State v. Chew’s Empirical Analysis
1997
Citation profile
99 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 99 later decisions — most recently February 2026 · most notably State v. Morton (1998), State v. Koskovich (2001)
99 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3592 · 21 U.S.C. § 848 (§ 408 of the Controlled Substances Act)
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · United States v. Olano · Edwards v. Arizona · Gregg v. Georgia · Furman v. Georgia
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 99 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he predecessor Rule 20 was interpreted as not to contain a temporal requirement 'that a party seeking admission of a prior consistent statement show that the prior statement was made before any alleged motive to falsify existed on the part of the declarant.'”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“be interpreted in a light most favorable to the defendant.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Defendants argue that § 848(n)(7) is intended to apply only to either "murder for hire . . . or, for example, to gain an inheritance or life insurance proceeds". . . . They argue that the government's evidence will at best show that the . . . homicide was committed in the course of a robbery, and that the intent with which the murder is carried out has to be pecuniary gain over and above robbery. The court finds CT Page 17022 that defendants' interpretation is an unreasonably restrictive reading which does not comport with the structure and plain language of the statute. The Court first notes that § 848(n)(7) has two prongs: that the offense was committed "as consideration for the receipt," or "in expectation of the receipt" of something of pecuniary value. Defendants' view seems correct that the first prong's use of the "as consideration for" language of contract contemplates murder-for-hire. For this Court to transport that restriction to the second, "in expectation of the receipt" prong, however, would render the clause mere surplusage. Defendants also point to the statutory structure and argue that since this factor follows § 848(n)(6) ("The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value") . . . Congress intended § 848(n)(7) to identify the flip-side of procuring a murder-for-hire. It is enough to say that a finding that the first clause does indeed comprehend the other half of murder ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.