his property by proceedings absolutely without warrant of law or of justice; it is not in the power of any American Legislature to deprive one of his property by making his adversary’s claim to it, whatever that claim may be, conclusive of its own validity. It cannot, therefore, make the tax deed conclusive evidence of the holder’s title to the land, or of the possible jurisdictional facts which would make out title. But the Legislature might doubtless make the deed conclusive evidence of * * * everything except the essentials.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Collier v. Goessling