Volume 150 — Indiana Reports

<p>Appeal. — Bill of Exceptions. — Longhand Manuscript of Evidence.— The record must affirmatively show that the longhand manuscript of evidence was filed in the clerk’s office before it was incorporated in the bill of exceptions.</p>

<p>From the Elkhart Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From tbe Henry Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Injunction.— Action by State. — Demurrer.—To question the capacity of the State to maintain a suit for injunction, a demurrer should embrace the second statutory ground for demurring, to wit: ‘ ‘That the plaintifE has no legal capacity to sue.” p. 27.</p> <p>State. — Courts Open To. — The courts of the State and of the United States are open to the State, both in its sovereign capacity and by virtue of its corporate rights, pp. 27, 28.</p> <p>Natural Gas.— Waste Of. — Constitutional Law. — Section 7510, Bums’ B. S. 1894, providing that it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation operating a natural gas or oil well to permit the flow of gas or oil from such well to escape into the open air, is not unconstitutional as an unwarranted interference with private property, as the title to such gas or oil does not vest in any private owner until it is reduced to actual possession, pp. 28-32.</p> <p>Statutory Construction. — Scope of Statute.— Preamble. — It, on review of the whole act, a wider intention than that expressed in the preamble appears to be the real one, effect is to be given to it, notwithstanding the less extensive import of the preamble, pp. 32, 83.</p> <p>Natural Gas. — Waste Of. — Statute-Construed.—Section7510, Burns’ R. S. 1894, making it unlawful “to permit the flow of gas or oil from any such well into the open air,” applies to the waste of gas from wells producing both gas and oil. p. 34-</p> <p>Same. — Waste Of. — Nuisance.—Injunction.—In a suit by the State to enjoin an oil company from wasting natural gas,' the complaint alleged that a large number of the people of the State were almost wholly dependent upon such gas for fuel supply; that the State relying upon the permanent supply of gas, had equipped many public buildings and institutions for the use of natural gas as fuel; that defendant, in the operation of certain wells producing botji gas and oil, has permitted large quantities of gas to escape and become wasted, and avows its purpose to continue so to permit the escape of such gas; that the statutory penalties for the wasting of gas are wholly inadequate, and that the wrongful and unlawful conduct of defendant, if suffered to continue, will be irreparable. Held, that the facts stated in the complaint make a case of public nuisance which the State has a right to^have abated by injunction. pp. 35-46.</p>

<p>From the Marion Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Mortgages. — School Fund. — Sufficiency of Notice of Sale by Auditor. —A notice, under section 5820, Burns’ R. S. 1894, of the sale of land mortgaged to secure a loan from the common school fund, describing the indebtedness as due the “common and congressional school funds,” is sufficient, although the “common school fund” and the “congressional” are two separate and distinct funds, pp. 5k, 55.</p> <p>Same. — School Fund Mortgage. — Notice of Sale. — A notice of the sale of land to satisfy a school fund mortgage, which notice properly describes the land by metes and bounds, is sufficient, though it erroneously states that the laryl was conveyed by a certain deed. p. 56.</p> <p>Same. — School Fund Mortgage. — Notice of Sale. — Where a county auditor, upon the sale of real estate to satisfy a number of school fund mortgages, exposes for sale the separate tracts of real estate so mortgaged, it is sufficient notice, under section 5820, Bums’ R. S. 1894, to include all the tracts of land in one notice, pp. 57, 58.</p> <p>Same. — School Fund Mortgage. — Description of Real Estate. — Judicial Notice. — The real estate exposed for sale by a county auditor, to satisfy a school fund mortgage, is presumed to be in this State, and where such real estate is described by metes and bounds, and the section, township, and range are given, the court knows judicially in which county it is situated, pp. 58, 59.</p>

<p>Appellate Court. — A Court of Last Resort. — Decisions Not Subject to Review. — The Appellate Court, in all cases in which it is given jurisdiction, is a court of last resort, and its decisions are not sub- • ject to review, whether by appeal or by writ of certiorari.</p>

<p>Husband and Wife. — Marriage a Valuable Consideration. — Marriage is held to be a valuable consideration, and the wife is regarded as a purchaser of all property which accrues to her by virtue of her marital rights, or by virtue of any antenuptial contract, p. 66.</p> <p>Same. — Conveyance of Real Estate in Fraud of Marital Rights. — A secret voluntary conveyance by a man of his lands on the eve of his marriage operates as a fraud upon his wife, and cannot serve to defeat her upon his death of her interest in such lands allowed to her under the law as his widow, p. 66.</p>

<p>From the Shelby Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Larceny. — Possession of Stolen Property. — Presumption.—Instruction.- — On a prosecution for larceny the court instructed the jury that the exclusive possession, by defendant, of the stolen property, soon after the larceny, if not satisfactorily explained, raises a “presumption of law ” that defendant is guilty. Held, that the instruction was technically incorrect, in that the presumption raised was a presumption of fact, and not of law, but that the error was harmless, where other instructions given showed that the court meant a disputable, and not a conclusive, presumption, pp. 75-82.</p> <p>Same. — Possession of Stolen Property. — Presumption.—When Duty of Jury to Convict. — Where, on a prosecution for larceny, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the stolen goods were found in the exclusive possession of the defendant who failed to account for such possession so as to show that it was an honest one, or gave a false account thereof, and there was no other evidence or 'proof of countervailing circumstances, the jury were legally bound to find defendant guilty, although the presumption upon which the jury found such guilt was technically a presumption of fact and not one of law. p. 84-</p> <p>Criminal Law. — Appeal.— Reversal of Judgment.— Judgments in criminal cases ought not to be reversed for errors which do not materially injure the accused, p. 85.</p>

<p>Contract. — Sale.—Forfeiture.—Where by a contract of sale the purchaser of certain timber is given four years to remove it, such purchaser does not forfeit his right to remove the timber after the expiration of four years, in the absence of a forfeiture clause in the contract.</p>

<p>Equity. — When Court May Disregard Verdict of Jury. — In an equity case it is within the province of the court to disregard the verdict of the jury and enter its own finding, p. 90.</p> <p>Appeal. — Assignment of Error. — That the court erred in rendering judgment is not a specific assignment of error as contemplated by section 667, Burns’ R. S. 1894. p. 90.</p> <p>Same. — Conflicting Evidence.- — In support of a paragraph of complaint alleging the existence of a public highway along a certain section line during a certain period, positive evidence as to the existence of such highway was introduced. On the other hand, witnesses for the defense who lived in the neighborhood and were interested in the highways denied the use of a way upon such line, and claimed that the travel had been by devious paths through unenclosed lands, and denied even hearing of or seeing a highway along the line in question. Held, that the evidence is conflicting, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court, pp. 90, 91.</p> <p>Highway. — Presumption as to Course Of. — It will not be presumed,' because an established highway had some portion of its course upon a section line, that it followed the line throughout, pp. 91, 92.</p> <p>.Appeal. — When Error Not Available. — In the absence of a specific objection in the trial court from which it may be known that the objection there urged is the same urged on appeal no available error is shown, p. 92.</p> <p>New Tkial. — Obstructions of Highway. — Action to Abate as a Nuisance.- — Under section 1076, Burns’ R. S. 1894, granting a new trial as of right in actions to quiet title to real estate, a new trial as of right cannot be had wheye obstructions of a public highway are sought to be abated as a nuisance, further maintenance enjoined, and damages claimed, pp. 92, 93.</p>

<p>Appeal. —Decedents’ Estates. —Where the remedy sought by or against a decedent’s estate is not provided by the probate procedure act, hut must be enforced under the civil code, an appeal is governed by the civil code, and need not be within forty days, as provided by section 2610, Burns’ R. S. 1894. p. 96.</p> <p>Writ oe Assistance. — When Should Not Be Granted.— Plaintiff filed his petition for a writ of assistance to obtain possession of lands sold to him at administrator’s sale. Defendant filed a cross-action to quiet title, to which plaintiff answered alleging matters of estoppel in pais against defendant to assert his claim of title. Held, that the cross-demand and answer thereto departed from the theory upon which the application for the writ could rest, and, when filed, the writ should have been denied, pp. 97-99.</p>

<p>Appeal. — Trial by Jury. — Waiver.—A jury trial is waived by failure to demand it at the time of trial; a demand at a previous term of court is insufficient, pp. 100, 101.</p> <p>Same. — Exception to Conclusions of Law Admits Correctness of Findings. — New Trial. — Exception to conclusions of law is an admission that the facts have been fully and correctly found. The remedy to correct the findings of the court is by motion for new trial, p. 101.</p> <p>Same. — Record.—Agreement of Attorneys to Cure Defects. — An agreement in writing, signed both by the counsel for appellant and appellee, waiving deficiencies in the record, cannot be considered, where such agreement, though copied in the record, is not made a part thereof by order of court or bill of exceptions, pp. 10S-10k.</p> <p>Same. — Record.—Bill of Exceptions. —The bill of exceptions controls when there is a contradiction between it and the record, pp. 10S, 10k, 106.</p> <p>Equity. — Action to Compel Production of Sheriff’s Certificate, when not Triable by Jury. — An action' by the surviving heirs of the deceased assignee to compel defendant to produce to the sheriff the certificate of a sheriff’s sale of real estate, in order that the sheriff might execute a deed thereon to the plaintiffs, is an equitable proceeding, and not triable by jury. p. 107.</p>

<p>Prom the Hendricks Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Taxation. — Personal Property of Railroad Company. — Assessment.— Notice. — Where, under sections 8501, 8502, Burns’ R. S. 1894, a railroad company returns a schedule and valuation of its personal property to the county auditor, and such auditor submits the same to the assessor to be assessed, the railroad company is not entitled to ' notice before the assessor can make the assessment at a greater valuation than that returned by the company.</p>

<p>From the Marion Superior Court.</p>

<p>Telephone. — Construction Of in Streets. — Rights of Abutting Property Owner. — The reasonable use of the streets of a city for the polés, wires, and necessary equipment of a telephone system is not a new and additional servitude for which the abutting property owner is entitled to compensation, p. 140.</p> <p>Same. — Ownership by Individual. — An individual may own and operate a telephone system without legislative consent, where there is no legislative restriction upon such right, p. 141.</p>

<p>Appeal. — When Erroneous Conclusion of Law is Harmless. — Where one of three conclusions of law in a case is incorrect, the error is harmless if the other two conclusions are correct, and fully justify the judgment of the trial court, pp. US, 146. ■</p> <p>Railboads. — Condemnation of Land. — Lien for Damages Awarded. —Mortgage.— A claim for the payment of land condemned by a railroad company is superior to any lien afterwards placed upon said land whether by operation of a previous or subsequent mortgage. p. 146.</p> <p>Same. — Condemnation of Beal Estate. — Abandonment of Lnterest in Condemned Bealty. — In accordance with section 5160, Burns’ R. S. 1894, a railroad company, in the year 1880, condemned and appropriated a strip of land adjoining its right of way. The damages awarded were never paid, and no demand therefor was made till 1889. The company did not take formal possession of said land till 1887, and then, within a few days, suffered itself to be dispossessed by another railroad company. To the latter company, the original owners of the land, for a valuable consideration, executed a warranty deed. Held, that the acts, both of the original owners of the land, and the railroad company to which the land was first awarded, amounted to an abandonment of all claims under the condemnation proceedings, pp. 147,148.</p>

<p>From the Decatur Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Prom the Starke Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Special Verdict. — Improper Interrogatories. — Harmless Error. — It is error to submit to a jury'interrogatories calling for evidentiary facts or conclusions of law; but such error is harmless for the reason that the court in applying the law to the special verdict is required to disregard such interrogatories and the answers thereto. pp. 160, 161.</p> <p>Same. — Proper-Instruction When Special Verdict is to be Returned.— Where a special verdict is to be returned, it is only proper for the court to instruct the jury as to the issues made by the pleadings, the rules for weighing and reconciling the testimony, who has the burden of proof a,s to the facts to be found, with whatever else may be necessary to enable the jury to understand clearly their duties concerning such special verdict, and the facts to be found therein, pp. 161, 162.</p> <p>Same. — Instructions as to the Law. — Harmless Error. — Practice.— Where a special verdict is to be returned, general instructions as to the law of the case are not necessary, and available error cannot be predicated upon the giving of such. p. 162.</p> <p>Wills. — Proof of Insanity Prior to Execution of Will. — Burden of Proof as to Return of Sanity at the Time of Execution. — In an action to set aside a will on the ground of mental unsoundness, proof on the part of the plaintiff that the testator, prior to the time of the execution of the will, was a person of unsound mind, not from a temporary cause, does not require the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence a return of sanity, or a lucid interval, at the time "of the execution of the will, pp, 162, 163.</p> <p>Instructions. — Erroneous.—When Not Cured. — Where, in an action to set aside a will on the ground of mental unsoundness of the testator, the proof establishes testator’s unsoundness of mind prior to the execution of the will, an erroneous instruction, as to the burden of proof as to a return of sanity at the time of the execution of the will, is not cured by general instructions, as to the burden of proof, which state the law correctly, pp. 163, 16L</p> <p>Witness. — Impeaching Question. — Form Of. — A question put to an impeaching witness need not be in the exact words of the question asked of the witness sought to be impeached, but the words should be identical as to time, place, and substance, and the impeaching question should be so framed as to admit of a negative or affirmative answer, pp. 165-167.</p>

<p>Township Trustee. — Surplus Dog Tax Fund. — An action may be maintained against a school township by the board of school commissioners of a city located in snch township for the recovery of surplus' dog tax funds wrongfully appropriated by the township trustee to the use and benefit of the school township, p. 170.</p> <p>Pleading. — Estoppel.—Facts creating an estoppel, to be available, must be specially pleaded, p. 173.</p> <p>Overruled Cases. — Last Decision the Law. — A decision of a court of last resort is but an exposition of what the court construes the law to be, and in overruling a former decision the court does not declare the overruled decision to be bad law-, but that it never was the law, and the court was simply mistaken in regard to the law in its former decision; the first decision is wholly obliterated, and the law as therein declared must be considered as though it never existed, and that the law always has been as expounded by the last decision, p. 173.</p> <p>Same. — Vested Rights. — Courts will not apply a change made in the construction of the law, as it was held to be in the overruled case, so as to invade vested rights, p. 173.</p> <p>Township Trustee.— Surplus Dog Tax Fund.D-Overruled Cases.— Vested Rights. — Where dog tax funds were appropriated to the school township by the township trustee, under a construction placed upon the law by the Supreme Court, the township did not thereby obtain such a vested right in such funds as to prevent the recovery thereof by the board of school commissioners of a city located in such township, under a decision of the Supreme Court overruling the former decision, pp. 17J.-176.</p>

<p>From the Allen Superior Court.</p>

<p>From the Marion Superior Court.</p>

<p>Corporations. — Liability of Directors for Corporate Debts. — Fraud. —A corporation with a capital stock of $200,000.00 was organized for the construction and operation of a system of water-works for a city. Three persons who were its sole incorporators became its directors. Although the company had been organized more than eighteen months, no part of the capital stock was paid in or collected, except that the three organizers subscribed for shares to the amount of $8,000.00, which were paid by allowance to them of that sum for their services as promoters in the organization of the company, and except that the company issued its bonds in the sum $150,000.00, secured by a mortgage on the property which it should afterwards acquire, by which to procure funds for the construction of the water-works. The company contracted with a firm to construct the water-works, and, in compensation therefor, turned over to said firm the $150,000.00 bonds, and also issued to said firm the remaining capital stock of the company to the amount of $197,-000.00. There was a secret understanding between the contracting firm and the directors that the firm was to pay one of the directors $6,000.00 in cash, and'to assign to each of the other directors $20,-000.00 of the capital' stock. This secret understanding was carried out. For the extension of the water-works system the company contracted a debt of $4,015.19, which was not paid. Afterwards, on foreclosure of the mortgage given to secure the bonds, the whole plant was sold for $107,500.00. The corporation published no annual report, as provided by section 5071, Burns’ R. S. 1894. Held, in an action to recover the indebtedness of $4,015.19 incurred in extending the system of water-works, that the directors were personally liable, pp. 186-197.</p> <p>Corporations. — Failure to Publish Annual Report. — Liability of Directors. — Complaint.—In an action against the directors to recover a debt of the corporation, where the corporation has become insolvent, a cause of action is stated in a complaint which alleges the insolvency of the corporation, the failure to publish the annual . report, and that the plaintiffs were misled and damaged thereby. p. 19S.</p> <p>Pleading. — Indefinite Complaint. — Demurrer.—A demurrer does not raise the question as to whether or not a complaint is sufficiently definite, p. 199.</p>

<p>Appeal and Error. — Exceptions.—Where exceptions to conclusions of law are joint, no question is presented if either conclusion is correct, p. 301.</p> <p>Wills. — Probate.— Clerical Error. — Where the probate order book containing the record of the probate of a will refers to the testatrix as Mary Baker, but the will and the proof made a part of the record identifies the will as that of Martha V. Baker, and discloses the error of the clerk in making the entry,” such error will not defeat the probate thereof, nor cast a cloud on the title to the real estate devised, p. 201.</p> <p>Same. — Probate.—Section 2754, Burns’ R. S. 1894, et seq., does not require a specific finding to be entered of record of each of the elements of proof in probating a will, where the proof itself is entered of record, pp. 301, 303.</p> <p>Appeal and Error. — Wills.—Probate.—Appellant cannot complain of a judgment of the court denying his petition to cancel the record probating a will and to be permitted to make due probate thereof, where such judgment was based upon a finding that the will was properly probated, p. 202.</p>

<p>Prom the Miami Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Schools jnd School Districts. — Abandonment of School. — Bemoval of School Site. — Township Trustee. — Section 5920a, Burns’ R. S. 1891 (Acts 1893, p. 17), limiting the power of township trustees in the removal of school buildings, and changing the sites thereof, does not apply to the action of a township trustee in abandoning or discontinuing a school in a certain district in the township on account of the small attendance of pupils.</p>

<p>Appeal and Eeeoe. — Special Bill of Exceptions. — How Made Part of Record. — A special bill of exceptions must be presented to the trial judge within the time given therefor in order to become a part of the record on appeal, p. 214.</p> <p>Same. — Conclusions of Law. — Exceptions.—The proper way to save for review the question of the action of the court in overruling a motion to set aside its conclusions of law, is by exception, and bringing such motion into the record by bill of exceptions, p. 214.</p> <p>Evidence. — Longhand Manuscript. — When Not in Record. — Appeal and Error. — The longhand manuscript of the evidence is not properly in the record where it is not affirmatively shown that it was presented to the judge within the time allowed for the filing of the bill of exceptions, and before the filing thereof, p. 215.</p> <p>Same. — Longhand Manuscript. — Record.—Certificate of Clerk. — Appeal and Error. — The manuscript of the evidence is not properly certified to this court where no reference is made thereto in the clerk’s certificate, nothing being certified but “ a true and correct transcript of all the proceedings.” pp. 215, 216.</p>

<p>From the Marion Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From tlie Marshall Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. — Larceny.—Robbery.— Indictment.— The defendant may be convicted of larceny, under an indictment charging robbery. P- 274.</p> <p>Same. — Indeterminate SentenceLaw. — Constitutionality Of. — The Act, known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, (Acts of 1897, p. 219), is constitutional. Following Miller v. State, 149 Ind. 607. p. 274.</p> <p>Same. — Larceny.—Cross-Examination of Defendant.— Practice.— A person on trial for larceny, who becomes a witness in his own behalf, may be asked on cross-examination whether he had not previously been convicted of a similar crime, for the purpose of showing his credibility as a witness, pp. 275, 276.</p>

<p>„ Evidence. — Omission of Proof Essential to a Recovery. — Appeal.— Where the party in whose favor judgment was rendered omitted proof essential to a recovery, that fact is no reason for reversal if the adverse party in his evidence supplied the omission, p. 277.</p> <p>Justice of the Peace. — Transcript of Judgment. — Certificate.—The certificate to a justice’s transcript was as follows: “I hereby certify that’ the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy, as appears of record on my docket, together with the costs taxed at,” etc. Held, that the certificate was sufficient. pp. '277, 278.</p>

<p>Receivers. — Appointment.—It is not necessary in an appeal from an interlocutory order appointing a receiver to inquire into the suffi- - ciency of the complaint as the foundation of a cause of action. It is enough if, from the verified pleadings and affidavits, there was sufficient ground shown for the appointment of a receiver, p. 285.</p> <p>Same. — Appointment.—Fraud.—Under the provisions of section 1236, Burns’ R. S. 1894 (1222, R. S. 1881), that a receiver may be appointed where the property in controversy is in danger of being materially injured, where a corporation is insolvent or in imminent danger thereof, the court may appoint a receiver for property assigned by the corporation for the benefit of certain creditors, although no fraud is shown in such assignment, if, in the opinion of the court, such action cis necessary to secure ample justice to the parties, pp. 285, 286.</p> <p>Same. — Appointment.—Interest of Petitioner. — A receiver will not be appointed on petition of one whose complaint shows no right of ultimate recovery in the action, p. 286.</p> <p>■ Same. — Appointment.—Interest of Petitioner. — Assignment for Benefit of Creditors. — Where a trust deed for certain creditors provides that any surplus arising from the sale of the property after the satisfaction of such creditors shall be paid to grantor, a general creditor has such an interest as to give him the right to apply for a receiver, where there is a possibility that there will be a surplus. pp. 286, 287.</p>

<p>From the Jackson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Criminal Law. — Punishment Increased. — Ex.Post Facto Law. — Punishment may be lessened, but it cannot be increased, by a statute enacted after the commission of the offense, p. 294-</p> <p>Same. — Bigamy.—When the Crime Does Not Come Within the Purview of Indeterminate Sentence Law. — The word “punishable” as used in section 1, of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Acts 1897, p. 219), applies only to those crimes which actually are, and not which may be, punished by confinement in the State prison, and where a person found guilty of bigamy does not, in the opinion of the court or jury trying the case, deserve punishment greater than a fine and imprisonment in the county jail, such case does not come within the purview of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. pp. 297-299.</p>

<p>From the Jay Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Contracts. — Joint and Several. — A written contract by the terms of which three firms of attorneys are to undertake the legal work con-) nected- with the contest of a will, and to receive a stipulated sum, one-third of which is to be paid to each firm, is, in effect, three sev- * eral contracts, pp. 303-305.</p> <p>Pleading. — Joinder of Plaintiffs in Action to Avoid Settlement.— Three firms of attorney’s had contracts with the same client by the terms of which several contracts the client was to pay a certain per cent, of the amount recovered. The cause was compromised, and by fraud the attorneys induced to accept a smaller sum in full settlement and discharge of the contract than was due them. Held, that the several firms might join in an action to avoid the settlement. pp. 305-307.</p> <p>Same. — Action to Set Aside Settlement for Fraud. — Complaint.—In an action to avoid a settlement because of alleged fraud, where the facts are stated entitling the plaintiff to such relief, and there is a general prayer for judgment and other proper relief, it is not necessary that the complaint contain a specific prayer that the settlement be set aside on the ground of fraud, p. 307.</p> <p>Same. — Complaint.—Allegation of Partnership. — A partnership is not alleged in a complaint by merely setting out a contract which had been signed by two of the plaintiffs in their firm name. p. 308.</p> <p>Joint Contract. — Action by Survivor. — A contract by the terms of which it is agreed to pay a certain sum of money to two persons, is a joint contract as between such payees, and upon the death of one the right of action vests exclusively in the other, p. 309.</p> <p>Pleading. — Defective Complaint.— Answer.— Practice. — Where the grounds for demurrer do not appear on the face of the complaint, and defendant files answer, as provided by section 346, Burns’ R. S. 1894, and issue is joined, and the proof establishes the truth of the answer, the complaint will be defeated in the same manner as if the facts of the answer appeared in the complaint, and a demurrer had been sustained to it. p. 311.</p> <p>Practice. — Carrying Demurrer to Answer Back to Complaint. — The right to carry a demurrer back to, and sustain it to, the complaint, depends entirely on whether the facts stated in the answer as, an objection to the complaint, and admitted by the plaintiff’s demurrer to said answer, can be considered as a part of the facts on which the complaint rests, p. 312.</p> <p>Partnership. — Right of Survivor Upon Death of Partner. — The right of action to collect the debts and assets due to a partnership where any of the partners are dead is vested by law exclusively in the surviving partner or partners, p. 312.</p> <p>Pleading. — Complaint Not Stating Cause of Action as to All Plaintiffs. — A complaint which does not state a good cause of action as to all, though it does as to some of the plaintiffs, is bad as to all, for want of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. N p. 313.</p> <p>Judgment. — Against Part of Plaintiffs or Defendants. — Statute Construed.— Section 577, Burns’ R. S. 1894, providing thatif judgments may be given for or against one or more of several defendants, and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side,” is not applicable to a question of pleading, but relates to a question of evidence and the manner of the rendition of judgment in such cases, p. 314-.</p> <p>Appeal. — Evidence When Not in Record. — The evidence is not in the record where there is no showing that the longhand manuscript of the evidence was ever filed in the clerk’s office, p. 316.</p> <p>New Trial. — When Judgment Rendered on Last Day of Term.— Where judgment is rendered on the last day of the term of court, and a njiotion for a new trial is not made till the first day of the next regular term, a special term of the court having been held in the meantime, the motion for a new trial is too late. pp. 316, 317.</p>

<p>Pleading. — Answer.—Where an answer is directed to an entire complaint consisting of several paragraphs, in order to withstand a demurrer, it must be good as to all of the paragraphs, p. 324.</p> <p>Divorce. — Property Rights. — Adjudication.—A decree of divorce by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter constitutes an adjudication between the divorced parties of all property rights or questions growing out of or connected with the marriage, p. 325.</p> <p>Same. — Marriage.—Capacity of Parties. — A decree of divorce settles the fact, as between the parties, that they were duly married to each other, and affirms the capacity of each to enter into the contract of marriage, p. 325.</p> <p>Same. — Property Rights. — Breach of Antenuptial Agreement. — Real estate conveyed by a husband to his wife in pursuance of an ante-nuptial agreement that in consideration of such conveyance she ■was to marry him and care for him as long as he should live cannot be recovered because of a breach of such agreement, after a decree of divorce has been granted, pp. 325-328.</p>

<p>Justices of the Peace. — Pleading Judgment Of. — Jurisdiction.— Under the provision of section 373, Burns’ R. S. 1894 (369, R. S. 1881), that in pleading a judgment of a court of special jurisdiction it shall be sufficient to allege generally that judgment was duly given or made, it is not necessary to allege the facts conferring jurisdiction, provided it is alleged that judgment was duly given or made. pp. 829, 380.</p> <p>Judgment. — Assignment.—To pass the legal title to a judgment by assignment, the clerk of the court, or justice of the peace, must attest such assignment, pp. 380, 331.</p> <p>Same. — Equitable Assignment. — In an action by an equitable assignee of a judgment, the assignor should be made a party defendant to answer as to his interest, p. 832.</p>

<p>From the Delaware Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Intoxicating Liquors— • ‘ Quart Shop ” Law — No Penalty Provided in Act. — Penalty Presaribed by General Statute. — The aot of March 8, 1897 (Acts 1897, p. 258), commonly known as the “ Quart Shop ” act, making unlawful the sale of liquors in less quantities than five gallons without a county license, is not rendered ineffective by its failure to prescribe a penalty for its violation, as the penalty is supplied by the general provision of section 2186, Bums’ R. S. 1894. pp. 850-358.</p> <p>Statutory Construction. — Incomplete Statute. — The rule that general statutes give way to special statutes upon the same subject, applies only when the special statute is complete within itself, p. $68. Same. — Doing Business Without License. — Statute Applicable to Future Legislation. — In section 2186, Burns’ R. S. 1894, prescribing a penalty for the transaction of any business without a license when such license is required by law, the words of the statute are comprehensive, and apply as well to future as existing legislation. p. 358.</p> <p>Intoxicating Liquors. — “Quart Shop”-Law. — Constitutional Law. —Section 3 of the act of March 8, 1897, providing that ‘ ‘ none of the provisions of the act shall apply to any person engaged in business as a wholesale dealer, who does not sell in less quantities than five gallons at a time,” does not discriminate in favor of wholesale dealers, so as to violate section 1, article 14, of the federal constitution. pp. 861-363.</p>

<p>Practice. — Harmless Error. — No error was committed in overruling a demurrer to an insufficient paragraph of complaint, where the special findings affirmatively disclose that the judgment rests wholly upon another paragraph, p. 365.</p> <p>Vendor’s Lien. — Exchange of Property. — Where, in an exchange of real estate, one of the parties agreed as a part consideration of the trade that she would pay off and discharge certain liens against the property conveyed by her, upon her failure to do so the grantee may pay off and discharge such liens, and recover from her the amount thereof as the balance of purchase money of the real estate taken in exchange, and enforce a vendor’s lien therefor on the real estate conveyed to her. pp. 365-369.</p> <p>Deeds. — Consideration.—Where the consideration in a deed is stated in general terms, the true consideration may be shown by parol by either party, for any purpose, except to defeat the operation of the deed as a valid and effective grant, and it may be shown by such evidence that grantee verbally agreed as a part of the consideration to pay an incumbrance existing on the real estate conveyed, p. 369.</p> <p>Evidence. — When Not in Record. — Bill of Exceptions. — The evidence is not properly in the record, where it is not shown that the bill of exceptions containing the evidence was filed with the clerk or in open court, p. 370.</p>

<p>From the Hancock Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Usury. — Complaint to Cancel Mortgage. — Sufficiency.—A complaint to set aside a mortgage which alleges that defendants were loaning money at usurious interest; that they had separate places of business, but a mutual understanding and arrangement between themselves by which the loans were changed from one to the other in order the more successfully to carry on the business of loaning money at illegal and usurious interest; that plaintiff borrowed $25.00 in 1891, and $50.00 in 1892, under an agreement that she was only to pay interest at the legal rate, and that she paid thereon, principal and interest, $175.00, when in 1894 they claimed that there was yet due $150.00; that she finally executed the mortgage and note for $112.60, on account of the threats, importunities, and oppressive conduct of the parties, set forth in the complaint, states facts sufficient to withstand a demurrer, p. 380.</p> <p>Same. — Recovery of Usurious Interest Voluntarily Paid.— Common Law Action. — Assumpsit.—A borrower who has paid more than the legal rate of interest is not confined to the remedy given by statute, but may maintain assumpsit at common law to recover back the excess of interest paid, on paying or offering to pay the money lent with lawful interest, pp. 382-387.</p> <p>Statutory Construction.— Repeal of Statute. — Repeal of Repealing ’Act.— Common Law Rule. — Where a statute or rule of the common law is repealed or modified, and the repealing or modifying act is afterwards expressly or impliedly repealed by an act which manifests no intention that the statute or common law rule repealed or modified shall continue repealed, the common law rule is that the repeal of the repealing or modifying act revives the act or common law rule so repealed or modified, p. 386.</p> <p>Statutory Construction. — Repeal of Repealing Act — Common Law Rule Changed. — The common law rule in regard to the effect of the repeal of a repealing act has been changed, so far as the same applies to acts of the legislature, by section 248, Burns’ R. S. 1894 (248, Horner’s R. S. 1897), but the rule as to the repeal of an act’ repealing or modifying a rule of the common law remains unchanged, and the repeal of the act repealing or modifying the common law rule revives the rule ab initio, and it exists the same as if it had never been repealed, pp. 886, 887.</p> <p>Usury. — Voluntary Payment of Usurious Interest. — The payment of usurious interest is not a voluntary payment in such sense as to entitle the receiver to retain the amount paid above the legal interest, but such payment is regarded as under the constraint of a formal, though illegal, contract, obtained by taking advantage of the necessities of the borrower, and, therefore, excepted from the ordinary rule that one voluntarily paying money on an illegal claim cannot maintain an action to recover such payment, p. 888.</p> <p>Practice. — Motion to Modify Judgment. — Must Be Good as a Whole. —Motions to modify judgments or interlocutory orders, or motions to strike out evidence, pleadings, judgments, or interlocutory orders must be good as a whole, pp. 389, 390.</p>

<p>Instructions. — Criminal Law. — Appeal.—In criminal cases instructions cannot be brought into the record except by bill of exception. p. 392.</p> <p>Same. — Appeal.—Presumption.—In the absence of a showing by the record to the contrary, it will be presumed on appeal that the trial court properly instructed the jury. p. 393.</p> <p>Criminal Law. — Larceny.—Verdict.—Indeterminate Sentence Law.— On a prosecution for larceny the jury returned the following verdict ; “We the jury find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment; and we-further find that he is thirty-two years of age.” Held, that the verdict was not defective in not fixing the punishment,- as the case came within the provisions of the indeterminate sentence law. p. S9k.</p>

<p>Married Women. — Suretyship.-—-Answer.—Iu an action against a husband and wile to foreclose a mortgage on the wife’s separate property, an answer by the wife that the note and mortgage sued on were executed ‘ ‘ to secure the debts of her husband, and for no other purpose or consideration, and that she did not receive any of the consideration of said note, nor was the same or any part of it paid to her or used for her benefit or the improvement of her separate property ” is a sufficient answer of suretyship, pp. 395, 396.</p> <p>Same.— Suretyship.— Evidence. — In an action against a husband and wife to foreclose a mortgage on the wife’s separate property, the evidence showed that the note and mortgage were executed for money borrowed by the husband to pay his own debts, which fact was known to the mortgagee; but that the money was paid to the wife by check. Held, that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding that the wife executed the note and mortgage as surety. pp. 396, 397.</p> <p>Appeal. — Weight of Evidence. — In determining on appeal whether the evidence sustains the findings or verdict, only the evidence sustaining the trial court will be considered, pp. 397, 398.</p>

<p>Rahjroads.— Blowing Whistle.— Damages. — Complaint. — A complaint against a railroad company for damages for personal injuries which 'alleges in general terms that defendant carelessly, negligently, recklessly, and without any necessity whatever, caused the whistle of its locomotive to be blown, thereby frightening plaintiff’s team, causing it to run away, and resulting in the injuries of which he complains, without any fault on the part of plaintiff, states a cause of action as against a demurrer for want of facts, pp. 398-403.</p> <p>Railroads. — Blowing Whistle. — Not Negligence Per ge. — The mere sounding of a locomotive whistle, even at a place of extraordinary danger, is not negligence per se, but a railroad company is liable for its negligence in blowing a locomotive whistle from which horses are frightened and caused to do injury, pp. 401, 40ñ.</p> <p>Pleading. — Demurrer.—A demurrer does not raise the question of the sufficiency of a complaint where such defect could properly be reached by a motion to make the allegations of the complaint more specific, p. 403.</p>

<p>Real Estate. — Wife’s Inchoate Interest. — Release Of. — A made a contract to convey certain real estate in which contract his wife did not join. Upon his refusal to execute the conveyance suit for specific performance was commenced; and lis pendens notice setting forth a description of the real estate and the nature of the plaintiff’s rights and interest sought to be enforced was duly filed. Pending suit for specific performance the husband and his wife joined in a conveyance of the real estate to S, who reconveyed . to the husband. The court afterwards ordered a conveyance by the husband under the contract, which conveyance was made by a commissioner. Held, in an action by the vendee against the wife to quiet title, that by joining in the deed to S she had relinquished her inchoate interest in the real estate.</p>

<p>Prom the Vigo Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Fraudulent Conveyances. — Action to Set Aside. — Complaint.—An allegation in a complaint to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent that grantor had not, at the time of the conveyance and suit, property, subject to execution, sufficient to pay plaintiff’s judgment amounts to an allegation of insolvency, p. 41k-</p> <p>Evidence. — Weight Of. — Action at Law and Suits in Equity. — The rule of this court against weighing the evidence and passing upon conflicts therein admits of no distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, pp. 414, 415.</p> <p>Same. — Fraudulent Conveyances. — Evidence of dealings and declarations of grantor subsequent to the conveyance, as tending to show fraud upon his part, is admissible as against the grantor in the trial of an action to set aside such conveyance as fraudulent, pp. 41B, 416.</p> <p>Fraudulent Conveyances. — Execution.—Proof.—Promissory Notes. —It is not necessary that plaintiff, in an action to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent, prove a refusal by defendant to turn out notes before he could maintain that the debtor had no property subject to execution, as section 736, Burns’ R. S. 1894, makes promissory notes leviable upon condition that the execution defendant give them up, and the burden is upon the debtor to disclose not only ownership, but his willingness to turn them out for levy. pp. 416. 417.</p> <p>Evidence. — Fraudulent Conveyances. — Character of Grantor. — Evidence as to the reputation of grantor for honesty and fair dealing is not admissible in the trial of an action to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent, p. 417.</p>

<p>Divorce. — Allowance to Wife. — Section 1054, Burns’ R. S. 1894, does not provide for any allowance by the court to a wife’s attorneys on decreeing to her a divorce, or refusing one to her husband, the allowance must be made to the wife, on her petition.</p>

<p>From the Johnson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Hamilton Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Howard Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Jackson Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Jay Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Wabash Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Subrogation. — Not Founded Upon Contract. — The right of subrogation is not founded upon contract, express or implied, but upon principles of equity and justice, p. Jfl8.</p> <p>Same. — Replevin Bail.— Special Findings.— Injunction. — Defendant became replevin bail for stay of execution of a judgment at the request of one not a party, but interested in the payment of the judgment, and was compelled by the judgment creditor to pay same; the judgment defendant brought suit to enjoin replevin bail from collecting the judgment, and for the cancelation thereof. Held, that the court erred in rendering judgment granting such relief, where the special findings on which the judgment was rendered did not show that the protection of the property and interests of replevin hail or that of the person who procured such stay of execution did not requiri the payment thereof, pp. Jfl3-Jf83.</p>

<p>From the Wells Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Pleading. — Overruling a Demurrer. — Harmless Error. — The overruling of a demurrer to a bad answer is harmless where there was a special finding of facts by the court, and the facts found could have been proved as well under another paragraph of plaintiff’s answer.</p>

<p>Vendor’s Lien. — When Reserved in Deed. — Mortgage.—Subrogation. ■ — For the purposes of subrogation there is no difference between a vendor’s lien expressly reserved in the deed and a mortgage given by the vendor to secure the purchase money, pp. 49%, 498.</p> <p>Subrogation. — Right of Not Founded Upon Contract. — Equity.—The right of subrogation is not founded upon contract, express or im plied, but upon principles of equity and justice, and includes every instance in which one party, not a mere volunteer, pays a debt for another, primarily liable, and which in good conscience should have been paid by the latter, p. 493.</p> <p>Vendor’s Lien. — Reservation of in Deed.- — Notice.—A lien reserved in a deed conveying real estate is notice to a subsequent mortgagee of the rights of those claiming under such lien. p. 496.</p> <p>Mortgage. — To Secure Preexisting Debt. —A mortgage given to secure a preexisting debt will not cut off prior equities, p. 496.</p> <p>Subrogation. — Vendor’s Lien. — Where a third party pays a note secured by a vendor’s lien, under an agreement with the makers that he is to hold the note with the lien as security, the person so paying the note will be subrogated to the rights of the vendor, as against a subsequent mortgagee, pp. 495-497. ■</p>

<p>Instructions. — Must Be Applicable to the Evidence. — An instruction is not only required to state correct legal principles, but it should so state them that the jury may be able to apply them to the particular evidence to which they are germane, p. 513.</p> <p>Negligence. — Co-employe.—Imputed Negligence. — Contributory Negligence. — Where two persons are associated together as car inspectors, and by an arrangement or agreement between them, either express or implied, it became the duty of one while the other was under a car engaged in the inspection and repair thereof, to look out, and give notice to the other of approaching danger, the relation of principal and agent exists between them in this respect, and if the former fails to perform such duty, and by reason of his neglect his co-employe is injured by an approaching train, such negligence is imputable to the latter, and in order that a recovery can be had for such injury it is incumbent upon plaintiff to show freedom from contributory negligence on the part of his co-employe. pp. 513, 514-</p> <p>Instructions. — Invasion of Province of Jury. — An instruction given to the jury in the trial of an action against a railroad company for damages for the death of an employe caused by defendant backing a car against another car under which deceased was at work, to the effect that if a red light was on the rear platform of the car' under which deceased was at work when injured, and if you find from the evidence that a red light by night is a danger signal, and if defendant’s employes knew, or might have known, that such a light, in general railway usage, so placed, was a signal of danger, then such facts made it the duty of such employes to heed it and exercise care and caution, etc., was a usurpation of the functions of the jury, where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the red light on the car at the time of the accident was a signal of danger, pp. 514.-5H0.</p>

<p>From the Lake Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Pleading. — Answer.—Form of Demurrer. — A demurrer to an answer as not stating facts “sufficient to constitute a good answer to the complaint of the plaintiff,” does not question the sufficiency of the answer as stating a cause of defense, p. 557.</p> <p>' Slander. — Complaint.—Neglect of Official Duty. — Words, charging that a sheriff neglected, mistreated, and starved prisoners in his custody, impute the commission of a crime, and are slanderous. pp. 557, 558.</p> <p>Same. — Justification.—Rule as to Evidence.— Prior to the act of March 4,1897 (Acts 1897, p. 187), it was necessary that a plea justifying the speaking of words imputing the commission of a crime be supported by evidence establishing its truth beyond a reasonable doubt, p. 559.</p>

<p>Appeal. — How Extrinsic Matters Made Part of Record Without Bill of Exceptions. — To make matters outside of the record a part thereof by order of court instead of bill of exceptions, such extrinsic matters must be set out in the order, pp. 560-564.</p> <p>Same. — Presumption.—It will be presumed on appeal that the circuit court in all things conformed to and complied with the law. p. 565.</p>

<p>From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Pleading. — Sham, Pleading. — Section 385, Burns’ R. S. 1894, providing that a pleading may be rejected as sham where it plainly appears on its face, or by answer to interrogatories, to be false or intended for delay, does not authorize the court to reject a pleading upon answers to interrogatories tending to show that the facts averred in the pleading were false, where the court could only reach the conclusion that the allegations were false by weighing and balancing the probabilities arising from certain inferences to f>e drawn from physical facts stated in such answers, pp. 576-578.</p> <p>Railroads. — Accident at Crossing.— Burden of Proof.— Where a person is injured by a collision with a train, while crossing a railroad track, the fault is prima facie his own, and before a recovery can be had for such injury, it must be shown not only that he looked and listened without seeing or hearing the train in time to escape, but that he could not have seen it or heard it in time to have escaped if he had looked and listened, pp. 578-582.</p>

<p>Appeal. — Joint Assignment of Errors. — Husband and Wife. — Where a husband and wife join in an assignment of errors, the assignment will be good as to both if it is good as to the wife. p. 585.</p> <p>Decedent’s Estate. — Action by Heirs. — Complaint.—Where an action is brought by heirs for a debt due an ancestor, it is necessary to allege and prove that the debts of the ancestor have been paid, and the estate settled, or that no letters of administration have been granted, p. 585.</p> <p>Evidence. — Possession of Note. — The possession of a note and mortgage securing it is prima facie evidence of title in them. p. 586.</p> <p>Husband and Wipe. — Estate by Entireties. — Mortgage.—Estoppel.— Where a husband and wife own real estate by entireties, and, desiring to procure a loan, make an affidavit setting forth that a part of the money to be borrowed is to be used to pay off an incumbrance upon the land, and the balance to purchase other land to be held by entireties, and upon the faith of such affidavit the loan is made, and a mortgage on such real estate accepted as security, the wife will afterwards be estopped from claiming that the mortgage was exe7 cuted to secure money to pay the husband’s debts, and therefore void. pp. 686, 587.</p> <p>Husband and Wife. — Estate by Entireties. — Presumption.—Where property is held by entireties, there may be some presumption indulged that the owners are, as they seem to be, equally interested and equally responsible, and that, when they give their joint note and mortgage, they are joint principals, p. 588.</p>

<p>From the Vanderburgh Superior Court.</p>

<p>From the Monroe Circuit Court.</p>

<p>• ■ Prom the Decatur Circuit Court:</p>

<p>Pleading. — Action.—Ejectment.—Trespass.—Necessary Allegations.— An action based upon a paragraph of complaint stating facts sufficient to constitute an action for trespass, damage, and for an injunction, and which does not allege that plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the premises described, nor that the defendant unlawfully kept him out of the possession thereof, will be held to be an action for trespass, and not an action to recover the possession of the real estate, pp. 605, 606.</p> <p>New Teial.— Quieting Title.— Joinder of Causes of Action. — New Trial as of Bight. — Where a paragraph of complaint for the possession of real estate, or to quiet the title thereto, is joined in the same complaint with one for any other cause of action, a new trial as of right, under section 1077, Burns’ R. S. 1894, is not permitted, pp. 606, 607.</p>

<p>From the Marion Superior Court.</p>

<p>Adverse Possession. — Survey.—Estoppel.— Quieting Title. — Adverse possession of land, continued for twenty years, passes the title thereof to the occupant, in fee simple, as completely as though he had acquired it from the true owner by conveyance, and the fact that such owner submitted to a survey of 'such lands will not estop him from asserting title to the land under his claim of adverse possession, irrespective of the survey, when the time for appeal therefrom has not expired, pp. 624, 625.</p> <p>Quieting Title. — Survey.—Consent to Making Survey. — Effect Of.— The fact that a person holding land by adverse possession consented to a survey thereof will not estop the holder from asserting title to the land, regardless of the survey, as the only effect of such consent was to dispense with the notice required by statute, p. 625.</p>

<p>Practice.— Harmless Error. — Special Verdict. — Where the facts found in a special verdict are within the issues joined on two paragraphs of complaint, and applicable thereto, error if any in overruling a demurrer to other paragraphs of the complaint is harmless. p. 627.</p> <p>New Trial. — Joint Assignment of Error.— Instructions.— Appeal and Error. — Where error is assigned as a cause for a new trial that the court erred in giving instructions three and four, such assignment will not be available if one of the instructions is correct. p. 627.</p> <p>Instructions. — Witnesses.—Credibility.—Jurors are not authorized to consider any evidence except such as is given at the trial, but they have the right to test its truth and weight by their general knowledge, derived from experience and observation in their relations with others, and an instruction that in determining the credibility of a witness the jury might call to their aid that knowledge of men and their actions acquired by mingling with men, is proper, pp. 627, 628.</p> <p>Interrogatories to Jury.— Motion to Require Answer. — Where the answer to an interrogatory to the jury was, “ Evidence don’t show,” the action of the court in overruling a motion to require an affirmative or negative answer cannot be questioned on appeal, where no facts are disclosed by the record on which the jury could have answered such interrogatory affirmatively or negatively, pp. 628, 629.</p> <p>Witnesses. — Competency.—Decedents’ Estates. — Section 506, Burns’ E. S. 1894, providing that “in all suits in which an executor or administrator is a party, involving matters which occurred during the lifetime of the decedent, where a judgment or allowance may be made or rendered for or against the estate represented by such executor or administrator, any person who is a necessary party to the issue or record whose interest is adverse to such estate, shall not be a competent witness against the estate,” does not renderthe administratrix, who is the widow of decedent, incompetent to testify to matters occurring prior to the death of decedent, in an action for damages for his death, where her interest was not adverse to the estate, and she did not testify against the estate, but in favor of it. p. 629.</p> <p>Witnesses. — Competency.—Decedents Estates. — Action in Tort. — The provision of section 507, Bums’ E. S. 1894, that “in all suits by or against heirs or devisees, founded upon a contract with or demand against the ancestor, to obtain title to or possession of property, real or personal, of or in right of such ancestor, or to affect the same in any manner, neither party to such suit shall be a competent witness as to any matter which occurred prior to the death of the ancestor,” is not applicable to an action in -tort for damages for the death of decedent, pp. 629, 630.</p> <p>New Trial. — Special Verdict.— Motions for Judgment.— Review.— Overruling or sustaining motions for judgment on a special verdict is not a cause for a new trial. The correctness of the rulings on such motions can only be presented by assigning such rulings as error in this court, p. 630.</p>

<p>Taxation. — Tax Sales. — Notice.—Private Sale. — A notice to sell lands for taxes at public sale constitutes a sufficient notice to sell same at private sale under sections 247, 248, 249, of tbe tax law of 1872 (R. S. 1876, p. 127), and such provision is not in conflict with the federal constitution in that it deprives the owner of his property “without due process of law.”</p>

<p>From the Wayne Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Rush Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Tippecanoe Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Laboeny. — Information.—An information charging one E with the larceny of certain described property, “such property then and there being the personal goods and chattels of one H,” sufficiently, charg'és that the property stolen was the property of H. pp.651,652.</p> <p>Same. — Information.—Idem Sonans. — An information for larceny is not rendered bad by reason of the fact that the affidavit gives the name of the person from whom the property was stolen as ‘.‘Horrick,” and the information as “Horick,” the names being idem sonans. p. 652.</p> <p>Cbiminal Law. — Second Conviction.— Where a statute imposes a greater punishment upon second or subsequent convictions of an offense, the former conviction must be alleged in the indictment and proved at the trial, or the same can only be punished as a first offense, p. 653.</p> <p>Laboeny. — Second Conviction. — Ver diet. — Where an indictment for petit larceny charges a former conviction for a like offense, and the jury return a verdict of guilty as charged, the defendant is found guilty of petit larceny, but is subject to the punishment prescribed for grand larceny, p. 654.</p> <p>Same.— Information. — Verdict.—Harmless Error. — Where an affidavit and information charges larceny, but does not charge a former conviction, a verdict finding the defendant “guilty of grand larceny as charged in the information,” will be construed as a conviction for petit larceny, and an error of the court instructing the jury as to grand larceny, is-harmless, jpp. 654, 655.</p> <p>Appeal, — General Objections to Judgment. — Review.— Where on the trial of'a criminal cause the defendant makes a general objection to the judgment rendered on the verdict, but does not point out any specific objection thereto, or move to modify the same so as to conform to the verdict, the objection will not be considered on appeal, p. 655.</p>

<p>From tbe. Lawrence Circuit Court.</p>

<p>Municipal Coepobations. — Improvement of Streets. — Authority of Board of Trustees of Town.— The board of trustees of an incorporated town is invested with plenary powers and exclusive jurisdiction over the streets and the improvement and repair thereof, pp. 664, 665.</p> <p>Same. — Improvement of Sidewalk in Manner Different from that Provided by Ordinance. — Injunction.—An incorporated town, having by ordinance provided for the improvement of a sidewalk according to certain plans and specifications, may enjoin an abutting property owner from making the improvement in a manner materially different from that provided by the ordinance, pp. 665-668.</p> <p>Appeal. — Bill- of Exceptions.- — -A bill of exceptions must be signed by the judge before it is filed with the clerk, p. 668.</p>

<p>From the Marion Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Whitley Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Marion Superior Court.</p>

<p>From the Hamilton Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Henry Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Dubois Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Sullivan Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Elkhart Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Porter Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Clinton Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Hancock Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the Madison Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.</p>

<p>From the St. Joseph Circuit Court.</p>