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The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Cotitran.
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The Court is entirely satisfied with the decree of his Honor, Judge Mann, and, for the reasons stated by him, the decree is affirmed and made the judgment of this Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Watts, and Messrs. Justices Bleasf, Stabler, and Carter concur.
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Case posture Posture Before MANN, J., Richland, March, 1928. Affirmed.Action by J. William Eargle against Herbert B. Eargle. Decree for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
The decree of Judge Mann follows:
The above-entitled case was begun by the service of a summons and complaint upon the defendant on March 12, 1927, which alleged that the plaintiff and the defendant had entered into a contract of date October 4, 1923, which provided, in substance, that the defendant was to live with the plaintiff, who is his grandfather, and the plaintiff's wife, who was his grandmother, and was to cultivate the tract of land and otherwise take care of and provide for the said J. William Eargle and his said wife if they should get so infirm as to be unable to provide for themselves. The contract further agreed to deed to the defendant a certain tract of land described in the contract as tract No. 1, and containing 50 acres, more or less. The answer of the defendant was an admission of the execution of the contract and the allegation that the defendant had complied completely with his part of said contract.
The case was referred to the Master for the purpose of taking the testimony only, and the testimony was reported to the Circuit Court by the Master without any finding or conclusion of law or fact. The facts surrounding the transaction appear to be from the testimony practically conceded by both sides, in so far as the execution of the agreement is concerned. J. William Eargle, the plaintiff herein, and the grandfather of the defendant herein, was a man about 77 years old at the time of the execution of the agreement, while his wife was about 74 years old at the said time. Their daughter, the mother of the defendant herein,
had resided with the plaintiff and his wife all of her life along with her son, Herbert, the defendant herein. In 1923, the daughter decided to get married to a man named Meetze and to move from the home of her parents to the home of her husband. This left her son, Herbert, with the plaintiff, his grandfather, and his wife. The plaintiff had lived on this tract of land practically all of his life and both he and his wife were at the age in life where they did not wish to leave the place which had been so long their home. At the time of the making of the contract, Herbert, the defendant herein, was not married, but from the testimony, it is a fair inference that he intended to be married and was married in December, 1923, the contract having been executed in October, 1923. There is no doubt under the decisions in South Carolina, as well as in other states, that the agreement to live with the plaintiff and his wife was a valuable and sufficient consideration for the contract to deed the land in question. Kennedy v. Badgett , 19 S.C. 591 ; McNair v. Moore. 64 S.C. 82 , 41 S.E., 829 ; Knight v. Jones , 93 S.C. 376 , 76 S.E., 978 .
The plaintiff conceded in open court that the consideration for the contract was perfectly valid. This, in my opinion, left the sole question to be determined as to whether or not the defendant had lived up to his part of the agreement, and on this issue the entire case turns. It is admitted by all parties and shown by the testimony that for a considerable time, certainly for a period of about two years, there was no complaint whatsoever as to the conduct of the defendant with reference to his grandparents. The grandmother lived and died at the place in June, 1926, and, although there was a meeting before her death in 1925, it was only after her death that there seems to have been friction between the plaintiff and the defendant herein. The grandmother died in June, 1925, having lived with plaintiff and defendant after the 1925 meeting and in October, 1926, the plaintiff became dissatisfied, and finally, under his own admission, voluntarily
left the home of the plaintiff about Christmas, 1926, and went to the home of one of his daughters, Mrs. Eleazer, who was one of the witnesses in plaintiff's behalf. The plaintiff does not claim that at that time there had been any particular reason for him to leave, but says that he was tired of the ways of the defendant and that the defendant had refused to get some sugar at the time of the leaving. There was considerable testimony on the part of the plaintiff's witnesses who, it might be said in passing, are all more or less personally and directly interested in the outcome of the cause as to the conduct of the defendant with reference to both the plaintiff and his wife. It is passing strange that with this knowledge these children of the plaintiff allowed and permitted him to remain in the home of the defendant without any complaint whatsoever, for these many years.
It was the duty of the plaintiff to prove his case by the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence, and this burden rested with him throughout the case. Even without considering the testimony of the defendant's witnesses, which was convincing, I do not think that the plaintiff has made out his case by the preponderance of the testimony. When you consider the testimony of the defendant and a number of disinterested witnesses who testified for him, there can be no doubt in the mind of any reasonable man that the defendant has fully performed and lived up to his part of the contract and was and is in no wise at fault for the plaintiff leaving his home and refusing to accept the benefits of the contract from the defendant. I therefore find as a matter of fact that the plaintiff has failed to make out his case by the preponderance of the testimony, and that on the whole case the defendant by the testimony has fully sustained his position.
There are no decisions in South Carolina directly in point as to this matter. The majority of those found are with reference to the claim of undue influence being exerted at the time of the making of the contract, such as Wille v. , where equity set aside a deed of conveyance made to his son by a weak-minded mother on the ground of inadequate price and undue influence.
We find, however, in the case of Du Bose v. Kell , 90 S.C. 196 , 71 S.E., 371 , the Court upholds a deed made by an aged and feeble lady to one not even her blood relation, where it was shown that the deed was made pursuant to a long-cherished intention of granting the property to the party. An examination of this case will show that the Court is loathe to set aside and cancel a solemn contract entered into by the parties for a good and sufficient consideration.
The case of Knight v. Jones , 93 S.C. 376 , 76 S.E., 978 , is nearer in point that any of the foregoing. In this case an old unmarried lady named Susan Bramlett conveyed land to her widowed niece, Sarah C. Jones, a tract for the maintenance and support of Susan for her natural life and then to Sarah for the life of Sarah, then to Sarah's children, the defendants in fee. Sarah died before Susan, and, after the death of Sarah, an action was begun against the children of Sarah to vacate the deed. The complaint, among other things, alleged that there was no consideration for the deed, and that the grantees had not complied with the terms of the deed and the contract to care for Susan Bramlett.
A still later case is that of Huguenin v. Adams , 110 S.C. 407 , 96 S.E., 918 .
Mrs. Huguenin, an elderly lady, deeded a very valuable plantation to Julius Adams, the defendant. Judge Gage, Associate Justice, rendered the opinion of the Court, and affirmed the Circuit Court in upholding the validity of the deed made to Adams.
I therefore conclude that the defendant is entitled to a decree in this matter; the plaintiff having failed to make out his case, and the defendant having fully sustained his answer.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the complaint be, and the same is hereby, dismissed, and that judgment be given in favor of the defendant. Source: CourtListener
