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← 15 B.R. 521 - In Re Callister

In Re Callister’s Empirical Analysis

1981

Citation profile

75
cited by 75 later decisions
May 2011
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 1 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 75 later decisions — most recently May 2011 · most notably Flagstaff Foodservice Corporation General Electric Credit Corporation v. Levin & Weintraub (1984), In Re Colortex Industries, Inc. (1994)

6 federal appellate · 1 district ·

5401981199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 1129 · 11 U.S.C. § 330 · 11 U.S.C. § 362 · 11 U.S.C. § 502 · 11 U.S.C. § 503 · 11 U.S.C. § 506 · 11 U.S.C. § 507 · 11 U.S.C. § 546

Relies on Reading Company v. Brown · Bankers Life Insurance v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In Re Alyucan Interstate Corp.) · In Re Standard Furniture Co. · In Re Curlew Valley Associates · Sanders v. Tucker (In Re Tucker)

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “If the trustee, under Section 362, 363, or 364 of this title, provides adequate protection of the interest of a holder of a claim secured by a lien on property of the debtor and if, notwithstanding such protection, such creditor has a claim allowable under subsection (a)(1) of this section arising from the stay of action against such property under Section 362 of this title, from the use, sale, or lease of such property under Section 363 of this title, or from the granting of a lien under Section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor’s claim under such subsection shall have priority over every other claim under such subsection.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “The question whether debt incurred by an estate without court approval is entitled to an administrative priority, if not analogous, is suggestive. Two authorities have noted that “ [unauthorized loans may receive this priority ‘in such unusual cir-cumstnaces as would justify equitable relief.’ In applying this test, courts consider whether the loan would have been approved if timely application had been made, whether creditors were not harmed by or were benefited by the loan, the good faith of the trustee and lender with respect to whether they believed the transaction was authorized, whether the proceeds of the loan were used solely for purposes authorized by the court, whether the loan was instrumental in aiding the business to continue, and whether there was sufficient time to apply to the court for authority to borrow. Courts usually do not indicate which factor is most important, but if the lender does not believe in good faith that the loan was at least impliedly authorized, the court should deny priority. In such circumstances the lender cannot reasonably expect the court to accord him priority and to do so would be to give him a windfall. Also, no priority should be granted if the trustee’s lack of authority could be discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence and the lender failed to investigate. Here the lender could have prevented the problem from arising, and to grant him priority would be to reward his negligence. If the lender acts in good faith and exerc”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “On balance, Rand is not entitled to a superpriority for the loss attributable to the error in the stipulation. Disallowance under these circumstances will not discourage stipulations. Rather, it will further care in their formulation. Rand was less the cooperative creditor than reluctant caretaker of its collateral. Hence, its motive in stipulating is not an equitable consideration in its favor. Given the incalculability of values, some misapprehension is expected; but this error was not the product of excusable neglect. It was a gross miscalculation which could have been easily detected. Indeed, the disparity between the price and stipulation should have warned Rand that something was amiss, prompting investigation, and discovery of the trailer siding and unpaid repair bills. Rand is experienced with this type of collateral, familiar with values and industry trends. Given its sophistication and leverage under the Code, it enjoys substantial bargaining power with debtor. Thus, its claim that it relied upon the representations of debt- or in arriving at the stipulated value is unpersuasive. Under these circumstances, equity will look past the form of the stipulation to the substance of the value....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.