Speer v. Miller

¶6FAY, Senior Circuit Judge:

¶7Robert H. Speer, Jr. (“Speer”) filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of O.C.G.A § 35-1-T9.1 Speer challenged the statute entitled “Inspecting or copying records of law enforcement agency for commercial solicitation prohibited; penalty” both facially and as applied to him on first and fourteenth amendment grounds. The District Court dismissed Speer’s first amendment count and, while recognizing his equal protection claim, denied Speer’s motion for a preliminary injunction. He appeals that denial. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Because we hold that the District Court erroneously dismissed Speer’s first amendment claim and that he has a good likelihood of prevailing on the *1009merits, we VACATE the District Court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶8I. FACTS

¶9Speer is an attorney licensed to practice in Georgia. He primarily practices criminal law. Speer obtains most of his clients through inspecting public records and sending advertisements to those persons who are likely in need of an attorney’s services. He had access to the records under O.C.G.A. § 17-4-27.2

¶10In 1991, the Georgia legislature passed O.C.G.A. § 36-1-9 which states:

¶11Inspecting or copying records of law enforcement agency for commercial solicitation prohibited; penalty.

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to inspect or copy any records of a law enforcement agency to which the public has a right of access under paragraph (4) of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-18-72 for the purpose of obtaining the names and addresses of the victims of crimes or persons charged with crimes or persons involved in motor vehicle accidents or other information contained in such records for any commercial solicitation of such individuals or relatives of such individuals.3

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not prohibit the publication of such information by any news media or the use of such information for any other lawful data collection or analysis purpose.

(c)Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

¶12Following the passage of this law, several law enforcement agencies would not allow Speer to inspect various records which were otherwise available to the general public and the media. Speer claims that the enforcement of O.C.G.A. § 35-1-9 causes him economic hardship and challenges its enforcement on first and fourteenth amendment grounds.

¶13II. DISCUSSION

¶14A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15We review the District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. However, if we find that the District Court has misapplied the law, its conclusions are subject to broad review. E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross International Imports, 756 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1985).

¶16B. JURISDICTION

¶17Generally, “[a] litigant’s right to appeal interlocutory injunctions only goes to the injunction itself, and he cannot forcé consideration of the merits of the underlying case except as necessary to review the injunction.” Cable Holdings of Battlefield, Inc. v. Cooke, 764 F.2d 1466, 1472 (11th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). However, “[i]t is true that in reviewing interlocutory injunc*1010tions we may look to otherwise nonap-pealable aspects of the order.” Id., citing Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 650 F.2d 617, 621 n. 7 (5th Cir.1981). Because we construe § 1292(a)(1) narrowly, Gould, 650 F.2d at 621, there are few instances where we review that which technically falls outside the four comers of the order granting or denying injunctive relief. This case is one of those instances.

¶18Here, Speer’s motion for preliminary injunction and his memorandum in support thereof challenged O.C.G.A. 35-1-9 on both first amendment and equal protection grounds. The District Court subsequently granted the state’s motion to dismiss only as to the first amendment challenge and allowed his equal protection challenge to stand. The District Court then went on to discuss the propriety of granting a preliminary injunction solely on equal protection grounds. After finding that Speer failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the District Court denied him relief.

¶19Under Cable Holdings, the mere fact that the District Court disposed of Speer’s first amendment claim by way of the state’s motion to dismiss does not absolutely foreclose our review of the question. An integral part of the District Court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was its decision that Speer failed to state a cognizable first amendment challenge. We have the discretion to reach the merits of the first amendment issue because it is so “closely related to the interlocutory order being appealed.” Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 n. 6 (11th Cir.1985). Indeed, it was the primary ground urged in support of the request for injunctive relief. Because we find clear error in that decision, we subject the purely legal first amendment question to our broad review. Remy Martin, 756 F.2d at 1529.

¶20C. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION4

¶21A first amendment challenge is appropriate where a state prohibits the use of public records by one who wishes to engage in non-misleading, truthful commercial speech. See Innovative Database Systems v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.1993).5 Advertisements by lawyers fall within this protected category. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). Statutes that restrict commercial speech must directly advance a substantial government interest and the state bears the burden of justifying its restrictions. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466, 472, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 1921, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1987); Fane v. Edenfield, 945 F.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1991), aff'd., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123 L.Ed.2d 543 (1993). A mere reading of this statute indicates that it probably impinges upon Speer’s commercial speech. Because of the procedures followed in the District Court, however, the state had no opportunity to develop its interest in the area.

¶22Because it appears that Speer is likely to prevail on the merits and because we conclude that the District Court should review the request for injunctive relief upon both first amendment and equal protection grounds, we remand this matter for a hearing. Of course, Speer and the state should both be allowed to develop the issues fully.6

¶23III. CONCLUSION

¶24The District Court’s order is VACATED and the matter is REMANDED for reconsid*1011eration after a plenary hearing.7

¶25VACATED and REMANDED.