Lindsay v. Clayman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

102 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 104 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We agree with the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that, as a matter of law, the title to the two lots, under the contract and deed, vested in Mrs. Frances M. Lindsay as her separate property and estate. “The recitation contained in the contract and deed are to all intents and purposes the same as that in the deed construed in Kahn v. Kahn, 94 Tex. 114 , 58 S.W. 825, 826, 827 . In that case this Court said ‘The decisions do clearly establish the proposition that the intent to make the property conveyed the separate property of the wife may be shown not only by words of conveyance to her sole and separate use, but by recitals of a consideration such as would, if moving from her, give such a character to it. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the deed before us upon its face unequivocally expresses the purpose of Kahn to convey to his wife in her separate right, and he cannot be permitted, consistently with correct principles, to show that he did not so intend. The evidence admitted does not come within the rule which sometimes permits the true consideration of an instrument to be shown to have been different from that recited. This principle, properly applied, admits the evidence where the consideration has been stated as a fact, but not where the recital is contractual in its nature.’ ” (Emphasis ours.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Messer v. Johnson

2. ““The evidence offered in this case is of such character as to render the deed ineffective. It would prove that the beneficial title did not rest in the wife for her separate use, as the deed declared, but that it remained in the community. Such evidence would contradict the very statements in the deeds which the court held in Kahn v. Kahn to belong to that class of particular and contractual recitals which the parties may not deny. The deeds in express terms declare the particular purpose or use for which the property is conveyed; that is, that it shall belong separately to the wife. Parol evidence should not be admitted to prove that it was conveyed for a different purpose or use.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Messer v. Johnson

3. ““The [Loeb] case also holds that where the evidence shows the third party seeking to introduce evidence to- vary the recitals in the deed is in privity with the parties to the deed, the parol evidence rule also applies to him. Petitioner was a party to the contract and in privity with the parties to the deed conveying the lots to his wife. Since the deed states the nature of the estate conferred upon the wife and the consideration being contractual, parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the deed in the absence of allegations of fraud, accident or mistake.” (Emphasis supplied).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Jackson v. Hernandez