Volume 151 — Indiana Appellate Court Reports

1. WORDS AND PHRASES — <italic>Willful or Wanton Misconduct.</italic> — Willful or wanton misconduct consists of the conscious and intentional doing of a wrongful act or omission of a duty, with reckless indifference to consequences, under circumstances which show that the doer has knowledge of existing conditions and that injury will probably result. p. 421. 2. STATUTES — <italic>Guest Statute — Wanton Misconduct.</italic> — Under the Indiana guest statute, IC 1971, 9-3-3-1, to be guilty of wanton misconduct the driver must (1) be conscious of his misconduct; (2) be motivated by<page_number>Page 418</page_number> a desire to assert himself or his interest above and beyond, or in reckless indifference for, the safety of his guest, and (3) he must do so knowing that his conduct subjects them to a high probability of injury. p. 422. 3. STATUTES — <italic>Guest Statute — Trial Court Evaluation.</italic> — In the trial court's evaluation of guest cases an error of judgment or a mistake standing alone, on the part of the host, will not amount to wanton or willful misconduct but rather the host must have manifested an attitude adverse to the guest, or of perverseness, in that the host must have shown he was indifferent to the consequences of his conduct. The entire course of conduct of the host leading up to the accident must be considered and the host must have had actual knowledge of danger confronting the guest. p. 422. 4. STATUTES — <italic>Guest Statute — Perverse Motive.</italic> — To constitute "willful or wanton misconduct" there must be a "perverse motive," in that the misconduct must be conscious and intentional and of such nature that under the known existing conditions injury will probably result therefrom, however, this does not mean that the wrongful conduct of the driver must be motivated by malice, ill will, or intent to injure. p. 423. 5. STATUTES — <italic>Guest Statute — Immaturity of Host.</italic> — The Indiana guest statute makes no distinction in regard to ages and the standard of conduct required for recovery by a guest, so responsibility must be measured by the standard with which reasonable men of ordinary intelligence are chargeable under the circumstances. p. 423. 6. VERDICTS — <italic>Directed Verdict.</italic> — Directing a verdict for one party is proper only if all the evidence favorable to the other party and all the inferences which reasonably might have been drawn therefrom were not sufficient to establish his case. p. 424. 7. TRIAL COURTS — <italic>Willful or Wanton Misconduct.</italic> — The question as to whether the accident was caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of a defendant, when presented to a trial court, should be left to the jury where there is any conflict in the evidence or where different inferences from the testimony might be reasonably drawn. p. 424. 8. MOTIONS — <italic>Motion for Directed Verdict.</italic> — Where the evidence is such that the minds of reasonable men might differ, or if the determination of negligence depends on conflicting evidence, then the question is for the jury and the motion for a directed verdict should not be granted. p. 425.