15 Md. App. 520 - Avery v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

56 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““(b) Privilege generally. — Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings, a patient or his authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing, communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional disorder. (d) Exclusion of privilege. — There is no privilege if: (1) A disclosure is necessary for the purposes of placing the patient in a facility for mental illness; (2) A judge finds that the patient after being informed there will be no privilege, makes communications in the course of an examination ordered by the court and the issue at trial involves his mental or emotional disorder; (3) In a civil or criminal proceeding: (i) The patient introduces his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense; or (ii) After the patient’s death, his mental condition is introduced by any party claiming or defending through or as a beneficiary of the patient; (4) The patient, an authorized representative of the patient, or the personal representative of the patient makes a claim against the psychiatrist or licensed psychologist for malpractice; (5) Related to civil or criminal proceedings under defective delinquency proceedings; or (6) The patient expressly consents to waive the privilege, or in the case of death or disability, his personal or authorized representative waives the privilege for purpose of making claim or bringing suit on a policy of insur”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 98 Md. App. 348 - Reynolds v. State

2. ““Concededly a police agent who conceals his police connections may write down for official use his conversations with a defendant and testify concerning them, without a warrant authorizing his encounters with the defendant and without otherwise violating the latter’s Fourth Amendment rights. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, at 300-303 , [ 87 S.Ct. 408, at 412-414 ] 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 . For constitutional purposes, no different result is required if the agent instead of immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person, Lopez v. United States, supra; (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency. On Lee v. United States, supra [ 343 U.S. 747 , 72 S.Ct. 967 , 96 L.Ed. 1270 ]. If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant’s constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks. “Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particular defendants in particular situations may be or the extent to which they may in fact have r”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Jennings

3. ““[I]n the instant case we have an electronic interception and video transmission of the conduct of the accused toward the victim while in the victim’s house which was transmitted to the police with the full cooperation and consent of the victim as a party to that conduct. The situation here is comparable to one where the conversations between a government agent and the accused are transmitted to police authority by a radio transmitter secreted on the person of the government agent (informer) with the cooperation and approval of the agent. ... If the transmittal of the verbal conversation to the police through the cooperation of an informer does not constitute an unreasonable seizure in violation of a ‘justifiable expectation of privacy’ in White , we see no good or sufficient reason to conclude that a video transmittal of the accused’s conduct brought about by the cooperation of Miss Hall should be interpreted as constituting an unreasonable seizure in violation of the appellant’s ‘justifiable expectation of privacy’ in the instant case.” 292 A.2d at 742-43 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Jennings