15 N.Y. St. Rep.
Volume 15 — New York State Reporter
209 opinions
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 6Smith v. Clews (1888)
<p>Appeal from á judgment dismissing the complaint at the circuit.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 11Hickinbottom v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment on verdict.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 36Platt v. Withington (1888)
<p>Appeal from part of the judgment rendered at special term, resulting from a construction of the will of George W. Platt, deceased.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 39Stallcup v. National Bank of the Republic (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment entered upon the dismissal of the complaint at circuit at close of plaintiff’s case.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 46Balestier v. Mechanics' National Bank (1888)
<p>1. Practice—When action for cancellation of written instrument maintainable.</p> <p>An action to procure the cancellation of a written instrument cannot be maintained, unless some special circumstance exists establishing the necessity to resort to equity to prevent an injury which might be done and which equity alone is competent to prevent. It is not sufficient that a defense exist as against the instrument, or that evidence might be lost.</p> <p>2. Same—When an action at law is the proper remedy.</p> <p>In this case, the defendant had been notified of the appointment of plaintiff as receiver of the assets of one Clark, and also of the claim of the receiver to any sum in which it might be indebted to Clark. The defendant thereafter made a settlement of a claim with Clark, without notice to the receiver and without his consent. Held, that this settlement would be no defense to an action at law by the receiver to recover the claim of Clark, if any existed or was established by competent evidence primafacie. That the plaintiff must seek his remedy at law and not in equity.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 50In re Mackay (1888)
<p>Title to property—Parties to proceeding to ascertain.</p> <p>The question whether certain funds are the accumulations of interest on a trust fund cannot be determined summarily in a proceeding commenced by petition, but an action must be brought for that purpose, to which all persons who can possibly have an interest in the fund should be made parties.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 100Klumpp v. Gardener (1888)
<p>Assignment for benefit of creditors — When one partner can EXECUTE VALID ONE FOR FIRM—MUST BE DONE IN THE NAME OF THE. FIRM.</p> <p>The execution and acknowledgment of an assignment of the firm, property by one partner is sufficient, where the other partner has authorized the assignment and the partner who executed it does so in the name of the firm. Following Lowenstein v. Flaurand, 82 N. Y., 494.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 101Fourth National Bank v. Burger (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment of the special term setting aside assignment as made with intent to hinder delay and defraud creditors.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 108People ex rel. Welsh v. French (1888)
<p>Certiorari to review removal of the relator from the police department.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 110Thompson v. Saint Nicholas National Bank (1888)
<p>Appeal by plaintiff for a new trial upon exceptions ordered to be heard at the general term.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 116In re the Accounting of Burnett (1888)
<p>1. Practice—Appeal prom order op surrogate—When it lies.</p> <p>An appeal lies only from such orders of the surrogate or surrogate’s court as affect a substantial right.</p> <p>2. Same—Order permitting amendment when not appealable.</p> <p>In the answer to a petition for an accounting, the contestant alleged that the account failed to charge the executors with other property received by them “and with debts due said estate, for which they were liable.” The contestant having learned during the trial of specific money appropriated, was permitted to allege the same by way of amendment. Held, that the order permitting it in no wise affected a substantial right, and was not appealable.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 123Weston v. Watts (1888)
Appeal by Alexander Thain from an order adjudging him to be in contempt, and directing his commitment until he shall pay a fine of $600, and from a further order directing him to transfer and deliver to the defendant the co-partnership property, stock, chattels, books, vouchers, accounts, «hoses in action, and effects of every nature and discription received or held by him, or under his control, by virtue of his appointment as receiver.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 124Hatton v. McFadden (1888)
<p>1. Trustees—Removal of—Violations of Duty.</p> <p>A deliberate violation of the provisions of a trust by a trustee in material respects will always call upon the court to take action against such trustee.</p> <p>2. Pleadings—Complaint—Demand for judgment.</p> <p>The plaintiff is entitled to such relief as the facts proven upon the trial entitle him to.</p> <p>3. Pleading—Causes of action improperly joined—When the objection IS WAIVED.</p> <p>The objection as to the improper joinder of causes of action must be taken by demurrer when it appears upon the face of the complaint or it is waived.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 127Varick v. Second National Bank (1888)
<p>1. Bond—Stolen property—When one not a holder for valueagainst TRXJE OWNER.</p> <p>The receipt of stolen property merely as collateral for a past due debt does not constitute the holder a holder for value so as to prevent the true owner from recovering.</p> <p>2. Same—When one a holder for value.</p> <p>The defendant upon the receipt of the bond in question actually parted with value, changed its position, refrained from protesting a certain note and charging the endorser, Held, that by reason of these acts it became a holder for value.</p> <p>8. Sams—Remedy oe true owher.</p> <p>If the other collaterals which were received by the defendant were sufficient to pay the note, guare ^whether the plaintiff would have the right to have those collaterals applied to the payment of the note in order that her property might be discharged from the lien which the defendant had upon it.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 134Driscall v. Sanderson (1888)
<p>1. Pleading—Counter-claim to action on contract—What must be shown—Code Civ. Pro., § 501.</p> <p>The complaint set forth three causes of action for. commissions for selling real estate and obtaining a loan on bond and mortgage. The answer contained a counter-claim, arising out of the misrepresentation made by the plaintiff concerning the condition and value, of vacant lots in the city of Brooklyn, for which defendant was indueed to exchange property owned by her and situated in Pennsylvania. Held, that the facts alleged in the answer must disclose that the counter-claim was a cause of action arising out of the contract cr transaction set forth in the complaint, or that it was connected with the subject of the action, or was some other cause of action on contract existing at the time of the commencement of the action.</p> <p>2. Same—Misrepresentations must be alleged to have been made WITH INTENT TO DECEIVE.</p> <p>The answer alleged that these representations of plaintiffs were untrue, etc., and misled defendant to her damage, but it did not allege that plaintiff intended to deceive in making the representations. On' demurrer, Meld, defective; that without the existence of such an intention, no right of action for damages on defendant’s part was disclosed.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 145Flynn v. Hancock (1887)
<p>Justice of the peace—Time in which he may bendeb and docket his JUDGMENT—Oban STIPULATION EXTENDING.</p> <p>An oral stipulation extending the time in which a justice of the peace may render and docket his judgment is void for indeiiniteness, if no time is fixed The auth.,rity,of an attorney to make it must be shown.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 155Farrie v. Supreme Council Catholic Benevolent Legion (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment entered upon a verdict directed at circuit.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 160Elsworth v. Hinton (1888)
<p>Appeal from part of an interlocutory judgment, and from orders amending findings.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 161Frank v. Olin. (1888)
<p>Motion by defendant for a new trial on exceptions ordered to be first heard at the general term.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 164Haantjes v. Bank of Metropolis (1888)
<p>Jury—Question of fact—Properly fob the consideration of the jury.</p> <p>The question was submitted to the jury to determine whether or not a notice was served upon the defendant at a certain date, of an attachment granted against one of its depositors, who had then to his credit a sum • sufficient to pay the claim, Meld, that the question being one of fact and there being a conflict of evidence, it was properly submitted to the jury, and that their determination would not be disturbed on appeal from a judgment entered thereon, although it might seem to the court unjust.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 167New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Jackson (1888)
<p>1. New York (city of)—Right of New York and Harlem R. R. Co. to Fourth Avenue—Laws 1869, chap. 919—Laws 1884, chap. 261.</p> <p>Any part of the roadway of Fourth avenue in the city of New York, which the New York and Harlem Railroad Company was authorized to take in building its. depot, by Laws 1869, chap. 919, and Laws 1884, chap. 261, and which that company has not occupied, remains a part of Fourth avenue as it was before the new depot or annex was built, until the said company does use it.</p> <p>2. Same—Injunction—When railroad company not entitled to.</p> <p>The plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from carrying on his transfer baggage business, provided he conducts it in the usual and ordinary manner, and under proper authorization of the city of New York.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 170People ex rel. Heiser v. Asten (1888)
<p>Certiorari to review the proceedings of the board of assessors.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 200Hayden v. Eagleson (1888)
<p>Appeal from, a judgment entered upon the report of a referee.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 204Cary v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1888)
<p>1. Pleading—Answer—General denial—What mat be proved as a DEFENSE.</p> <p>Under the general denial contained in the answer, the defendants have a right to establish such facts as would show that no valid contract had ever been entered into between the parties. Following Oscamyany. Arms Go., 103 U. S„ 861.</p> <p>8. Contracts—Illegal contracts—Services in making personal ap- " PLICATIONS TO LEGISLATORS AND OTHER OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.</p> <p>The plaintiff, on behalf of the defendant and others, attempted to secure the passage of certain legislation at Albany, and in their attempts to succeed made many personal visits to the attorney-general, comptroller, and prominent members of both of the bodies of the legislature. ■ On the defendant’s refusal to pay for their services, this action was brought. Held, that plaintiffs could not recover for services consisting of personal application to legislators or other officers of the government; _ the services rendered were of a character which come within the definitions of illegal contracts, being against public policy.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 215Ziporkes v. Chmelniker (1888)
<p>1. Service of papers—Duress—Effect of.</p> <p>If the party upon whom papers are served was torced to come into the state by the persons having the process to serve, and thus subject himself to the jurisdiction of the court, which he would not otherwise have done, the service of the process is void.</p> <p>2. Same—What does hot cohstitute duress.</p> <p>The defendant, who had been a clerk at Odessa, in Russia, was fleeing to this country under an assumed name, with the fruits of an embezzlement, and was upon the steamboat which was to take him to Castle Garden (which is the place where he would have been bound to come, under any circumstances, in order to land), when he was served with these papers (á summons and complaint and order of arrest). Held, that there was no duress or fraud used to bring him within the jurisdiction of the court. That if any was used it was by the officers of the United States government, in requiring the defendant to land at that place in the port of New York.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 217Platt v. Platt (1888)
<p>Appeal from an order at special term sustaining an exception by the respondents, Charles Clark and Mary Ann Todd, to the referee’s report, and ordering the judgment of said clerk to be paid out of the proceeds.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 223Harnickel v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co. (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 227Beinhauer v. Gleason (1888)
<p>1. Contract—Construction of—Means to be employed in.</p> <p>This action was brought to recover for work, labor and services performed under a sealed contract in erecting and finishing a house. Payment was agreed to he made in instalments, one of the last instalments to he paid when the work was all completed. Deld, that in determining the effect to be given to the provisions of the contract, regard should hj had to the circumstances, and that these justifying the conclusion that the payment agreed to was not to be subordinated in point of time to the completion of work not within the contract of the plaintiff, he was entitled to such payment upon the completion of that portion placed under his supervision.</p> <p>2. Same—Excuse for non-performance within time limited.</p> <p>Deld, That he was not deprived of his right to payment by the fact that his work was not performed within the time limited by the contract, where Ms failure in that respect was due to delay caused by the defendant.</p> <p>3. Same—Condition—Excuse for non-performance of.</p> <p>Payment was by the contract to be made only upon the plaintiff present- ' ing a certificate of the architect having the matter in charge, that the work had been properly completed. Deld, that the plaintiff was entitled to payment without producing such certificate, where it was unreasonably withheld at the instigation of the party having charge and management of the building under the defendant.</p> <p>4. Same—Waiver of condition—How made—Effect of.</p> <p>Deld, That a condition contained in the contract might he waived by the parties, although that instrument was under seal, that such waiver might result from the acts as well as statements made by the party entitled to the observance of the condition, and that it deprived that party of the right to insist on the performance of the condition in similar situations subsequently arising.</p> <p>5. Same—What will not be construed as condition precedent.</p> <p>A provision of the contract declaring that there should be no legal or lawful claims against the contractor in any manner, from any source whatever,for work or materials furnished about the building, Deld, that this did not constitute a condition to the contractor’s right to payment, but was merely a covenant, for the breach of which the defendant might, if she had sustained injury, bring an action for damages.</p> <p>6. Same.</p> <p>The contract also provided that the contractor should not sub-let any portion of the work without the written consent of the defendant, Deld, that there being no provision that for a violation of the agreement in this particular, the contractor should forfeit his right to "compensation for work done, he was not, in case of a breach thereof deprived of his right to payment.</p> <p>7. Same—Excuse for non-performance within time limited.</p> <p>Deld, that it was competent for the plaintiff to show that work on the building, necessary to he finished before the completion of Ms was so delayed that he was unable to perform Ms part witMn the time limited by the contract.</p> <p>8. Same—Construction of performance.</p> <p>Certain deviations from the original plan were made under the authority of the contract which lessened the expense of the performance of the work, Deld, that the plaintiff was not entitled to set off against this the performance of other portions of the work in a manner superior to that demanded by the contract, there being no provision allowing that to be done. f</p> <p>9. Same—Action upon—Parties to—Who are necessary.</p> <p>Held, that while snb-contrabtors were not entitled to maintain proceedings for the enforcement of liens in their favor, as the plaintiff was forbidden to sub-contract the work, yet they were parties necessary to the disposition of the present controversey.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 237New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad v. Robinson (1888)
<p>Appeal from an order staying all proceedings on the part of the plaintiff in this action until the hearing and determination of an action between the same parties, in the superior court of the city of New York.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 240United States Life Insurance v. Jordan (1888)
<p>Appeal from an interlocutory judgment, overruling a demurrer to the complaint.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 248Greef v. Sickle (1888)
<p>Attachment—What must be shown to give court jurisdiction.</p> <p>_ There must be some evidence tending to show that the defendant has disposed of or secreted some part of his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors before the court can acquire jurisdiction to issue a writ of attachment. The fact that he has committed another and different fraud cannot of itself justify the interposition of the court.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 285Platt v. Platt (1888)
<p>Partition—Distribution of proceeds—Adjustment of claims between parties TO.</p> <p>After a sale in a partition suit a referee was appointed to take proof of the interest and rights of the several parties and claimants in the fund. In a previous action on an accounting, it was determined that as his share William H. Platt had received $60,839, and was indebted to his father’s estate in that amount with interest from April 3, 1883. It was shown that this indebtedness was for rents collected from the real estate partioned in these actions and proceeds of the sale of other real estate. Annie R. Platt, the wife of the said William, and his sole devisee, appeals from a decision of the referee in this action charging her with the amount aforesaid. It was proved that there was no personal property which could be applied to the payment of the claim for $60,839 and that all the land in which William H. Platt had an interest at the time of his death had already been sold in this very litigation. It appearing that said Annie R. Platt must eventually be held liable for said $60,839 under- Code Civil Procedure, chapter 15, title 3, article 2, Held, that the claim should be enforced in this proceeding by reducing the sharé of the proceeds of the sale to which Annie R. Platt would otherwise be entitled.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 292United States Life Insurance v. Jordan (1888)
<p>Demurrer—Order overruling—When it bails to authorize entry OB INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT THE DEFECT MAY BE CORRECTED BY THE COURT MAKING IT.</p> <p>Where an order overruling a demurrer does not authorize the entry of an interlocutory judgment, that defect does not deprive the court which made the order of the power to correct it, upon notice to the defendant, and cause it to he entered in proper form.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 294In re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of Bethune (1888)
<p>1. Wills—Undue influence—Exercise of must usually be established BY EVIDENCE.</p> <p>Probate of the instrument pronounced as the will of the deceased, was contested on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity on. his part, and because of undue influence alleged to have been exercised upon Mm to procure its execution. Held, that although where certain confidential relations exist between the testator and beneficiaries under the will, the presumption may arise that undue influence was employed, yet the fact that restraint was placed upon the testator must as a rule be established by evidence.</p> <p>S. Same—Undue influence—What will not warrant a presumption OF THE EXERCISE OF.</p> <p>Held, that where the will was drawn by the counsel of the testator according to directions given by him, no such presumption arose, although that were done at the house of a beneficiary.</p> <p>3. Same—Testamentary capacity—-What will not warrant a conclusion OF THE LACK OF.</p> <p>Held,, that the mere fact that the testator was addicted to the use of liquor, was not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that he had not testamentary capacity.</p> <p>4. Same—What not sufficient to set aside.</p> <p>Held, That a will could not be set aside simply because the testator had not correctly informed himself as to all the facts and circumstances surrounding him.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 297Kantrowitz v. Rothweiler (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint on trial before the special term.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 299Reed v. Lozier (1888)
<p>1. Judgments—Assignment of—What it cabbies.</p> <p>The assignment of a judgment carries with it the debt upon which it has been recovered.</p> <p>2. Limitations—(statute of)—Time cubing which a fabty may maintain AN ACTION AGAINST A NON-RESIDENT—SIMILAR BULE UNDEB THE REVISED Statutes and code.</p> <p>When the cause of action shall accrue against a person who shall be out of the state, such action may be commenced within the time limited by the statute after the return of such person into this state. The law upon the suject is the same whether the enactment as it is contained in the Revised Statutes is followed or its enactment in the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>3. Executors and administrators—When not liable fob the acts of CO-EXECUTORS.</p> <p>Where co-executors obtain possession of misappropriated property and control the same by excluding one of the executors from any management of it, he would not be liable for their Conduct.</p> <p>4. Decedent’s estate—Liability of real property for the payment of debts—Rule under the Revised Statutes—Practice under the Code limited—Code Civ. Pro,, § 3352.</p> <p>The law before the enactment of that part of the Code regulating the practice in such cases, declared that the heirs of a deceased person were liable for his debts to the extent of the estate descending to them only when the deceased left no personal assets within the state to be administered or his personal assets were not sufficient to pay and discharge the debt, etc. Section 3352 Code Civil Procedure has declared that the provisions relating to this class of actions do not affect rights which have accrued under the statutes existing prior to the enactment of the Code.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 306Nichols v. Bennett (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint at the special term.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 310Van Campen v. Ford (1888)
<p>' Bills and notes—Mortgage—Consideration—Question of.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s husband having been arrested in an action brought by the defendant’s testator against him, she made a note and a mortgage to secure it, to secure the debt of her husband, whereupon he was discharged on bail, Held, that as the action against the husband was not discontinued or any right thereunder surrendered, though defendant’s testator voluntarily refrained from prosecuting it, there was no consideration for the note and mortgage, and they should be set aside.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 316Cutting v. Massa (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment overruling demurrer.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 317Sichel v. Davies (1887)
<p>Exceptions ordered to be heard in the first instance at the general term.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 318Doyle v. Doyle (1888)
<p>Practice—Power oe surrogate under Code Civ. Pro., § 2710.</p> <p>Where a person cited as one having property of the deceased interposes a written answer, duty verified, that he is the owner of the property, etc., as provided in Code Civ; Pro., § 2710. Meld, that under said section the surrogate has no power to investigate the verity of the denial thus made, hut must dismiss the proceedings as to such property so claimed.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 323Gallatin v. Gallatin (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment recovered on trial at the special term.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 328People ex rel. Harrington v. Court of Special Sessions (1888)
<p>Certiorari to the court of special sessions.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 330Horgan v. Ricker (1888)
Appeals by the plaintiffs and the defendants from a judgment recovered and entered under the direction of the special term.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 337Purroy v. Schuyler (1888)
<p>Appeal from an order continuing an injunction.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 339Durant v. Abendroth (1888)
<p>1. Statute of limitations—When action not defeated by.</p> <p>The note which constituted one of the causes of action was proven to have been in part paid October 5, 1872, and this action was commenced on the 19th of September, 1878. Held, that the action for the balance due upon the note was not defeated by the Statute of Limitations.</p> <p>3. .Bills and notes—Evidence—When immateiual.</p> <p>One of the defendants was examined as a witness upon the trial, and by his cross-examination it was proved that the note was given to a firm who sold lumber to defendant’s firm. He was then asked whether 1he notes which were given to said lumber firm were for material used upon leasehold premises and whether the material was delivered before the note was given. Held, that they were properly excluded as immaterial.</p> <p>3. Statute of limitations—Avoidance of—Evidence—When sufficient under Code Civil Procedure, § 532.</p> <p>The complaint contained a statement fully setting forth a cause of action, for goods sold, and the defense of the statute of limitations was set forth in the defendant’s answer. The plaintiff was allowed to prove that they were sold on thirty days’ credit, and that this was the custom in the trade. Held, that the proof was admissible. That defendant’s answer could be legally avoided by this proof under Code Civil Procedure, § 522.</p> <p>4. Pleading—Answer—What is an admission of the making of a note.</p> <p>The answer denied the cause of action upon a certain note, but it afterward stated that the parties who were the holders of said note were made parties to proceedings in bankruptcy and that they proved this demand in those-proceedings and received a dividend thereon, stating the amount. Held, that this was sufficient admission of the making of the note, there being no evidence to the contrary, to entitle plaintiff to maintain this cause of action.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 376People v. Flegenheimer (1888)
<p>Forfeited recognizance—Judgment upon—Discharge of.</p> <p>To warrant the discharge of a judgment upon a forfeited recognizance, it must he shown to the court that the accused did not escape conviction through the absence of prosecutor and witness.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 381Horner v. Wehle (1888)
<p>1. Court of common pleas of New York—Jurisdiction upon appeal FROM CITY COURT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The general term, of the New York court of common pleas cannot disturb a verdict rendered in the New York city court because against the weight of evidence. Their only power to reverse a judgment of latter court is upon errors of law duly excepted to.</p> <p>3. Non-suit—Refusal of—When proper.</p> <p>If the evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim is such as to warrant a verdict in his favor, if no evidence is offered in the defendant’s behalf, a motion for a non-suit should be denied.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 382People v. McGinnis (1888)
<p>Forfeited recognizance—Application to vacate—What necessary to-show.</p> <p>Upon an application to vacate a judgment upon a forfeited recognizance it must not only appear that the accused was subsequently surrendered, tried and acquitted, but that the prosecutor and all the witnesses for the people were in attendance on the trial, and that the latter were examined if necessary, and a copy of the evidence taken must be produced.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 383Taylor v. Arnoux (1888)
<p>Appeal—Leave to appeal to covet op appeals—When granted.</p> <p>An order giving leave to appeal to the court of appeals, will not be granted, except where it is necessary to have some important question of law settled or where the interests involved are great, or numerous other actions are to be decided on the same principle.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 384Duval v. Wellman (1888)
<p>1. Contract—Promising marriage.</p> <p>Any contract or promise to do anything, in consideration of efforts in procuring a marriage, is void as against public policy.</p> <p>2. Same—Monet paid on. cannot be recovered back.</p> <p>Money paid upon such contract cannot be recovered back in an action for money had and received.</p> <p>3. Same—When no rescission.</p> <p>There can be no rescission of a contract void as against public policy, for in legal contemplation there is no contract to be rescinded.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 389Harris v. Berger (1888)
<p>Promissory notes—Signed in blank—Effect of delivery.</p> <p>Where printed promissory notes are signed in blank, and delivered to another for use as negotiable instruments, the person signing them confers upon the person to whom they are delivered implied authority to fill up the usual and ordinary blanks, such as date name of payee, amount and time of payment, and an innocent holder, who receives such notes properly filled out, may recover thereon as valid instruments. The rule stated does not authorize the holder to alter a note in which the blanks are all filled when it reaches his hands, as the unauthorized alteration of a completed instrument vitiates it. Neither does it apply to the case of a person who signs his name to a blank piece of paper, and it is wrongfully taken from his desk and a contract written over it; The distinctions pointed out.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 393Muller v. Cox (1888)
<p>Partnership— Courts of law—Jurisdiction of actions between partners.</p> <p>In order to justify an action at law by one partner against another, the cause of action must be so distinct from the partnership accounts as not to involve their consideration.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 395Pearson v. Gillotte (1888)
<p>Landlord and tenant—Eviction—Statute of 1860.</p> <p>Eviction, to constitute a defense, must occur before the rent claimed becomes due. Under the act of 1860, there can be no eviction where the tenant fails to quit and surrender the premises before the rent claimed becomes due.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 396Harris v. Rogers (1888)
<p>Broker—When not entitled to commission.</p> <p>Where the owner of real estate employs a broker to effect a sale or exchange of property, upon the condition that if he sold the property himself, before the broker introduced a customer, he would not pay brokerage, the broker introducing a customer after the owner has sold the property himself, is not entitled to commission. The owner in such a case is under no obligation to notify the broker of the sale.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 397Hubbard v. Gicquel (1888)
<p>„ Costs—Secubity bob—Undertaking' by attobney.</p> <p>Where the plaintiff’s attorney gives an undertaking as security for costs for a non-resident plaintiff, the attorney cannot be proceeded against summarily to compel their payment, as the remedy is on the undertaking. An undertaking executed by an attorney is not void.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 398Stone v. Foley (1888)
<p>Appeal from order denying motion to set aside judgment.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 399Fischer v. Keilly (1888)
<p>Contract—When not of sale—Right to reject goods.</p> <p>A person ordering a suit of furniture to be made in a particular way is under no obligation to accept a suit of different style or inferior make up. Right' to correct verdict to conform to the fact considered.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 404Duval v. Wellman (1888)
The action, so far as the record discloses, is for money had and received. The facts are: The defendant is the proprietor of a matrimonial bureau, and the plaintiff’s assignor, Mrs. E. Guión (a widow), being desirous of securing a companion for life, became a patron of the defendant’s establishment.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 416Estate of Stack (1887)
<p>1. Marriage and divorce—The person against whom divorce is obtained IN THIS STATE CAN CONTRACT VALID MARRIAGE IN ANOTHER STATE.</p> <p>notwithstanding the provision in a decree of divorce granted by a court of this state on the ground of adultery of one of the parties, prohibiting such party from marrying during the lifetime of the other, a marriage entered into by such party in another state if valid there is valid here. Following Yan Voorhis v. JBrintnall, 86 H. Y., 18.</p> <p>3. Same—When marriage in another state must be treated as valid TQjjRE.</p> <p>The defendant, while the husband of a third party left this state and went to Connecticut, where he unlawfully lived and cohabited wi,h the proponent. The result of such cohabitation was a daughter, Helena Stack. Afterward decedent’s then wife obtained a divorce with the usual prohibition against marriage of the decedent. Thereafter decedent and proponent went to Pennsylvania and were married, such marriage being valid by the laws of that state. They then returned to the state of Connecticut and recognized the said daughter as their own child, and decedent died in the latter state. The marriage to proponent was not shown to have been void by the positive laws of Connecticut or Hew York. Held, that it must be treated as valid in Hew York and valid in Connecticut.</p> <p>3 Same—Children born out oe lawful wedlock—When legitimatized-by laws of Connecticut.</p> <p>In the state of Connecticut and in the state of Pennsylvania a child born out of wedlock could be legitimatized by the subsequent marriage of its parents, provided only that the parents thereafter recognized the child as legitimate. Held, that Helena Stack from the time of the intermarriage of her parents became their legitimate child in the state of Connecticut, and. that she was decedent’s next of kin and heir-at-law in this state.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 420Estate of Stewart (1887)
<p>Will—Construction of.</p> <p>The testator’s will provided: “I direct my executors to pay the Hudson River State Asylum its charges for the care and support of my unfortunate brother * * * during the remainder of his natural life, and I make this expense a charge on my residuary personal estate.” Held, that it was the intention of the testator that “his unfortunate brother” should be cared for and supported throughout his ufe out of testator’s residuary estate. That the said asylum should furnish such care as long as it would and should receive from the executors a reasonable compensation therefor. If at any time said asylum shall cease to exist, or shall be unable or unwilling to furnish such care and support, it would be the duty of. the executors to apply to the court for direction in the premises.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 435Estate of Smith (1887)
<p>■1. Pleading—Supplemental return—When facts alleged constitute A SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION.</p> <p>Hew allegations of fact constitute a separate cause of action, when they tend to establish for the complainant a right to relief separate and distinct from the relief to which he might have been entitled from proof of other facts previously alleged.</p> <p>2. Same—When they do not constitute a separate cause of action.</p> <p>When an action or proceeding has been commenced upon certain allegations of fact, allegations of other facts merely tending to strengthen the complainant's right to the very relief originally demanded, and not tending to establish his right to separate and distinct relief, cannot be said to constitute a separate cause of action.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 438Estate of Sherman (1887)
<p>1. Will—Construction of.</p> <p>The wiU of the testator gave to his executors his entire estate upon the following trusts, to reduce “all my personal property into cash, and invest the same upon bond and mortgage, *' * * to sell all * * * real property and * * * to invest the proceeds. They shall divide * * * the proceeds from sale thereof into two equal parts, one of which equal parts I do hereby give to the child or children ot my daughter Mona Totten, and the other of which equal parts I do give to the child or children of my daughter Mary Caddick.” The devises were conditional that “in case Joseph Totten, the son of my said daughter Mona shall arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and shall not then have a brother or sister living, then he shall have the whole of the first * * * of said two parts,” but if, “upon his arrival at full age, there shall be a child or children of said Mona in addition to said Joseph,” the said part “ shall be divided equally among said children, share and share alike.” “In case my said daughter Mona die without leaving issue her surviving, the share * * * shall go to my grandchildren then living, share and share alike,” “The other of said equal two parts shall be paid to the children of my said daughter Mary Caddick, in equal shares, at their arrival at the age of twenty-one. * * * None of my grandchildren shall receive anything * * * until arrival of full age, or the death of his or her or their mother as aforesaid.” * * * Neld, that the two sets of grandchildren become absolutely entitled to their appropriate shares of this estate upon the deaths of Mrs. Totten and Mrs. Caddick respectively, and become earlier entitled thereto in the event of earlier attainment of majority in the life-time of their respective mothers.</p> <p>3. Same—Time of distribution.</p> <p>Neld, that if Mona Totten survive Mary Caddick for twenty-one years, then the entire estate is to be distributed among the grandchildren, even though some of them then surviving may not have come of age.</p> <p>3. Same—When alienation not unlawfully suspended.</p> <p>Neld, that the half of the estate which goes to the children of Mary Cad-dick is all to be distributed at her death, and parts may be distributed in advance of that period as her children come of age; that the half which goes to the children of Mona Totten is to be distributed upon her death, or sooner if her children sooner come of age, or if in her life-time a period of twenty-one years shall have elapsed after the death of Mary Caddick; that there is no unlawful suspension of the power of alienation.</p> <p>4. Same—Distribution of income.</p> <p>That the income of the estate prior to its distribution should be divided between the-testator’s daughters.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 442Estate of Coman (1887)
<p>1. Practice—Surrogate’s court—Account of deceased administrator —Who made to render.</p> <p>A, the executor or administrator of a decedent B, which decedent was in his life-time the executor or administrator of another decedent, 0 may he required, at the instance of any person interested in C’s estate, to account for B’s administration thereof, and may also he compelled to deliver to B’s successors in such administration any trust property of C’s estate that may have come to his (A’s) possession or under his control.</p> <p>2. Same—Petition—When insufficient under Code Civil Procedure, § 2706.</p> <p>The prayer of the petition was “ that H, as executor of the last will and testament of L, deceased, heretofore administrator of the goods, chattels and credits, which were of C, deceased, account for and deliver over any and all personal property and all hooks, records, letters and other memoranda, which came into his possession as executor as aforesaid, or has since come into his possession or under his control.” Held, that the petition must be dismissed under Code Civil Procedure, § 2606.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 443Estate of Connor (1887)
<p>Will—Construction of—3 R. S., past 3, chap. 1, title 3, § 98.</p> <p>The only dispositive provision of the will in question is in these words: “ I hereby direct my executors and executrix to distribute and apportion to my wife and children” (naming them, six in number, of whom three are yet minors), my estate in such manner and at such time or times as shall, in their judgment, be for the best interest of my wife and children, giving unto my executors and executrix full power to sell such and so much of nay_ real and personal property as they shall deem best, and to invest or distribute the proceeds of such sale as they shall deem best for the best interest of all. Three of testator’s children are named as executors and the wife as executrix. He'd, that in prescribing that the distribution and apportionment should be made “in such manner” as should commend itself to the judgments of the executors, the testator did not give or intend to give any direction in respect to the proportions in which his beneficiaries should share his estate, and therefore they are entitled to share equally in the ultimate distribution.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 445Estate of Willett (1887)
<p>1. Testamentary trustee—Accounting—Decree is only binding on PARTIES THERETO.</p> <p>Persons not parties to the accounting of a testamentary trustee in the supreme court are not bound by the decree of said court.</p> <p>2. Same—When liable fob misconduct of associate.</p> <p>One of two trastees cannot ordinarily be held liable for the misconduct of his associate, unless it is made to appear that he is personally chargeable with negligence.</p> <p>3. Same—What constitutes negligence in tbustee.</p> <p>The accounting trustee was the co-trustee of William M. Willett, Jr., during his life-time, and acted as sole trustee for a considerable period thereafter. If it should be made to appear that the value of the trust estate had been impaired by the misconduct of said Willett, Jr., and that such impairment might have been made good through prompt action on the part of the accounting trustee, and that the opportunity to recover from the estate of Willett, Jr., had been lost through the neglect of the accounting trustee, Held, that the latter could be held responsible, not for his co-trustee’s negligence, but for his own.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 445Estate of Britton (1887)
<p>Pleading—Parties—Persons severally liable on same instrument MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SAME ACTION—CODE OF PROCEDURE, § 120.</p> <p>Under Code of Procedure, § 120, persons severally liable upon the same obligation or instrument can be included in the same action. The circumstance that such persons could be held jointly liable is not an obstacle to such inclusion, or to the amplest judgment that the nature of the contract or obligation would admit of.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 449Estate of Paramore (1887)
<p>1. Practice nr surrogate’s court—Discovert proceedings—Code Civm Pro., § 2706.</p> <p>In a discovery proceeding in the surrogate’s court, commenced under the Code of Civil Procedure, § 2706, a citation must issue upon the filing of the petition and all subsequent steps in such proceeding await the return of the citation.</p> <p>2. Same—Laws or 1882, cbap. 410, §§ 222-224—When warrant will be issued.</p> <p>In a discovery proceeding brought by the public administrator pursuant to Laws 1882, chapter 410, §§ 222-224, no answer is contemplated, and the right of the public administrator to the issue of a warrant therein provided, depends entirely upon the disclosures of the examination of the witnesses brought in by the subpoena.</p> <p>3. Same—When personal estate reduced to possession bt roreign ADMINISTRATOR—OUR COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER.</p> <p>It appears that the decedent was at the time of his death a resident of the state of Missouri, and that letters of principal administration were there issued upon his estate. About two months before his death he had subscribed $20,000 toward the capital stock of a corporation, then in process of formation, under the Laws of this state. He had paid in the said $20,000, and received two certificates. It, also, appeared that at the time of the payment of this subscription the decedent entered into a written contract with R. & R., whereby he bound himself at any time within two years to sell to the said R. & R., the stock to which he had become entitled, at a stipulated price. After the death of the decedent these cer-' tificates came into the possession of the Missouri administrator, who prior to the issue of letters to the public administrator of Hew York, transferred them to K., who transferred them to R. & R., taking their note for the purchase price. Held, that this stock had been reduced to possession by the administrators of the decedent’s domicil before the jurisdiction of this court had been in any manner invoked. That this court has no jurisdiction to control the conduct of said foreign administrators. That this court could not compel R. & R. to pay over any sum in which they might be indebted to this estate.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 452Estate of Darragh (1887)
<p>1. Evidence—Physician—When incompetent as a witness—Code Crv. Pro., § 834.</p> <p>The only grounds upon which a physician’s testimony concerning his patient, is inadmissible, because of the mere relation of physician and patient are-the grounds stated in Code Civil Pro., § 834. It is not all information acquired by the physician that is excluded by said section. Information obtained by the physician, even when in actual attendance upon his patient, may be put' in evidence, provided the evidence was not necessary to enable him (the physician) to act in that capacity.</p> <p>53. Same'—-Competent to prove necessity of information.</p> <p>When one seeks to prove by; a physician, a fact regarding such physician’s patient,- the physician is himself a competent witness, to show whether his knowledge of such fact was or was not necessary to the due performance of his professional duties.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 464Reynolds v. Reynolds (1888)
<p>1. Agreement to farm on shares—Does not create relation oe landlord AND'TENANT—MAKES PARTIES TENANTS IN COMMON OE THE PRODUCE.</p> <p>This action was brought to replevy a quantity of wheat. The parties hereto entered into an agreement whereby the defendant was to work the farm of the plaintiff on shares for a term limited by the provisions of the agreement. Held, that the agreement did not constitute the legal relation of landlord and tenant, that the parties thereto became tenants in common of the products of the farm produced by the labor of the defendant.</p> <p>2. Same—Growing crops are personal- property.</p> <p>Held, that in the division óf property, growing crops were to be classed as personal property, and that the defendant had a legal title to an undivided half of the growing crops of wheat, unless the same was lost by non-performance of the agreement on his part.</p> <p>■8. Same—Breach of agreement.</p> <p>Held, that repeated threats made by the plaintiff to eject the defendant, though not amounting to an eviction, were such a breach of the agreement on his part as warranted the defendant in vacating the premises, and excused him from further performance of the agreement.</p> <p>4. Same—What act of party does not work forfeiture of shake in crops.</p> <p>_ Held, that such action on the part of the defendant did not forfeit his title to the share of the produce of the farm belonging to him under the agreement.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 488Blodgett v. Schofield (1888)
<p>Wills—Devise subject to power op sale—Power op sale constitutes CONDITION OF GIFT—COURT OF EQUITY WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH PERFORMANCE, EXCEPT IN CASE OF ABUSE, BAD FAITH OR FRAUD.</p> <p>A testatrix, by her will, devised certain lands to her brother, the father of the infant plaintiffs, for life, with remainder to them in equal shares. The will further contained a power of sale authorizing the executors, in case the brother of the testatrix should die, leaving any of his children under age, at any time after the death or coming of age of any of the children, in the exercise of their discretion, to sell, and convey any or all of the real estate so devised after the life estate, and keep the proceeds thereof invested for the benefit of the children until they became entitled to receive the same. Held, that the power of sale constituted a condition of the gift, and that the plaintiffs could not take the one without accepting the other. That it was not the province of a court of equity to relieve from such a condition, and that it would interfere only with the exercise of such a discretionary power in a clear case of abuse, bad faith or fraud.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 532In re the Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of McAlpine (1888)
<p>Appeal from the decree of the acting surrogate of Monroe county.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 542Leake v. Bundy (1888)
<p>Appeal from an order of special term, denying plaintiff’s motion to substitute the administrator of the deceased defendant, as defendant, and to confirm a referee’s report of sale in foreclosure, aud for judgment for a deficiency; or for such confirmation and judgment, in the name of the original parties, without substitution.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 546In re the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Railroad (1888)
Appeal by the Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power and Manufacturing Company, from an order of special term denying its application to be made a party to this proceeding.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 548Brush v. Batten (1888)
Appeal by defendant from an interlocutory judgment, entered on a special verdict at the circuit, and from an order of special term denying her motion for a new trial on case and exceptions.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 556Whitlock v. Forfar (1888)
Appeal by Kate Forfar from a judgment entered upon the decision of the Wayne county special term, giving a judicial construction to the last will and testament of Benjamin Whitlock.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 561Gisel v. City of Buffalo (1888)
<p>Submission of a case upon facts agreed upon pursuant to section 1278 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 570Walter Heywood Chair Manufacturing Co. v. Burns (1888)
<p>.1. Evidence—Goods sold and delivered—Order for goods—Evidence ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY TO MAKE.</p> <p>This action was brought to recover for chairs alleged to have been sold and delivered to the defendant. The evidence showed that the defendant was a furniture dealer, and had in his employ a brother who wrote upon stationery bearing the defendant’s business card, asking the price of a certain class of chairs, signing the letter as that of the defendant by himself; that the plaintiff answered this by letter addressed to the defendant at his place _ of business, and that thereupon the defendant wrote as before, ordering the chairs. The chairs were shipped by the plaintiff and sold by the defendant’s brother, and the money therefor placed in the defendant’s safe. The defendant testified that his brother had no authority to purchase the chairs, and that he was not aware of the fact that they had been ordered until the plaintiff drew on him for the amount of the purchase. Held, that from all the circumstances authority on the part of the writer of the letter ordering the chairs might be presumed, and that the letters written for that purpose were admissible in evidence, proof having been made of the receipt and sale of the chairs.</p> <p>2. Same—Authority to order—Evidence of—What considered.</p> <p>Held that while from the fact alone that the letter ordering the chairs had been written on the defendant’s stationery, authority for such an order could not be inferred, yet, in view of the circumstances, the court could not charge that no inference could be drawn from that fact.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 572Flint v. Rowell (1888)
<p>Excise law—Signing of license befobe the action of the boabd—Effect WHEN SAME IS GEANTED.</p> <p>The license in due form h: d heen prepared and signed by two of the commissioners prior to the action of the board upon the application and delivery of the same to the defendant. At a meeting of the board the license_wgs granted, Held, that the license was as effective, as evidence of the action of the board, as if it had been actually prepared and signed by the commissioners subsequent to the action of the board voting a license.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 576Calkins v. Chamberlain (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint, entered on the findings and decision of the court, without a jury, at the circuit.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 579Bishop v. Johnson (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury in the Cattaraugus county court in an'action first tried in justice’s court.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 581Bruton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance (1888)
<p>Submission of controversy under section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure upon facts agreed upon.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 583Rodman v. City of Buffalo (1888)
<p>1. Mortgages—Condemnation proceedings—Rights of mortgagor and MORTGAGEE.</p> <p>When land covered by the lien of a mortgage is taken by condemnation proceedings the amounts awarded it, received by the mortgagee, would go in reduction of the mortgage debt.</p> <p>2. Same—Mortgagee’s election of remedies in foreclosing the mortgage.</p> <p>The recovery of a deficiency judgment in an action of foreclosure does not bar the mortgagee's right to receive the award. The right exists until the deficiency is paid by the mortgagor, by doing which the mortgagor would become the beneficiary of the fund.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 587Fairmont Coal & Iron Co. v. Hasbrecht (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment dismissing the complaint, entered on the report of a referee.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 598Peck v. Kirtz (1888)
The purpose of the action was to restrain the defendant from entering judgment on a verdict in favor of her testatrix against the plaintiff, and from enforcing its collection. It appears that Jane A. Bush, having title to 157 acres of land, made to the plaintiff two deeds in October, 1872, in which her husband, Jamás F. Bush, joined. , And, although absolute in form, they were intended as security for moneys which the plaintiff had advanced and loaned to her and her husband.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 616Kerr v. Dildine (1888)
<p>1. Practice—Appeal from judgment irregularly entered—effect of.</p> <p>When a judgment is irregularly entered and an appeal is taken thei e-from, without first moving to set it aside, the appellant will be deemed to have waived the irregularity.</p> <p>2. Same—Disregard of direction to settle the form of the judgment BEFORE ENTRY—EFFECT OF.</p> <p>When an order is entered directing the settlement of the judgment, and the judgment is entered, without regard to this requirement, it is an irregularity, for which tile final judgment will be set aside.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 630National Bank of Commerce v. Manufacturers' & Traders' Bank (1888)
60, with costs. The questions of law and of fact, which the defendant seeks to review on this appeal, are presented by a bill of exceptions. The plaintiff, a banking corporation, doing business in Cleveland, Ohio, on the 30th day of October, 1882, drew its draft on the Manhattan Bank of New York, its correspondent in that city, for the sum of seventeen dollars, payable to the order of J. T. Watson, and delivered the same to him.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 644Gale v. Gale (1888)
<p>Equitable belief—When awabded, though not demanded — Must be WITHIN THE ISSUES.</p> <p>It is the well settled policy of courts of equity, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, after having acquired jurisdiction of the action, to retain it for all purposes necessary to afford complete relief. The recovery, however, must be within the scope of the pleading, and when matters within the issues are litigated the court will give relief to which it appears the plaintiff may be entitled, although not within that demanded in the complaint. But the recovery must he consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issues.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 647Mullen v. Lamphear (1888)
<p>1. Principal and agent—When one buying goods from an agent can COUNTER-CLAIM DEBT OF AGENT "WHEN SUED BY PRINCIPAL.</p> <p>When an agent dealing for his principal has the actual possession of the goods, and sells them as his own and delivers them in his own name, concealing from the purchaser that he is acting for another, the buyer has the right to consider him to all intents and purposes as the principal in the bargain, and may set off any claim he may have against the agent at the time the goods were delivered in answer to the demand of his principal.</p> <p>3. Same—When cannot.</p> <p>This rule does not apply when the purchaser has information from which he may fairly infer the existence of an agency, nor where the circumstances would ordinarily put him on inquiry.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 662Thalheimer v. Hays (1888)
<p>Appeal by the plaintiffs from order of Monroe special term, upon motion of certain judgment creditors of the defendants vacating attachments.</p> <p>The attachments were issued and levied upon the property of the defendants July 7, 1884, and judgments were ■recovered therein against them November 13th, and December 2, 1885, and executions issued. On August 2, 1884, one Perkins and another, recovered judgment against the defendants upon which execution was then issued. This judgment was afterward assigned to respondent Picard, who, on August 14, 1884, recovered a judgment against them, upon which execution was also issued. On August 29, 1884, respondent Goodwin recovered a judgment against the defendants, upon which execution was issued. The respondents Einstein and others recovered a judgment against the defendants July 18,1884, and on the same day Rowley & Johnson recovered a judgment against them and executions were issued upon their judgments.</p> <p>The motion upon which the order appealed from was made was founded upon the . alleged liens of those executions upon the attached property. And the motion was granted on the merits.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 666Vetter v. Kane (1888)
<p>Account stated—Sufficiency of evidence to prove.</p> <p>The evidence to support the finding of an alleged account stated was that the said paper was drawn off hy the defendant from an account of credits kept hy the plaintiff (which defendant did at plaintiff’s request), that it was not compared with the account as kept by the defendant and her husband, and that the plaintiff did not say it was, hut only that it was compared with his own account and found to be a correct copy. That when defendant handed said paper to the plaintiff she said “ there is your bill." Held, not sufficient to support the said finding of fact.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 668Colburn v. Trustees of the Village of Canandaigua (1888)
The action was brought to recover for personal injuries, suffered by the plaintiff in falling on the sidewalk of G-reig street, in the village of Canandaigua, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in permitting ice to remain on the walk. The plaintiff recovered $3,000.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 672Blaesi v. Blaesi (1888)
<p>1. Husband and wife—Conveyance from wife to husband—Burden OF PROOF OF EXECUTION AND CONSIDERATION.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, as heirs of Jacob Blaesi, deceased, attempted to establish title to ceitain real property under an alleged deed from his wife to him, against the defendant, whose title was of record and undisputed, except, for the allegations of such deed. Held, that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to establish, by clear and satisfactory evidence, not only execution of the deed by the wife and delivery by her to the husband, but also an adequate valuable consideration for such conveyance moving to the wife and enuring to her benefit.</p> <p>2. Same—Improvments put upon land—Not an adequate consideration.</p> <p>Improvements put upon a property by the husband in expectation of its conveyance to himself by his wife and after it is so conveyed, is not such a consideration.</p> <p>3. Same—Evidence—Competency—Code Civ. Pro., § 829.</p> <p>There was evidence tending to show that the alleged deed was in a certain desk which the defendant testified contained only her husband’s papers. Meld, that it was competent for defendant to testify that there never was a deed in that desk to her from said deceased husband; that the question involved no transaction between the defendant and deceased.</p> <p>4. Same—Evidence op pact op acknowledgment op deed—Competent.</p> <p>The acknowledgment of a deed is no part of the contract between the parties, but only affords a mode of proof of the contract. It was competent for defendant to testify that she never acknowledged a deed before anybody.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 675In re the Final Judicial Settlement of the Accounts of Wells (1888)
<p>Appeal by Frederick Fagan et al., from the decree of the surrogate of Seneca county, making a final distribution of the assets of the estate of Eunice B. Cook, deceased, who died on the 22d day of October, 1885, leaving a last will and testament, dated November 5, 1878, in terms disposing of all her property, both real and personal.</p> <p>The will contains several specific devises and bequests of parcels and items of real and personal property, none of which were brought in question on the accounting. The appellants claim the right to share in the distribution of the balance of the estate, which amounted in the aggregate to the sum of $44,432.43, under and by virtue of the tenth clause of the will, which is as follows:</p> <p>Tenth. “Ido will, give and bequeath and devise all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, of all kinds and descriptions, as follows, and subject to the following provisions, viz.: .One equal one-eighth part thereof unto Joseph Cooke, of Lowell, Mass.; one other equal one eighth part unto Persis Parke, of Lowell, Mass.; one other equal one-eighth part thereof unto Chester Cooke, of Janesville, Wis.; one other equal one-eighth part thereof unto Nathan Cooke, of Preston, Ct.; one other equal one-eighth part thereof unto Josephine Ferrie, of Middletown, Ct.; one other equal eighth part thereof unto the children of Isaac H. Cooke, late of Preston, aforesaid, share and share alike. One other equal one-eighth part thereof unto the children of Dwight W. Cooke, late of Norwich, Ct., share and share alike; and the other equal eighth part thereof unto the children of Christia Gore, late of Brooklyn, N. Y., share and share alike, to have and to hold the same to them, their heirs and assigns forever. But I do expressly authorize and empower my said executor to sell and convey and dispose of said residue and remainder of my said estate, above referred to, when and as he thinks best; but if he shall sell all or any thereof, the proceeds thereof of the parts or part so sold shall be divided and disposed of finally as hereinbefore indicated, and said respective parts or portions of said residue and remainder are herein and hereby bequeathed and devised subject to such power of sale by my said executor, but he need not execute such power of sale unless he deems it best to do so. And from the time of my decease until said residue and remainder is finally disposed of, under this will, my said executor shall have charge of said residue and remainder, and take possession thereof and collect the rents, issues and profits thereof and divide and pay over the same to the parties entitled thereto, after deducting therefrom his fees and commissions and necessary expenses of collection, taxes and repairs, if any.”</p> <p>The testatrix derived title to all of her estate as a gift from her husband, Calvin W. Cooke, who died in 1873, leaving a last will and testament by which he devised and bequeathed to her all of his property. The persons appointed legatees and devisees in the tenth clause of said will were all the next of kin of Calvin W. Cooke at the date of the said will of Eunice B. Cooke; the persons whose names were given in that clause being his brothers and sisters. The-sixth finding of fact of the referee is as follows:</p> <p>“6. After the making of her said will and before the death of the testatrix, four of the persons named in the said tenth clause died, viz., Persis Parke, who died on July 23, 1880. She was born on May 8, 1796; Chester Cooke, who died September 2, 1880. He was bom March 27,1798; James Cooke, who died April 10, 1884. He was born October 4, 1794; and Nathan Cooke, who died May 25,1885. He was bom November 20, 1802.”</p> <p>The appellants are the children and heirs-at-law, next of kin and successors in interest of the said Persis Parke, Chester Cooke, James Cooke and Nathan Cooke, who are mentioned in the tenth clause of the will. The surrogate held, as a conclusion, that the several legacies and devises to Persis Parke, Chester Cooke, James Cooke and Nathan Cooke, contained in the tenth clause of the will of said decedent on the death of the said devisees and legatees, lapsed, and that as to the portion of her estate given to them in that clause the testator dies intestate, and the same passed and descended to the testator’s next of kin and heirs-at-law, and excluded the appellants from sharing in its distribution. From this decree the appellants have taken an appeal.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 681Frank v. Otis (1888)
<p>1. Master and servant—Duty of master to provide safe machinery.</p> <p>It is a duty which the master owes to his servants to use all reasonable care, diligence and caution in providing for the safety of those in his employ and furnishing for their use in his work safe, sound and suitable tools, implements, appliances and machinery in the prosecution thereof, and keep the same in repair.</p> <p>8. Same—Duty not absolute.</p> <p>This duty of the master is not an absolute one and is satisfied by the use of reasonable care and prudence in the selection and repair of the machinery and appliances.</p> <p>3. Same—What duty only discharged by performance.</p> <p>The defect, if any existed in this case, was in the construction of the machinery, and the negligence imputed to the defendants was, in not useing ordinary care and caution in inspecting the same with a view of ascertaining whether it was safe and secure for the purpose for which it was being used. Held, that this duty could only be discharged by a performance. That it was not a case where the injury (which resulted in death) was caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant.</p> <p>4. Evidence—Competency of.</p> <p>In an action for damages caused by the death of the father of a family whom he had supported bjr the avails of his daily labor, Held, that it was competent to prove, in actions of this character, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary loss sustained by the next of kin, the character, qualities, capacity and financial condition of the deceased, and the age, sex, circumstances, and financial condition of the next of kin.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 699Sprout v. Newton (1888)
<p>1. Contract of sale—Warrant—Evidence—Competency of.</p> <p>In an action to recover part of the purchase price of a patent evaporator remaining due, it appeared that the evaporator was warranted to have an evaporating capacity of one hundred and fifty bushels of apples in twenty-four hours. It was competent for defendant to prove by a witness (who had used the same style and size of machine and had seen other like machines work, but had not seen the machine in question, that from his experience in running one of these evaporators, such as had been described) what would be the capacity of said evaporator. That slight difference in the machine, which was proved not to affect its capacity, did not render the evidence incompetent.</p> <p>2. Same—Executory contract—Right of vendee to sue on warrant.</p> <p>The vendee, under an executory contract of sale, has the right, after ac ceptance, to avail himself of an express warranty contained in said contract in support of a claim for damages sustained by its breach.</p> <p>3. Same—Measure of damages.</p> <p>In the absence of allegations of special damages, it may be for the purpose of the trial that the damages in view are such only as may reasonably be supposed to, have been within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made; for the breach of warranty on the sale of personal property, in respect to its character or quality, the damages are measured only by the difference between the value of it as it was and the value, if as warranted, it would have had.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 704In re Estate of Thorpe (1888)
<p>Will—Construction on.</p> <p>The testator by the first clause of his will, gave the use of his estate, real and personal, to his wife Eliza Thorpe, during her life and added these words, “And out of said property, I desire that my said wife shall support and maintain my aged brother, William Thorpe.” By the second clause he provided that in case his brother should survive his wife, that it was his will and devise that he should have his support out of his estate so long as he should live. The will then gave money legacies amounting to $260, to other relatives- and by the eighth clause he devised the residue of his estate to his two grand-sons Horace C., and Elmer E. Seeley, residuary legatees, reserving therefrom the support of his said aged brother, if he should survive his said wife, so long as he should live. The testator at the time of making his will, and at his death, owned a farm of ninety-two acres worth $2,000, and personal property and farming implements thereon, worth $1,000, of which personal property the said residuary legatees received during the life of Eliza Thorpe, in value, over $550. A claim was presented by Albert Thorpe, son of deceased, on judicial settlement, of $462.66, for the support of said William Thorpe, during the life of said Eliza, which the executor allowed. Held, first, that such claim was a charge upon the estate generally, and not solely upon its use as devised to the wife. Second, that under the will the widow had the right to use the corpus of the personal property if necessary for the support tif William Thorpe, and that as the residuary legatees had received during the life of the widow of such property, more than sufficient to pay said claim of $462.66; that in equity and law, the residuary estate in their hands should be charged with such support. Third, that the words in the first clause of the will, “And out of said property I desire that my said wife shall support and maintain my aged brother, William Thorpe,” considered in connection with the facts as proved and the second and third clauses of the will, created a trust or charge upon the decedent’s estate and were not simply precatory.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 707Estate of Ackerman (1887)
<p>Will—Construction of. '</p> <p>The tenth clause of the testator’s will provided “In case of the death of any person entitled to share in my estate, under and by the provisions of this my will, the lawful heirs of such person shall take if living subject to the provisions of this my will, except as herein otherwise provided. There was no provision in the will which excepted the eighth clause which was as follows: “I do hereby give * * * the other of my said sixth parts unto my daughter Maria * * * to her own use for ever * * * upon these conditions * * * if the said Maria shall die leaving no descendants surviving, then and in that case, it is my will and I do hereby in that case give * * * the said sixth part upon the decease of my daughter Maria, as follows: one equal fifth part of said sixth each unto my said children, Garret, etc.,” * * * Held, that the provision of clause eighth limiting over the share given to Maria, in the event of her death leaving no descendants surviving was not repugnant to the previous gift to Maria, although that was in its terms absolute. That the share which the testator’s son Garret would have taken in the event of his surviving his sister Maria goes under said will to such of testator’s children and grandchildren as survived Maria per stirpes and not per capita.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 712Estate of McCunn (1887)
<p>1. Practice—Surrogate’s court—Decree on accounting—Effect of on PARTIES NOT CITED.</p> <p>The executor of the estate filed an account on which a decree was entered. Afterwards he filed a second account citing as parties thereto certain persons who were grand-nieces of the decedent and were among the heirs-at-law and next of kin of decedent. The executor’s petition referred to the decree on the first accounting and alleged that by that decree, the account of his administration had been judicially settled and determined up to and including the date of said first account. The second account covered his proceedings since the last named date. It appeared that the said grand-nieces were not cited to appear in the proceedings for the first accounting, and that no special guardian was appointed to protect their interest. Held, that the decree on the first accounting in no way affected the rights of said grand-nieces in the present accounting proceeding to institute-inquiry into the executor’s management of this estate from the beginning.</p> <p>2. Same—Code Civil Pbocedtjbe § 1848.</p> <p>Held, that the concluding clause of Code Civil Procedure, § 1848 must be interpreted as providing either first, that an executor’s account when settled by decree of the surrogate must be received as presumptive evidence against all defendants in a creditor's suit against heirs, or that it is merely presumptive evidence against such of the defendants as had been parties to such decree.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 716Estate of Beckett (1887)
<p>1. Will—Construction or.</p> <p>The will of the testatrix bequeathed “ to my niece, Alice McBlair, all the money I die possessed of in several banks and bonds.” It appeared that besides certain bonds and money in incorporated saving banks there was, at the death of the testatrix, a sum of money belonging to her, on deposit with the Very Reverend Thomas S. Preston. Held, that this fell within the meaning or the term “ money in bank,” as used in said clause.</p> <p>2. Same—Specific legacy—When it can be used to pay expenses of ADMINISTRATION, ETC.</p> <p>Held, that the gift to Alice McBlair was a specific legacy, and that, until the assets of the estate, not covered by that gift, were exhausted, no resort could be had thereto for the payment of deots and funeral and administration expenses.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 718In re the Estate of Gilman (1887)
<p>Practice—Contempt—What must be shown under Code Crv. Pro., § 2268.</p> <p>To punish a person for contempt under Code Civ. Pro., § 2268, for the non-payment of money ordered to be paid by the court, the “ personal demand ” of which the said section required that the court must be satisfied by affidavit, must be a demand by or on behalf of the party to whom the order requires payment to be made.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 719Estate of Wellenberger (1887)
<p>Exbcutobs and administrators—Accounting—Pasties—Jurisdiction OF SURROGATE AS TO CLAIM AGAINST EXECUTOR IN FAVOR OF ESTATE.</p> <p>In a proceeding by the administratrix of defendant, to obtain judicial settlement of her accounts, it appears that the decedent was engaged in business in partnership with one Gan ter, who died in decedent’s life time, and while such partnership existed, leaving a will of which decedent was appointed executor. The decedent received letters testamentary, and af'er his death one Welle was appointed administrator c. t. a., of Ganter’s estate. Such administrator has been cited by petitioner to attend her accounting, because he' has claimed to be interested in this estate as the representative of decedent’s deceased partner. Welle protests against being treated as a party to this proceeding to be bound as such by any decree in which it shall terminate. Held, that the objection to the jurisdiction of the surrogate is well taken. Neither at the instance of this accounting party, nor upon the demand of the objection, nor by the consent of both, can the surrogate’s court, in the proceedings, adjust the difference between the. parties.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 721In re the Estate of Barlow (1888)
<p>Executors and administrators—May not purchase property op decedent.</p> <p>The sale by the administrator of the deceased member of a copartnership of his interest in the firm property to the survivor, and his individual purchase of the same from the survivor is unlawful. A trustee cannot sell trust property to himself.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 722In re the Estate of Wood (1888)
<p>1. Executors and administrators—Accounting of—Petition for—Who MAT PRESENT—CODE ClT. PRO., §§ 2726, 2514.</p> <p>Under the authority of Code Civil Procedure, section 2726, a person interested in an estate or fund in the hands of an executor or administrator may present a petition, praying for a judicial settlement of the account, and that the executor or administrator may he cited to show cause why he should not render and settle his account. By section 2514, subdivision 11, “A person interested in the estate or fund ” is defined to mean “ Every person entitled either absolutely or contingently to share in the estate or the proceeds thereof, or in the fund, as husband, wife, legatee, next of kin, heir, devisee, assignee, grantee or otherwise, except as creditor. Held, that the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York were not authorized by these sections to present such a petition.</p> <p>2. Judgment—Cannot be attacked collaterally.</p> <p>A judgment cannot be attacked collaterally.</p> <p>3. Executors and administrators — Accounting of — Petition for— Grounds for dismissal.</p> <p>The petition of a party claiming to be interested in the estate or fund must be dismissed, if his claim is derived from a clause in a will which attempts to create a trust which is void under the statute of perpetuities.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 725In re the Estate of Harnett (1888)
<p>1. Executors and administrators—Accounting of—Attorney’s fees— Burden of proof of necessity for tests on accounting party.</p> <p>The tact of payment by an executor .or administrator of a sum of money for attorney’s fees is not sufficient to cast the burden of impeaching its justness upon the objector.</p> <p>2. Same—May be deprived of right to commissions and charged with EXPENSES OF ACCOUNTING FOR NEGLIGENCE IN ADMINISTRATION.</p> <p>In cases of negligence in the administration of an estate an executor or administrator may be deprived of the right to commissions and charged with the expenses of accounting.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 727In re the Estate of Farley (1888)
<p>1. Collateral inheritance tax—Liability op executor for—Can only BE DETERMINED IN MANNER PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE—LAWS 1885, CHAP. 483, AS AMENDED By Laws 1887, CHAP. 713.</p> <p>A surrogate cannot, upon the motion of an executor, decide the question of his liability as such to pay the collateral inheritance tax provided for in Laws 1885, chap. 483, as amended by Laws 1887, chap. 713. The only method in which a decision of the question can be obtained, is by proceedings instituted by the district attorney as provided by § 16 of that act.</p> <p>2. Surrogate’s court—Surrogate may authorize compromise of claims DUE ESTATE, BUT NOT AGAINSt ESTATE.</p> <p>A surrogate has power upon the application of an executor to authorize him to compromise and settle a claim due the estate, but not a claim against it.</p> <p>3. Collateral inheritance tax—Certain trusts exempt from.</p> <p>When by her will a testatrix bequeaths all her property to her executor individually, agreeing with him at the time of the execution of the will that the bequest shall be in trust for her brother, such trust is within the exemptions of the statute.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 731In re the Estate of Nockin (1888)
<p>1. Executors and administrators—Accounting—Allowance oe disbursements.</p> <p>The fact that an administrator had paid certain disbursements to counsel is not sufficient to warrant their allowance upon his accounting, and such explanation as would satisfy judicial inquiry must be offered to justify it.</p> <p>2. Same—Accounting—Allowances under Code Civ. Pro., § 2562— What not allowed.</p> <p>Under Code Civil Procedure, section 2562, the attorney for the next of kin of an intestate is not entiled to be allowed compensation by the surrogate for days spent by him in examination of the administrator’s account or otherwise preparing for trial.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 733In re the Estate of Smith (1888)
<p>1. Contempt op court—Service op order—What is sufficient to place A PARTY IN CONTEMPT FOR DISOBEDIENCE TO ORDER.</p> <p>In order that the court may adjudge a party to he in contempt for neglect to comply with an order directing her to discover and produce hooks and papers for inspection, the order must he served on her personally. Service on her attorney is not sufficient.</p> <p>Ü. Inspection and discovery—Order granting—Affidavits to vacate under Code Civil Procedure, § 806, sued. 2—When must be presented.</p> <p>In order to he effectual affidavits provided for by Code Civil Procedure, § 806, subdivision 2, should be presented by the party upon the return of the order directing her to allow an inspection and discovery or in default thereof to show cause.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 734In re the Estate of Fithian (1888)
<p>1. Resulting trust—An investment op funds op an estate, made by AN EXECUTOR POR THE BENEFIT OP HIS WIFE, CONSTITUTES HER A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE.</p> <p>Where an executor, who is the surviving partner oí the testator, receives money in either capacity, and invests it for the benefit of his wife, she will be a constructive trustee, and a trust will result in favor of the original cestui que trust.</p> <p>2. Accounting—Executor op an executor may be made to account IN THE SAME CASES AS HIS TESTATOR—CODE OlV. PRO., § 2606.</p> <p>Under the provisions of Code Civ. Pro., § 2606, an executor of a deceased executor may be made to account as his testator might be.</p> <p>3. Same—Surrogate may allow amendment op objection to—Referee HAS LIKE POWER.</p> <p>A surrogate may entertain, a motion to amend an objection to an account and to allow for the objection, and a referee to whom the accounting is referred has like power.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 737In re Estate of O'Gara (1888)
<p>1. Gifts mortis causa—Donor must part with dominion over subject OF GIFT.</p> <p>It is essential to a gift mortis causa not only that the donor should re nounce and the donee acquire all interest in and title to the subject of the gift, but that at the time of the delivery the donor should part with the dominion over as well as the possession of the subject of the gift.</p> <p>2. Same—Delivery.</p> <p>The fact of delivery of the subject of the gift must be clearly shown, and possession by the alleged donee will not be conclusive when the relations existing between her and the donor were such that the subject of the gift would ordinarily be in the possession of the alleged donee.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 742In re the Estate of Colwell (1888)
<p>1. Assets—What abe—Debt due from legatee to testator is satisfaction of legacy pro tanto.</p> <p>A debt due the testator from one to whom he has given a legacy is an asset of the estate in the hands of the legatee, and is, to the extent of such asset a satisfaction of the legacy.</p> <p>2. Debts from "legatee to testator—Validity of cannot be tried by surrogate’s court.</p> <p>Upon a dispute as to the validity of the indebtedness the surrogate's court has no power to decide the controversy or to gainsay the correctness of the position of the executors that it is valid. The objecting party may have the question in another court.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 743In re the Estate of Dougherty (1888)
<p>Execution against administratrix—What necessary to authorize issuance of — Intermediate accounting under Code Civ. Pro., § 2723.</p> <p>An application was made for leave to issue execution against the administratrix of the estate of a decedent upon a judgment recovered against her as such administratrix. The petition did not disclose the extent of the assets of the decedent, their sufficiency or otherwise to satisfy claims having an equal or prior right to payment, or whether such claims existed. Held, that information as to these points was necessay to enable the surrogate to decide whether to authorize the issuance of an execution, and that for that end the administratrix should file an intermediate account under Code Civ. Pro., § 2723.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 743In re the Estate of Smith (1888)
<p>Surrogate’s court—Papers used on proceeding in—When may be removed from files of court—Code Crv. Pro., § 2500.</p> <p>By Code Civil Procedure, section 2500, the surrogate is required to file and preserve in his office every deposition, affidavit, petition, report, account voucher or other paper relating to any proceeding in his court, and deliver to _ his successor all papers and books kept by him. Held, that after having been copied by the stenographer of the surrogate’s court, books and writings produced by a proponent of a will as exhibits, might be returned on his application, but that unless so copied they could not be removed from the flies of the court.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 744In re the Estate of Zeuschner (1888)
<p>Executors and administrators—Accounting of—Petition for by creditor under Code Civil Procedure, § 2726.</p> <p>It is provided by Code Civil Procedure, § 2726, that in certain cases a petition praying for the judicial settlement of an account and that the executor or administrator may he cited to show cause why he should not render and settle his account, may be presented by a creditor. Held, that to entitle a person to the benefit of that provision the petition should show the nature and character of the debt claimed to be due to the petitioner, the amount thereof and when the same became due and payable.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 745In re the Estate of Witmark (1888)
<p>1 Surrogate’s courts—Appeal from decree of—When appeal is perfected—Code Civ. Pro., §§ 2577, 2578.</p> <p>It is provided by Code Civil Procedure, section 2577, to render a notice of appeal from a decree of a surrogate’s court effectual for any purpose, except in a case specified in the next section, or where it is specially prescribed by law, that security is not necessary to perfect the appeal; the appellant must give a written undertaking as therein directed. Held, that the undertaking provided for by Code Civil Procedure, section 2578, would not stay the execution of a decree appealed from, unless the appeal had been perfected by giving the undertaking specified in section 2577.</p> <p>2. Same — Discretionary power of surrogate to permit a party to PERFECT APPEAL—CODE OlV. PRO., §§ 2275, 1303.</p> <p>The surrogate is empowered by Code Civil Procedure, sections 2275 and 1303, to permit a party having served a notice of appeal from a decree to perfect his appeal by giving the undertaking provided for by section 2577.</p> <p>3. Same—Appeal from part of decree does not stay execution of OTHER PART FROM WHICH NO APPEAL IS TAKEN.</p> <p>Where a part only of a decree is appealed from, such part as is not appealed from is unaffected, and may be enforced.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 746In re the Estate of Benedict (1888)
<p>1. Executors and administrators—Accounting of—Taxes paid on land OF DECEDENT NOT ALLOWED ON.</p> <p>An executor or administrator upon his final accounting as such will not be allowed for sums used by him to pay taxes levied upon real property of the deceased after his death.</p> <p>2. Same— Stay of proceedings—vvhat is not sufficient GROUND.</p> <p>The pendency of an action which involves the question of the title of the deceased to lands is not sufficient ground for a stay of proceedings on the account of an executor or administrator and objections thereto.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 748In re the Estate of Conkling (1888)
<p>Surrogate’s courts—Distribution op estates.</p> <p>Where the law requires the surrogate to direct an ancillary executor to remit assets of an estate, to a prohate court of another state the fact that the property will come to the hands of a person inexperienced in business does not give him any discretion in the matter.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 749In re the Estate of Tobin (1888)
<p>Presumption of death—When seven tears absence will not give RISE TO.</p> <p>The mere absence of parties for a period of seven years will not raise the presumption of their death unless relatives and others who would naturally hear from them have not so heard.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 752In re the Estate of Johnson (1888)
<p>Executor—What must be proven to warrant removal of.</p> <p>An executor being a confidential agent solemnly chosen by the testator to execute his wishes, will not be removed by the court except upon undoubted proof of his utter improvidence and unfitness for his trust.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 753In re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of White (1888)
<p>1. Will—Probate—Evidence to entitle paper to.</p> <p>The fact that the testator, immediately after the execution of his will, takes and keeps it in his possession afterwards is not legal evidence that it is his will, nor does it raise such a presumption. Knowledge of its contents before its execution must be shown in order to entitle it to be probated.</p> <p>3. Same—Insanity—Definition.</p> <p>Insanity is a departure from the state of feeling and mode of activity usual to an individual when in health.</p> <p>3. Same — Will of person ordinarily insane—When entitled to PROBATE.</p> <p>The will of a person ordinarily insane, or sometimes having insane delusions upon some subject, must be admitted to probate if it was made when he was having a lucid interval and laboring under no delusions with reference to those who claimed to be entitled to his bounty.</p> <p>4. Same—Undue influence—Evidence of.</p> <p>To make opportunity to unduly influence a testator available as evidence. of undue influence, it should appear that the testator was of weak mind, unable to resist importunities, so enfeebled by sickness, old age or other causes, that he was unable to get away from his surroundings, among friends in whom he could trust and where he would be free from any restraint, free from the watchfulness of greedy heirs and beyond the influence which would not leave him a free agent.</p> <p>5. Same—Ofpobtunity fob undue influence—Weight of.</p> <p>Where the party is disabled by any cause from having a chance to act freely and independently, the fact of opportunity existing to bring about an unjust will always has great weight with the court.</p> <p>6. Same—Wife may induce husband to make will pboviding fob heb.</p> <p>The wife has the legal right to induce her husband to make a will, provided he is competent to make one and no improper influences are brought to bear upon him, which will provide for the widow suitable maintenance after his death.</p> <p>7. Same—Altebations of pboyisions in fobmeb will.</p> <p>When a person has once made a will and subsequently makes radical changes from his former will under suspicious circumstances, this fact, may be taken into consideration, and have an important bearing in determining whether the last was made free from undue influence, fraud or imposition, and when the testator was of sound disposing mind and memory.</p> <p>8. Same—Expbession of opinion as to not making will.</p> <p>When a person who had never made a will was in the habit of expressing disapproval of making will and declaring that the law makes the best will, etc., afterwards makes a will, no conclusion of undue influence should be drawn from the simple fact that he subsequently made a will.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 784In re the Probate of the Last Will & Testament of Gould (1888)
<p>1. Evidence—Expert testimony—Signature—Weight.</p> <p>The fact that one expert in testifying as to the genuineness of the signature in question, assumed to point out minute distinctions between the forms of the letters in signatures which were conceded to be genuine and the appearance of corresponding letters in the signature in question, while the testimony of another expert was chiefly as to the similarity in the general appearance of the genuine and disputed signature, Held, not to be of special importance. That the one opinion did not necessarily have greater weight than the other.</p> <p>2. Same—Weight op evidence.</p> <p>The uncertain recollections of witness as to the exact day and hour on which unimportant events of three years back occurred is not sufficient warrant for declaring reputable witnesses forgers and perjurers,</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 788Hatfield v. Hatfield (1888)
<p>1. Sheriff—Action against.</p> <p>If a sheriff returns an execution satisfied, he may he proceeded against by action or attachment.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>It is a necessary part of the return that the money (if not paid over to the parties) be brought into court.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 790Halstead v. Nelson (1888)
<p>On the retrial of this case at the Rome circuit the jury-rendered a verdict for the plaintiff of $500. A motion was made by the defendant’s counsel for a new trial on the minutes, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 804Smith v. Smith (1888)
Plaintiff and defendant are sisters. The plaintiff, in 1884, was living in Flatlands, Kings county. She had, in the savings banks-in Brooklyn, a considerable sum of money. Her sister Caroline, the defendant, offered to put out this money for her on bond and mortgage, so she could get more interest than in the bank. Plaintiff thereupon went to the savings bank with the defendant, drew out her money, and gave $2,000 of it to the defendant to invest for her on bond and mortgage.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 814Stehlin v. Golding (1888)
<p>This was an action by vendee against vendor for rescission of a contract of sale of real estate and for damages, on the ground of alleged defective title. The premises were, originally owned by one Nelson Tomlinson, who by quitclaim deed, dated September 18, 1876, acknowledged September 19, 1876, and recorded September 19, 1876, for an expressed consideration of five dollars, “ and other good and sufficient considerations ” him moving, conveyed the premises to one John Barrie, and the said John Barrie, by quitclaim deed, dated September 18, 1876, acknowledged September 19, 1876, and recorded September 20, 1876, for a like expressed consideration, conveyed the same premises, by the same description to one Ellen Tomlinson. Both of these grantors were married, but their wives did not join-in either of these deeds.</p> <p>Upon the trial it appeared that Barrie -was the son-in-law of said Nelson and Ellen Tomlinson, who were man and wife. The originals of these two deeds were not produced,, and the deed from Nelson Tomlinson to Barrie, as recorded,, was defectively acknowledged, in that the officer taking-the acknowledgment certifies that “before me personally came Nelson Tomlinson, , to be the individual described in and who executed the within conveyance, who acknowledged that he executed the same.”</p> <p>The defendant’s counsel objected to the introduction of the record of this deed in evidence, on account of the defect, in the acknowledgment, and the court sustained the objection, but permitted plaintiff to prove that he had received actual notice of the existence of such deed. The-plaintiff vendee proved by Mrs. Barrie’s sister that Barrie and his wife were married prior to September, 1876, and that he and his wife and the said Ellen Tomlinson were all still living, and that Barrie and his wife had been asked to. execute a release of Mrs. Barrie’s interest in the premises, and had refused.</p> <p>The subscribing witness to the two deeds, who was a-lawyer, was called by the defendant, and swore that the two deeds in question were drawn and recorded by him at the request and by direction, and upon the employment of Nelson Tomlinson, and to the best of his recollection for the purpose of vesting the title of the premises in the said Ellen, wife of the said Nelson Tomlinson; and that both deeds were paid for by said Nelson Tomlinson, and as the witness remembered upon being directed by said Nelson to have the title transferred from himself, said Nelson, to his wife, said Ellen, the witness stated that it would be necessary to make the transfer through a third person, and thereupon said Nelson directed said transfer to be made through his son-in-law Barrie, and that the witness did not see any money or other consideration pass between any of the parties, and that he could not remember how it was that the second deed was recorded the day after the first one. This evidence was not controverted.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s counsel maintained that the title was defective, and that the evidence now offered, which would seem to show that Barrie had no estate of ids own in the premises, was not res adjudícala as to him (said Barrie) or his wife, as they were not before the court or parties to the suit, and, therefore, were not estopped, and that, non constat, Mrs. Barrie might in the future claim dower after her husband’s death, and that the plaintiff should not be compelled to accept a title which was based partly upon facts requiring evidence aliunde. The defendant’s counsel contended, first, that in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, the presumption arising from these two deeds alone, based upon their respective dates, record, consideration, etc., was that Barrie was a mere conduit, and that the sole object was to transfer the title from the husband, Tomlinson, to his wife; but, secondly, that the evidence of the witness who drew and recorded the deeds that the facts were as claimed, established the fact fully and clearly, and that the title was, therefore, shown to be unimpeachable, and that as Barrie was a mere conduit of title, his only estate in the premises was as trustee, upon an implied trust to immediately reconvey to his mother-in-law, said Ellen Tomlinson.</p> <p>The court gave judgment for the defendant, rendering the following decision:</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 816Village of Tarrytown v. Pocontico Water Co. (1888)
<p>1. Water companies—Laws, 1873, chap. 737—Intention op legislature —Power to extend pipes to contiguous localities.</p> <p>The defendant is a water company, duly incorporated under the Laws of 1873, chapter 737, and acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. The company made contracts with the villages of West Tarrytown, Dobbs Ferry and Hastings to supply them with water. In so doing, the defendant attempted to lay its pipes through the streets of the village of Tarrytown. An injunction was obtained restraining such action and an order was afterwards entered dissolving the same. On appeal, held, that it was the intention of the legislature to provide a scheme by which a water company might extend its operations to contiguous localities by passing its pipes along intervening streets and public places.</p> <p>2. Injunction to restrain a trespass—When granted.</p> <p>Held, it is not usual to enjoin a mere trespass unless it is made to appear that the damages are irreparable or the defendant is insolvent.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 893Smith v. Smith (1888)
<p>Wills—Construction on devise.</p> <p>The will of a testator, after the payment of his debts, devised certain real property to one of his daughters, subject, however, to the condition that she do fully pay and discharge all my funeral expenses, and, also, pay to my daughter, “ the sum of fifty (50) dollars, all such payments to be made within sixty days after my decease.” Held, that the real estate devised, was not charged with the testator’s debts to the relief of other lands, and that the payment of the debts was not a condition precedent to the vesting of the title and enjoyment of the possession of the lands, and that the premises devised were not devised upon a condition, but charged with the funeral expenses, and the legacy of fifty dollars.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 967Kapp v. Kapp (1888)
<p>1. Partition of real property—Purchaser at sale—When not bound TO TAKE TITLE.</p> <p>The purchaser of land on a partition sale is not bound to take title unless he can be put into possession under the decree of sale. If independent proceedings are necessary to get possession, he should not be required to take title.</p> <p>'2. Same—Foreclosure—Parties to action.</p> <p>In action of foreclosure and partition, the person in possession of the premises should always be made a party to the action.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 980Peters v. Carleton (1888)
<p>1. Streets and highways—New York (city of)—When closed under Laws 1867, chap. 697.</p> <p>Under Laws 1867, chapter 697, upon the filing of the map therein provided for, each public thoroughfare not retained on said map ceased to be a highway, and became in law actually closed. The rights of the parties became fixed at the time of such filing, and the mere fact that the abutting owner failed to occupy the property which had reverted to him in no way changed the rights which had thus accrued.</p> <p>2. Same—Bloomingdale road—When right of abutting owners to ' damages accrued—Effect of continued use.</p> <p>In an action commenced to recover the award made to unknown owners for the damages sustained by reason of the closing of Bloomingdale road, under the provisions of said act, the Commissioners of the Central Park on March 7, 1868, made and filed maps showing the streets laid out and retained between Fifty-ninth street and South One Hundred and Fifty-fifth street. On that map no part of the Bloomingdale road is shown as retained as a public street. Meld, that on the filing of the map. said road ceased to be a public road, and the title to the land vested in or reverted to the abutting owners. That the owner of the property at that time was entitled to the damages awarded. That the fact that said road continued to be used after it was legally closed under the provisions of said law was immaterial.</p> <p>3. Same—Deed—Construction of.</p> <p>The deed by the abutting owner contained the clause: “ And also all the piece now called the Bloomingdale road adjoining the above granted premises to the centre line of said road, subject to the uses thereof by the public until closed by public authority.” The said road was legally closed by the filing of said map at the time this deed was delivered. Held, that there was no intention upon the part of the parties to the deed to in any wot restrict the operation of the grant or to recognize a condition of affairs which in law did not actually exist.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993Elgie v. City of Troy (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993Gallagher v. McMahon (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993Hafelfinger v. Fessler (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993Hoopes v. Auburn Water-Works Co. (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993McQuade v. Manhattan Railway Co. (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993People v. E. Remington & Sons (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 993Winants v. Blanchard (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Coghlan v. Stetson (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Hart v. Bowman (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Miranda v. Greenwich Insurance (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Hollister v. Stewart (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Turner v. City of Newburgh (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Cornell v. Cornell (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Ludlow v. Mead (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Donnelly v. Brooklyn City Railroad (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 994Hayward v. Hood (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Fackner v. Ross (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Carter v. Brooklyn Life Insurance (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Allison v. Abendroth (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Dolan v. Newburgh, Dutchess & Conn. Railroad (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Hayes v. Carr (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995In re Estate of McGraw (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995In re Poughkeepsie Bridge Co. (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Kellogg v. Stout (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995McVoy v. Mills (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Ross v. Third Avenue Railroad (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 995Baumann v. Pinkney (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 996Burley v. Hartson (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Kingsland v. Mayor of New York (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Langford v. Cook (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Wright v. Andrews (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Cashen v. City of Auburn (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Dow v. Rectors, Wardens of St. Phillip's Church (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Greef v. Sickle (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Hillijer v. Vandewater (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997Mulligan v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 997People v. Stevens (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 998Bean v. Whipple (1888)
Appeal by the defendants, Whipple and the mining companies, from the whole of a judgment rendered at special term upon a trial without jury and by the American loan and trust companies from certain parts of such judgments.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1000In re Collins (1888)
<p>Marriage and dower—Proof of marriage.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1001Ufer v. Hollender (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment on verdict and from order denying motion for new trial.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1002Sawyer v. Burnaby (1888)
Appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment on the report of a referee so far as it dismisses the first cause of action, and so far as it excludes two transactions from the second cause of action.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1002In re Hornberger (1888)
<p>Appeal from decree of the surrogate.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1004McFarland v. J. L. Mott Iron Works (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment tried before the court without a jury.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1005Cochran v. Smith (1888)
<p>Action—When maintainable.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1005People v. Alitta (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment of the court of special sessions.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1006In re Cahen (1888)
<p>Appeal from decree of the surrogate.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1006Phillips v. Brokaw (1888)
<p>Appeal from judgment dismissing complaint.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1006Church v. Stanton (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1007Harlem Bridge, Morrisania & Fordham Railroad v. Southern Boulevard Railroad (1888)
<p>Practice—Injunction—Cannot be granted on a case submitted.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1007Casserley v. Witherbee (1888)
<p>Pleading;—Complaint—When defective.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1008Lawrence v. Marcellite F. (1888)
<p>Executors—Compensation,</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1008August v. National Park Bank (1888)
<p>Appeal from order of reference.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1011In re the Final Judicial Settlement of the Account of Niles (1888)
<p>Administrator—Accountinb of.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1013Shattuck v. Bascom (1888)
An appeal from an order of the Erie county special term, denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, upon the grounds of surprise and newly discovered evidence.
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1014Durkin v. Seneca Falls & Waterloo Railroad (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment entered upon the decision of the Seneca equity court upon a trial without a jury.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1016Marshall v. Pierce (1888)
<p>Appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cayuga county, reversing a judgment rendered before a justice of the peace of that county upon the verdict of a jury.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Greenwood v. Marwin (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Kennedy v. Downer (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017White v. Bradley (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Baker v. Dickenson (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Bickford v. Isaac (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Chamberlain v. English (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017People v. Gibbs (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Smith v. Bailey (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1017Perkins v. Emory (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Kelsey v. Sargeant (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Munson v. Taylor (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Thomas v. Harmon (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Cornwall v. Cornwall (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Hunt v. City of Rochester (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Kelsey v. Pfaudler Process Fermentation Co. (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Lapham v. Marshall (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018People v. Reardon (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Risley v. Rice (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Williams v. Guile (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1018Thalheimer v. Hays (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1019In re the Application for the Removal of King (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1019Clews v. Bank of New York (1888)
<p>Bills and notes—Altered cheque—When verdict not against the weight of evidence.</p>
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1020Thompson v. Leerburger (1888)
- 15 N.Y. St. Rep. 1020People v. Reilly (1888)