Murray v. Dosal’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 3 district · 6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Even though seeking IFP status, the prisoner is required to pay the full amount of the fee. The court assesses and, when funds exist, collects a partial payment of the court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20% of the greater of: (a) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account; or (b) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the fifing of the complaint or notice of appeal.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 43 F. Supp. 2d 1039 - Ayers v. Norris · 173 F. Supp. 2d 951 - Jackson v. N.P. Dodge Realty Co.

2. “[The defendant] has also shown that section 1915(g) violates prisoners’ equal protection rights. Although it is true that the number of suits brought by prisoners has increased, there is no indication that the increase has significantly out-paced the increase in the number of people incarcerated in this country nor have the reasons for the increase in claims been established. In any case, prisoners continue to bring legitimate claims amid the large number of claims the courts dismiss as frivolous or failing to state a cognizable claim. In passing section 1915(g), members of Congress stated that the purpose of the provision is to require prisoners to pay for filing a lawsuit in the same way as nonprisoners. However, the provision has the opposite effect. Instead of being subjected to the same rules as nonprisoners, inmates who would otherwise qualify for in forma pauperis status must now pay the filing fees up front. Although prisoners are not a suspect class for the purpose of determining the proper standard of equal protection review, access to the courts is a fundamental right that remains with an individual even after incarceration.... [The defendant’s] claim that he suffered a violation of his religious freedom is precisely the type of fundamental rights claim for which we have vigilantly guarded a prisoner’s access to the courts. Because section 1915(g) affects a fundamental right, we must review the statute under a “strict scrutiny” standard. Under strict scrutiny, we u”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 43 F. Supp. 2d 1039 - Ayers v. Norris

3. “To determine what process is due, [courts] balance three factors: first, “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; second, “the Government’s interest”; and third, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the private] interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 119 F. Supp. 2d 900 - Salcido Ex Rel. Gilliland v. Woodbury County, Iowa