¶1 I concur in the opinion of Justice Lorigan. I think, however, that it does not sufficiently state the reasons for the proposition that the law does not delegate legislative power to the state board of architecture. If the statute gave power to the board to determine the qualifications necessary to entitle a person to become a certificated architect, it would be a delegation of legislative power. It does not do this, however. The statute does not expressly prescribe any standard of qualification in the applicant. It must be construed as at least an implied declaration that no person shall be entitled to a certificate as a licensed architect, unless he has such ordinary knowledge of the principles *339 and science of that art or profession, and such ordinary skill in the practical application of those principles and that science, as are usually possessed by those engaged therein. It is the usual standard implied in law, where no different standard is expressed by the statute. Doubtless the statute might require a higher standard, or a lower standard, but inasmuch as it does not expressly require any, it is to be considered as implying a requirement of the standard above stated. The provisions of the statute give the board the power to adopt rules and regulations, but it does not authorize it to require or enforce a different or higher standard than that of ordinary knowledge and skill, nor to require knowledge and skill of some other art or profession as a condition. It could not, for instance, require the applicant to display a knowledge of theology, or medical science, as a condition of receiving a certificate. The power which is conferred upon it is merely to make such examination as it shall deem sufficient to enable it to decide whether or not the applicant has this ordinary knowledge and skill. This is a task which the legislature could not itself undertake in each individual instance. If it were a legislative act, of a character so that it could not be delegated, it would follow that it would practically be impossible for the legislature to perform it, and consequently there could be no regulation of this or any other profession. The thing required of the board is the determination of the fact that the applicant does or does not have the qualifications which the law implies he must have. This is a ministerial or administrative function. Like many other ministerial acts, it involves to some degree a consideration of the effect of evidence and is similar in that regard to judicial proceedings, but it is well settled that such acts are not so far judicial that the legislature may not place the power elsewhere than in the court. The rules and regulations referred to in the act are merely such rules and regulations as relate to the method by which the board is to proceed in determining this fact.
151 Cal. 331
90 P 702
Ex Parte McManus
Decided May 22, 1907
California Supreme Court · decided 1907-05-22
<p>State Board op Architecture—Constitutionality op Act Creating— Classes op Architects—Uncertipioated Architects—Uniform Operation op Act.—The provisions of the act of March 23, 1901, creating the state board of architecture, which empower such board to grant certificates to practice the profession of architecture upon an examination of applicants therefor, and which punishes as a misdemeanor the practice of" such profession without a certificate, unless the architect so doing fully informs the person for whom he is acting that he is not a certificated architect, is not in violation of section 11 or 21 of article I of the state constitution. Such act recognizes two classes of architects whom it permits to practice the profession of architecture, to wit (1) certificated architects, and (2) uncertifieated architects who inform their patrons that they are not certificated. The act is uniform in its operation as to all architects whp have not a certificate, and makes no arbitrary or other discrimination as to members of that class, nor does it grant any special privileges or immunities to any of that class which are not possessed by or extended to all.</p> <p>Id.—Delegation op Ministerial Duties by Legislature—Public Commissions—Occupations Requiring Special Skill or Knowledge. :—The legislature, notwithstanding it may do things itself, may nevertheless authorize them to be done by ministerial officers or boards when it believes that they can do them more conveniently and effectually than it can itself. Especially may this be done when it is deemed proper by the legislature to regulate in the interests of the public, through public commissions or boards constituted for that purpose, the pursuit of particular professions or occupations which involve the exercise of skill and the possession of special knowledge and experience. •</p> <p>• Id.—Power op Board to Adopt Rules—Reasonableness op Rules— Examination op Applicants.'—The provision of that act empowering the board of architecture to formulate and adopt a code of rules and regulations for its government in the examination of applicants for certificates to practice architecture, and such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper, not inconsistent with the act, and, should the applicant pass a satisfactory examination, to grant him a certificate, does not delegate legislative functions to the board within the constitutional inhibition, or give them any other authority than the power necessary to be exercised by them to the end that the law as completely enacted by the legislature may properly be carried into effect. Such provision, in so far as it authorizes the board to adopt rules and regulations for the examination of applicants, does not confer discretionary and arbitrary power upon the board under which discriminating, unreasonable, and unfair rules and regulations may be established. The authority conferred by the térms of the act is to pass necessary and proper rules on the subject, which implies that such rules must be reasonably adapted for the purpose of determining the qualifications of all applicants, and the court will not presume that the authority conferred will be abused by the formulation of unreasonable or unjust rules, and from such presumption declare the act to be unconstitutional.</p> <p>Id.—Remedy Ip Rules Abe Unreasonable.—If the board should adopt rules which are not uniform, or which are discriminating or unreasonable, that would not affect the validity of the act; it would simply be a violation of its provisions. The remedy, if the board violates its duty in this respect, is to apply to the court under some proper and appropriate proceeding for relief. It does not justify an attack upon the validity of the act in habeas corpus proceedings.</p> <p>Id.-—Mode op Appointment op Board.—The provision of that act for the appointment by the governor of the ten members of the board, of whom five should be from the San Francisco chapter and five from the Southern California chapter of the American Institute of Architects, or from some similar institution or association of architects, is not unconstitutional. (Ex parte Gerino, 143 Cal. 413, approved.)</p>
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1907-05-22
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently May 1977 · most notably Farrington v. Tokushige (1927), 13 Cal. 2d 741 - McDonough v. Goodcell (1939)
2 district · 36 state decisions
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