Stein v. Meyer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “* * the remarks were highly improper, as their tendency would necessarily suggest to the jury sums they should allow in their verdict. It has been the uniform practice of this court to hold counsel strictly accountable for language used in addressing the jury, and willful or reckless misstatements or utterances calculated to unduly influence their verdict will be considered grounds for the withdrawal of a juror and granting a new trial. * * *. Causes must be fairly presented and defended, and the duty of counsel in this regard is not less important nor less imperative than that of the trial judge. A cause is not well tried unless fairly tried, and a verdict obtained by incorrect statements or unfair argument or by an appeal to passion, or prejudice, stands on but little higher ground than one obtained by false testimony. * * *. The amount of damages claimed is not to be determined by an estimate of counsel, but by the jury from the evidence before them, and any suggestion to the jury of an arbitrary amount is highly improper. * * *. While it is true in the present case, no definite amount was mentioned, yet, if plaintiff’s version be accepted, the language contained a suggestion to the jury that ‘thousands of dollars’ were claimed for injuries. This expression suggested the amount to the minds of the jury almost as clearly as if counsel had stated a definite number of thousands. * * *””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co.

2. ““Furthermore, although the trial judge understands that he is not bound by the Pennsylvania cases on this point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has emphasized that federal courts ‘should not be astute to widen federal diversity jurisdiction/ McCoy v. Siler, 3 Cir., 1953, 205 F.2d 498, 500-501 . To permit plaintiff’s counsel to refer to amounts selected by him in his closing argument to the jury in cases where pain, suffering, injury and inconvenience are the only items of damage, when such a course is not allowed in the state courts, would certainly have the result of expanding the diversity jurisdiction of this court and, particularly in a situation such as this, would ‘ * * * substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mitchell v. American Tobacco Co.