151 Ill. App. 3d 558 - People v. Beringer’s Empirical Analysis
1987
Citation profile
8 federal appellate · 22 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently October 2020 · most notably 226 Ill. 2d 92 - People v. Wheeler (2007), 175 Ill. App. 3d 136 - People v. Brooks (1988)
8 federal appellate · 22 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 76 Ill. 2d 289 - People v. Taylor · 43 Ill. 2d 375 - The PEOPLE v. Nuccio · 116 Ill. App. 3d 384 - People v. Starks · 135 Ill. App. 3d 534 - People v. Redman · 50 Ill. App. 3d 778 - People v. Suggs
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Q: Didn’t you call me and tell me you were locked up on a disorderly? A: No, sir. Q: And you wanted me to get you out of jail? A: No, sir. Q: Didn’t you tell me that? A: No, sir. Q: And that you would come into this court if I paid you money, didn’t you tell ■ me that? A: No, sir. Q: And you would say anything— MR. STAMOS [Kenny’s attorney]: If I may make an objection, inserting himself in this case as a witness. It is improper for him to be asking these forms of questions, get on the stand and testify. THE COURT: You will have to perfect your impeachment. MR. WADAS [State’s attorney]: I understand that. Q: Didn’t you tell me, Mr. Webb, if I scratch your back you will scratch my back, didn’t you tell me that? A: No, sir. ****** Q: How much did you have to drink before you came to our office that morning? MS. PLACEK [Petitioner’s attorney]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. I will sustain the form, as to the form. MR. WADAS: Q: Had you been drinking that morning? A: A glass of orange juice. Q: Had you been drinking any alcoholic beverages? A: I had not been out of the house. Q: How much of any reefer did you smoke that morning? MS. PLACEK: Objection. MR. WADAS: Q: Did you take any drugs or smoke any reefer that morning? A: I don’s mess with it. Q: You don’t mess with reefer? A: No. * * * * * * Q: Didn’t you tell us, Mr. Webb, you didn’t remember anything about the case and you didn’t want to remember anything about the case, didn’t you say that? A: No, sir. Q: You didn’t ask us”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[The] unsubstantiated cross-examination [of Harvey Webb] destroyed Harvey Webb’s credibility before the jury. None of [the above-cited] questions had any factual foundation. On at least one occasion the judge reminded the prosecutor the he would have to perfect his impeachment, but he never did_ [T]he “unfounded insinuation” was “substantial” because the prosecutors implied that Webb twice suborned perjury, used drugs, and conspired to change his testimony. Second, the objectionable questions were “repeated” occurring at no less than four separate points during cross-examination. Third, the questions prejudiced the defendant because after the eyewitness Webb was impeached, the uncontroverted evidence indicated that the defendant was the shooter, a fact the judge specifically relied upon in his sentence of natural life without parole. The State’s cross-examination also impugned the integrity of defense counsel, further prejudicing defendant, (citations omitted). Moreover, the prejudice that accrued to defendant could not be cured by the court’s instructions because the prosecutor repeated the prejudicial question after the objection had been sustained and the jury instructed to disregard it. Thus, the unperfected cross-examination constituted reversible error.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Our disposition makes it unnecessary for us to consider the remaining issues raised by the defendant on appeal. We note, however, that we believe the evidence at trial was sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not mean we are making a finding as to defendant’s guilt or innocence which would be binding on retrial, but rather our consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence admitted at trial will remove the risk of subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.