Sharp v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[T]he ‘error’ that must exist to warrant disturbing the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes is actual, purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury. It is this actual, purposeful discrimination then, rather than merely a prima facie case for such discrimination, that must be ‘plain’ in the trial-court record if we are to provide a defendant who fails to object timely to a prosecutor’s strikes relief from those strikes on a posttrial basis.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wiggins v. State · 166 So. 3d 705 - Riley v. State

2. ““ ‘ “Within the context of Batson , a ‘race-neutral’ explanation ‘means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). ‘In evaluating the race-neutrality of an attorney’s explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law.’ Id. ‘[Evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies “peculiarly within [aj trial judge’s province.”’ Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 , 111 S.Ct. at 1869 .” “ ‘Allen v. State, 659 So.2d 135, 147 (Ala. Crim.App.1994) (emphasis added). See also Rogers, 819 So.2d at 649. “‘The trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses.’” Harris v. State, 2 So.3d 880, 899 (Ala.Crim.App. 2007) (quoting Heard v. State, 584 So.2d 556, 561 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)). Thus, “‘“[o]n appeal, the trial court’s ruling on the question whether the responding party offered legitimate race-neutral reasons will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous.” ’ ” Harris, 2 So.3d at 899 (quoting Harrison v. State, 879 So.2d 594, 607 (Ala.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Woolf v. State

3. ““Under the second step of the Batson process, the burden shifts to the prose cution to offer a race-neutral reason for striking the juror or jurors in question. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d 609, 623 (Ala.1987). See, e.g., Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 680 (Ala.1991). The prosecution must provide ‘a clear, specific, and legitimate reason for the challenge which relates to the particular case to be tried, and which is nondiscriminatory.’ Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 623 . See also Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d at 680 . The reason for the strike, however, need not rise to the level of a strike for cause, and the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation. Ex parte Branch, 526 So.2d at 623 ; Doster v. State, 72 So.3d 50, 73 (Ala.Crim.App. 2010).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Woolf v. State