Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 149 F.3d 749 - Ramsey v. Bowersox

Ramsey v. Bowersox’s Empirical Analysis

149 F.3d 749 · 1998

Citation profile

71
cited by 71 later decisions
1
states following
July 2019
most recently cited

33 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 71 later decisions — most recently July 2019 · most notably United States v. McVeigh (1998), United States v. Brown (2006)

33 federal appellate · 2 district · 3 state decisions

400199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Teague v. Lane · Lindh v. Murphy · California v. Green · Barefoot v. Estelle · Victor v. Nebraska

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Could each of you consider the death penalty in this case with the understanding that under Missouri law you are never [ ] required to impose it? If Roy Ramsey is convicted of first-degree murder, are there any of you who feel he should get the death penalty regardless of any mitigation circumstances? If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, that Roy Ramsey is guilty of first-degree murder, would the defense have to convince you that he should not get the death penalty? Would your views on the death penalty prevent or substantially impair your ability to follow the following instruction: You are not compelled to fix death as the punishment, even if you do not find the existence of one or more mitigating circumstances, sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances or circumstances which you find to exist. You must consider all of the circumstances in deciding whether to assess and declare the punishment at death. Whether that is to be your final decision rests with you. If you find one or all of the aggravating circumstances exist be yond a reasonable doubt, could you still consider life without parole as a possible punishment? If you found aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt and that they warrant the death penalty, could you still consider life without parole as a possible punishment? If you find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and find that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, woul”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Rather than posing these questions, the trial court told the jurors, “I’m going to ask you some questions [about] imposition of the death penalty. These questions are asked of you in the abstract, understanding that no evidence has been presented.... If you were selected as a juror in this case, you must be able to vote for both of the punishments authorized by law. My question is would you be capable of voting for a sentence of death? Would you be capable of voting for a sentence of life without parole?” (Trial Trans, at 578-80.) To help the attorneys exercise their peremptory challenges, the court also asked, “If you were chosen as a juror, would you have a tendency to favor either the death penalty, the life imprisonment penalty, or neither?” (Trial Trans, at 580.)”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The trial court’s queries were more direct and succinct than Ramsey’s proposed questions, and addressed the crucial disqualification issue of whether the prospective jurors would automatically vote for or against the death penalty in every case, see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29, 732 , 112 S.Ct. 2222 , 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Because the trial court’s questioning reasonably assured Ramsey of a chance to detect a potential juror’s prejudice about the death penalty, see [United States v.] Spaar, 748 F.2d [1249,] 1253 [ (8th Cir.1984) ], Ramsey was not denied his rights to due process and a fair trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.