Shauer v. Alterton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 federal appellate · 24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 97 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hile the plaintiff was not bound to act upon mere suspicion as to the intent with which [the transferor] made the sale in question, if he had knowledge or actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put him, as a prudent man, upon inquiry as to whether [the transferor] intended to delay or defraud his creditors, and he omitted to make such inquiry with reasonable diligence, he should have been deemed to have notice of such fact, and therefore such notice as would invalidate the sale to him, if such sale was in fact made with the intent upon the part of the [transferor] to delay or defraud other creditors.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Charles v. Roxana Petroleum Corp. · Zazzali v. Goldsmith (In re DBSI Inc.)

2. ““A less stringent rule can not be applied to the Dakota statute relating to transfers of property with intent to delay or defraud creditors. The plaintiff had the right, by a purchase of his brother’s stock of merchandise, to obtain payment of his claims in preference to the claims of other creditors. But the statute of Dakota, however liberally construed in favor of purchasers from a fraudulent debtor, will not permit him to enjoy, to the exclusion of other creditors, the fruits of his purchase, when the sale was made with the intent to delay or defraud other creditors, if he had, at the time, actual notice of such intent or knowledge of such circumstances or facts as were sufficient to put a prudent person upon an inquiry that would have disclosed the existence of such intent upon the part of the vendor. The plaintiff could not properly have claimed a more favorable interpretation of the Dakota statute than was given to it by the court below. A statute that declares every transfer of property, made with intent to delay or defraud any creditor of his clemands, void against all creditors of the debtor, would be wholly defeated in its operation if the rights of the transferee were not subject to the rule that ‘whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard, and call for inquiry, is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led.” (Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 141 ; Kennedy v. Greene, 3 Myl. & K. 699, 722.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Charles v. Roxana Petroleum Corp. · Kansas Moline Plow Co. v. Sherman

3. ““The refusal of the court to allow the plaintiff to read the answer of the witness Nash, to the question: ‘'you may state whether or not that check has all the appearance of having passed through the bank in the ordinary course of business/ cannot be assigned as error. The bill of exceptions does not state what answer was -made to the question in the deposition of the witness. It does not even state the facts the answer tended to establish. We cannot therefore say that the exclusion of the answer was prejudicial to the plaintiff. For aught that appears in the record, the witness may have made an answer that was injurious to the plaintiff, or one that was of no value to either party.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. O'Keefe v. Dillenbeck