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15 Mich. 415

Duncan v. Campau

Michigan Supreme Court

Decided May 15, 1867

Michigan Supreme Court · decided 1867-05-15

Appeal in Chancery from Wayne Circuit. This was a bill for partition of the real estate of the late Joseph Campau, deceased. A receiver was asked for, and the bill also prayed that the administrators of said Campau be enjoined from interfering with the estate; they having acquiesced in the action of several of the heirs attempting to dispose of it among themselves, in fraud of complainant, and having yielded possession.

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““It comes, then, to the simple inquiry whether a receiver can be appointed over tenants in common. I think the precedents permit this in some cases.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Heinze v. Butte & Boston Consolidated Min. Co.

Relies on Lewis v. Campau

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1867-05-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently December 2000

1 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

20186718701880189019001910192019301940195019601970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Martin Ch. J.

¶1Said he thought the appeal should be dismissed for the same reasons assigned by him in Lewis v. Campau, 14 Mich. 458.

Campbell J.

¶2This case differs entirely from Lewis v. Campau. I think a legal estate can not be divested by preliminary proceedings. But nothing like that is attempted here. The *416receiver is appointed over nothing but the real estate. The bill shows that the administrators have given up possession of it, and they have joined with the other heirs in their attempts to divide it. We have held they were not bound to take possession unless they chose, and I doubt whether they could do so after such acts as are charged. It comes then to the simple inquiry whether a receiver can be appointed over tenants in common. I think the precedents permit this in some cases, and where, as in this case, the other tenants not only deny complainant’s title, but have endeavored to entangle the whole title, and are not disposed to account for the rents and profits, there is power to make such appointment. The bill, however defective, is a bill for partition. The receivership is merely incidental and ancillary, and we can not review the discretion of the judge in granting it.

Cooley J.

¶3Regarded the order appealed from as clearly interlocutory within the former decisions by this court. The order in Lewis v. Campau gave the complainant that which his bill prayed for as the end and object of the bill upon that branch of the case; and the decision proceeded on the ground that the relief asked for, so far as the receiver was concerned, was ancillary, not to further relief to be had in that case, but to the proceedings on the probate appeal. The appointment in this case, on the contrary, is only pending the suit, and auxiliary to the principal relief which this bill prays for. Wisely or unwisely, the legislature have not authorized us to review such an order at this stage of the case.

Christiancy J.

¶4Also concurred, considering the case quite distinct from the one referred to, though he did not think that a failure in the bill to make out a ease would make any difference *417as to the power of this court to review an order which in its frame and purpose was interlocutory.

¶5The question whether an order is final or interlocutory does not depend upon the question whether it was properly or improperly granted.

¶6Appeal dismissed.

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