151 Md. App. 527 - Webster v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As we approach our analysis of this contention, we point out that the focus is not on whether the prosecutor was guilty of an impropriety or even whether the prosecutor was guilty of a deliberate and flagrant impropriety, but only on what the appropriate sanction should be. The judge agreed with the appellant that an impropriety had indeed occurred and promptly gave a curative instruction. She did not believe, however, that sufficient prejudice had occurred to merit the extreme sanction of a mistrial. We hold that she did not abuse her discretion in that regard. A mistrial is not a sanction designed to punish an attorney for an impropriety. It is rather an extreme sanction that sometimes must be resorted to when such overwhelming prejudice has occurred that no other remedy will suffice to cure the prejudice.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 235 Md. App. 540 - Winston, Mayhew & Cannon v. State · 216 Md. App. 235 - Williams v. State

2. “The exception specifically contemplates the admission of statements describing how the patient incurred the injury for which he is seeking medical care. For example, “if the doctor needed to know the source of the injury in order to determine treatment ..., the patient’s statement as to source should be admissible, particularly if the doctor told the patient that the information was necessary for proper treatment.” 6A Lynn McClain [sic], Maryland Evidence § 803(4):1, at 218 (2d ed. 2001) (collecting eases). * * * But the “need to know” premise for the exception means that it does not extend to statements made to nontreating medical personnel. In Maryland Dep’t of Human Re sources v. Bo Peep Day Nursery, 317 Md. 573, 589 , 565 A.2d 1015 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1067 , 110 S.Ct. 1784 , 108 L.Ed.2d 786 (1990), the Court of Appeals explained why statements made to treating medical personnel fit within this exception, but those made to medical providers who merely examine a sexual assault victim do not. “Under the law of evidence, as a general proposition, statements of medical history, made by a patient to a treating medical practitioner for the purpose of treatment, may be admitted as substantive evidence through the medical witness.” Id. at 589, 565 A.2d 1015 (citations omitted). “Consequently, statements made to a nontreating physician, such as an expert preparing for an upcoming trial, are not admissible as substantive evidence!)]” 2 In re Rachel T., 77 Md.App. at 34 , ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 175 Md. App. 588 - Coates v. State

3. “specifically contemplates the admission of statements describing how the patient incurred the injury for which he is seeking medical care. For example, “if the doctor needed to know the source of the injury in order to determine treatment ..., the patient’s statement as to source should be admissible, particularly if the doctor told the patient that the information was necessary for proper treatment.” 6A Lynn McClain, Maryland Evidence § 803(4):1, at 218 (2d ed.2001) (collecting cases).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 197 Md. App. 487 - Davis v. Petito