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← 149 TENN 601 - Harrison v. Harrison

Harrison v. Harrison’s Empirical Analysis

1923

Citation profile

5
cited by 5 later decisions
1
states following
February 1968
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently February 1968

2 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

3019231930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““As stated by Mr. Justice Lansden in Walker v. Walker, supra [ 138 Tenn. 679 , 200 S. W. 825 ]: “ ‘The doctrine of subrogation is steadily expanding in its practical administration so as to embrace all cases where complete justice cannot be done without it. ’ “In Cottrell’s Appeal, 23 Pa. 294 , the court said: “ ‘Subrogation is founded on principles of equity and benevolence, and may be decreed where no contract of privity of any kind exists between the parties. Wherever one not a mere volunteer discharges the debt of another, he is entitled to all the remedies which the creditor possessed against the debtor. ’ “These are general statements of the settled rule. In a note in 23 L. R. A. 124, citing many cases, the following statement is to be found: “ ‘Generally where it is equitable that a person furnishing money to pay a debt should be substituted for the creditor or in the place of a creditor, such person will be so substituted. ’ “It is insisted that Mrs. Harrison was a volunteer. The equitable remedy of subrogation is by no means confined to those personally bound on the obligation. Mr. Pomeroy divides those entitled to this relief into three classes : “ ‘First, those who act in performance of a legal duty, arising either by express agreement or operation of law; second, those who act nnder the necessity of self-protection, third, those who act at the request of the debtor, directly or indirectly, or upon invitation of the public, and whose payments are favored by public ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.