151 Ind. App. 417 - Fuller v. Wiles’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In judging the conduct of the appellee herein we are bound to apply the same standard to him as we would to an adult even though he was but 16 years of age and had just obtained his driver’s license earlier on the day of the accident. As was said in Sausaman v. Leininger (1957), 237 Ind. 508 , 146 N.E.2d 414 : ‘The fact that appellant was a youth and that wanton impulses may be natural to young people does not excuse appellant of his misconduct. Neither does his immaturity excuse his failure to contemplate the consequences of his act. There is nothing in the statute which indicates a legislative intent that we should place one construction on the statute as applied to young people and another to adults. Therefore, in determining whether the driver of a motor vehicle had knowledge that injury would probably result from his wanton misconduct, responsibility for such knowledge must be measured by the standard with which reasonable men of ordinary intelligence are chargeable under the circumstances. Under our statute no person, young or old, can operate an automobile on the public highway, in a manner controlled by wanton impulse or motive, under conditions known likely to produce injury, without being legally responsible to his guests for injuries caused thereby.’ ” 280 N.E.2d at 62 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gibson v. Estate of Holderbaum · Barrow v. Talbott

2. ““When passing on a motion for a directed verdict, the court is merely called on to determine if there is some evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant which the jury is entitled to consider. Jones v. Furlong (1951), 121 Ind. App. 279 , 97 N.E.2d 369 . Where the evidence is such that the minds of reasonable men might differ, or if the determination of negligence depends on conflicting evidence, then the question is for the jury.” (Emphasis supplied) Hatmaker v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Company (1956), 126 Ind. App. 566 , 133 N.E.2d 86 ; Heiny v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company (1943), 221 Ind. 367 , 47 N.E.2d 145 ; Robertson Brothers Department Store v. Stanley (1950), 228 Ind. 372 , 90 N.E.2d 809 ; Haney v. Meyer (1966), 139 Ind. App. 663 , 215 N.E.2d 886 ; Oliver v. Clemons’ Estate (1968), 142 Ind. App. 499 , 236 N.E.2d 72 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 163 Ind. App. 240 - Gregory v. White Truck & Equipment Co., Inc.

3. ““a. An error of judgment or a mistake standing alone, on the part of the host, will not amount to wanton or wilful misconduct. “b. The host must have manifested an attitude adverse to the guest, or of ‘perverseness’, in that the host must have shown he was indifferent to the consequences of his conduct. “c. The entire course of conduct of the host leading up to the accident must be considered. “d. The host must have had actual knowledge of danger confronting the guest.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tutterrow v. Brookshire