Texas Ry Co v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 33 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In the view of that court, a railway company might be held directly liable when a receiver is appointed in an amicable suit at the instigation of the company and for the company’s own purposes, and, these purposes being accomplished, the property is returned to its owner, the rights of no third persons as purchasers intervening, upon the ground that the acts of the receiver might well be regarded as the acts of its own servant, rather than those of an officer of the court, which under such circumstances he would only be sub modo. But as the court did not feel authorized to entertain a conclusion which might carry the implication that this receivership would have been, created or continued, although its object had only been to place the property temporarily beyond the reach of creditors until it could be augmented in value by improvements made from earnings under the protection of the court, that rule was not applied in this ease. The company was held liable upon the distinct ground that the earnings of the road were subject to the payment of claims for damages, and that as, in this instance, such earnings to an extent far greater than sufficient to pay the plaintiff had been diverted into betterments, of which the company had the benefit, it must respond directly for the claim. This was so by reason of the statute (Laws Tex. 1887, p. 120, c. 131, § 6), and, irrespective of statute, on equitable principles applicable under the facts.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gray v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.

2. ““ Certainly the preservation of general equity jurisdiction over suits instituted against receivers without leave does not, in promotion of the ends of justice, make it competent for the appointing court to determine the rights of persons who are not before it or subject to its jurisdiction; and the right to sue without resorting to the appointing court, which involves the right to obtain judgment, cannot be assumed to have been rendered practically valueless by this further provision in the same section of the statute which granted it.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Trumbull v. Makeever

3. “In this connection it should be observed that the property was not sold but merely redelivered to the company. No judgment in rem was entered; no fund existed through a sale in foreclosure; the earnings far exceeded the debts during the temporary management; and it did not appear that either in reference to expenses incurred in the administration or in the matter of claims resting on controverted priorities, or otherwise, there were any equities to be adjusted which required the further exercise of jurisdiction. . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Stuart Ex Rel. Stuart v. Dickinson