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150 Ala. 89

Leonard v. State

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided March 2, 1907

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1907-03-02

<p> Burglary. </p> <p>1. Burglary; Evidence; Criminating Circumstances.- — It was permissible for the state to show, on a trial for burglary of a railroad car, that tracks of a man were found on the ground near the car.</p> <p>2. Same. — It having been shown that part of the goods which were stolen were found in the mine where defendant worked and the evidence tended to show flight of the defendant immediately after the goods were discovered, it was permissible to show that the defendant was a married man, and that he did not carry his family away with him but sent for them after-wards.</p> <p>3. Criminal Law; Trial; Instructions; Burden of Proof. — A charge asserting that before the defendant should be convicted the law requires that his guilt be fully proven exacts a too high degree of proof and is properly refused.</p> <p>4. Same; Reasonable Doubt. — A charge is properly refused which asserts that if there is reasonable possibility of defendant’s innocence, from the evidence the jury should acquit.</p> <p>5. Same. — A charge is argumentative which asserts that it is not necessary to a reasonable doubt that the jury should be able to give a reason therefor.</p> <p>6. Same; Instructions Covered by Those Given. — It is not error to refuse requested instructions substantially covered by instructions already given.</p> <p>7. Same; Confused Instructions. — An instruction that if the' jury did not believe the evidence in the ease they should find the defendant not guilty was properly refused as' obscure.</p> <p>8. Same; Reasonable Doubt. — An instruction is erroneous and properly refused which asserts that if the jury have.a reasonable doubt as to any material facts in the case, growing out of the evidence, they should find the defendant not guilty.</p> <p>9. Same. — A charge asserting that a probability that some person may have entered the car and taken the goods in question, is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, is not good and its refusal proper.</p> <p>10. Same; Doubt of Individual Juror. — A charge asserting that if any individual juror is not convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the jury cannot convict is a proper statement of the law and its refusal error.</p> <p>11. Same; Affirmative Charge. — Where there is evidence sufficient to authorize the jury to convict the defendant the affirmative charge is properly refused.</p> <p>12. Same; Argumentative Instructions. — Instructions asserting no proposition of law but being a mere argument are properly refused.</p>

Relies on Rogers v. State · Amos v. State · Brown v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded · Decided 1907-03-02

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently May 1972

20 state decisions

8019071910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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DOWDELL, J.

¶1There ivas no merit in the demurrer interposed to the indictment, and the court properly overruled it.

¶2There was no error committed in permitting the state to show, by the witness Sudduth, tracks of a man on the ground near the door of the car alleged to have been burglarized, and from which whiskey and brandy had been stolen.

¶3There was evidence tending to show flight of the defendant immediately after the discovery of the stolen goods, a part of which — that is, a keg of gin — was found in a “junk nile” in the mine where the defendant was mining; and in this connection it was competent to show that the' defendant was a married man and had a family, and did not carry his family away with him, but sent for them after he had left the county.

¶4*94Written charge 1, requested by defendant, was properly refused, as exacting too high a degree of proof of the defendant’s guilt.

¶5Charge 2, refused to the defendant was bad, in predicating an acquittal on a reasonable possibility of the defendant’s innocence.

¶6Charges 3 and 5 weie each argumentative, and for this reason, if no other, were properly refused.

¶7Charge 4 finds a substantial duplicate in one of the written charges given at the request of the defendant. Charge 6 was condemned in the case of Koch v. State, 115 Ala. 99, 22 South. 471.

¶8Charge 7 was held had in the case of Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 South. 268. Charge 8 has been repeatedly condemned by this court. See Watkins v. State, 133 Ala. 92, 32 South. 627; Amos v. State, 123 Ala. 54, 26 South. 524; Rogers v. State, 117 Ala. 9, 22 South. 666. Charges 9 and 10 should have been given. A charge similar to these charges was held good in Mitchell v. State, 129 Ala. 23, 30 South. 348.

¶9Charge 11 finds substantial duplicate among the charges given at the request of the defendant, and no error was committed in its refusal.

¶10Charge 12 was the general affirmative charge to find for the defendant, and was properly Refused, as there was evidence from which the jury was authorized to find the defendant guilty.

¶11Charge 16, refused to the defendant, is faulty in several respects. This charge asserts that a probability that some person entered the car, without excluding the defendant from being the probable person, is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. This, without more, is sufficient to condemn this charge.

¶12For the error in refusing defendant’s charges 9 and 10, the judgment must be reversed.

¶13Reversed and remanded.

Tyson, C. J., and Anderson and McClellan, JJ., concur.
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