151 So. 2d 283 - State v. Leveson’s Empirical Analysis
1963
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 13 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently August 1987
4 federal appellate · 13 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Mapp v. Ohio · Jones v. United States · 116 So. 2d 16 - Carraway v. Revell · Church v. State · 138 So. 2d 361 - Leveson v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that, under the long-established Florida rule existing prior to Jones v. United States, supra, Leveson had a sufficient interest in the property searched to enable him to attack the validity of the search. We, therefore, do not reach the question of the applicability of the rule of Jones v. United States, supra. By that decision the Supreme Court of the United States apparently has eliminated the former technical requirements of ownership or right of occupancy. The federal rule now appears to be that anyone legally on the premises which are subjected to the search can attack the validity of the search if the proceeds of the search are offered in evidence against him. This rule, however, is still in its formative stages and remains subject to numerous potential ramifications." * * * * * * "In reaching our conclusion we lay aside any concern regarding technical distinctions relating to rights of occupancy and possession, as defined by the great body of private property law. Our consideration of the instant problem is limited entirely to the question of standing to assert the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 151 So.2d at 285 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[W]here the premises searched is the dwelling or, is owned or rented by, or is in the possession of the accused, he has standing to attack the search. As employed in this connection we understand `possession' to have reference to an unrestricted right of occupancy or custody and control of the premises as distinguished from occasional presence on the premises as a mere guest or invitee.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“"It appears that Leveson had arranged for the occupancy of the apartment by his `girl friend.' Although the lease was technically taken in the name of the `girl friend' it is perfectly obvious that the arrangement was made for the convenience and accommodation of Leveson, as well as the technical lessee. Leveson had fulltime possession of a key to the apartment and occupied the same at will. He kept articles of clothing there and frequently spent the night. On occasions he had occupied the apartment for as many as five nights consecutively. He paid the rent for the first and last months, as well as for intervening periods. The execution of the lease in the name of the `girl friend' was merely to accommodate his meretricious arrangement to the fact that he had a wife and a home at another location." 151 So.2d at 284 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.