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← 149 F.3d 641 - Kelley v. Myler

Kelley v. Myler’s Empirical Analysis

149 F.3d 641 · 1998

Citation profile

103
cited by 103 later decisions
1
states following
April 2024
most recently cited

41 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 103 later decisions — most recently April 2024 · most notably Payne v. Pauley (2003), Katherine Gardenhire and Walter Gardenhire v. Donald Schubert, in His Individual and Official Capacity as Chief of Police (2000)

41 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions

5301998200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Illinois v. Gates · Heck v. Humphrey · Malley v. Briggs · Beck v. State of Ohio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 103 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Probable cause does not depend on the witness turning out to be right; it's what the police know, not whether they know the truth that matters.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[t]he inquiry is whether an officer has reasonable grounds on which to act, not whether it was reasonable to conduct further investigation.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[a] police officer has probable cause to arrest when, at the moment the decision is made, the facts and circumstances within her knowledge and of which she has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. This flexible, commonsense approach does not require that the officer’s belief be correct or even more likely true than false, as long as it is reasonable.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.