Suster v. Marshall’s Empirical Analysis
149 F.3d 523 · 1998
Citation profile
15 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently August 2015 · most notably Osterberg v. Peca (2000), Barry F. Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand (2001)
15 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Buckley v. Valeo · Elrod v. Burns · Roth v. United States · Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. · Weinstein v. Bradford
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) whether the movant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm; (3) whether issuance would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)whether the public interest would be served by issuance.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Review of the constitutionality of spending limits in Buckley was not based upon the line of reasoning that such limita tions should apply only to federal political campaigns. Rather, the constitutionality of such limitations was based upon the reasoning that any expenditure limitation — irrespective of the kind of election involved (state, federal, judicial, non-judicial, civil penalties, criminal penalties, etc.), “[i]n a republic where the people are sovereign, [and] the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential,” must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling government interest in order to infringe upon a “most fundamental First Amendment activity.” Id. Although Defendants cite several cases to support their argument that there is a distinct difference between judicial officers and political officers, this Court finds that an election candidate does not forego his or her First Amendment rights simply because he or she decides to seek a judicial office, rather than a non-judicial one. Further, to the extent Defendants have attempted to raise the argument that Buckley was not intended to apply to state elected judicial officers because federal judges are appointed, not elected, such an attempt misses the mark. While it is true that the issue in Buckley involved federal campaign legislation, that fact simply illustrates that Congress, in enacting the legislation, did not intend for the legislation to apply to state election”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.