Niles v. Gonzalez’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It is well settled that the notice of appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial need be served only on the parties who were adverse to the motion in the court below. (Watson v. Sutro, 77 Cal. 609 , [20 Pac. 88]; In re Ryer, 110 Cal. 556 , [ 42 Pac. 1082 ]; Johnson v. Phenix Ins. Co., 146 Cal. 571 , [ 80 Pac. 719 ].) If Mrs. Tarr was not a party to the motion in the superior court, she was not an adverse party upon whom notice of appeal from the order had to be served. The record before us fails to show that she was such adverse party. The notice of intention to move for a new trial is not incorporated in the transcript. The statement on motion for new trial is entitled ‘Statement of defendant Lillian L. Gonzalez on motion for new trial,’ and states that it is proposed by said defendant as a statement to be used ‘on motion for new trial.’ "Whether or not the defendant Tarr participated in the proceedings leading up to the settlement of the statement, or gave or received notice of intention to move, for a new trial, or, upon the hearing, appeared either in favor of or in opposition to the granting of the motion is not shown. • “All that is contained in the record in addition to the statement is the copy of a minute entry showing the action of the court on the - motion. This entry reads ‘On this cause defendants’ motion for a new trial is denied.’ In view of the fact that the notice of appeal purports to be given by the defendants Gonzalez, this entry might well be ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Niles v. Gonzalez

2. ““The decree declared that the plaintiff was entitled to the specific enforcement of his contract against Lillian L. Gonzalez, and was entitled to receive from her a good and sufficient deed of conveyance of the property upon payment to her of the sum of $107.38. It further declared that the defendant Jennie R. Tarr is the owner and holder of the Gonzalez note and mortgage above referred to and that said Jennie R. Tarr is entitled to receive from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is required to pay to her as a condition to the specific performance of said contract and as a condition to having said mortgage satisfied of record the sum of $578.30. The decree orders the plaintiff to pay to the clerk of the court within ten days the sum of $107.38 for the defendant Lillian L. Gonzalez, and the sum of $578.30 for the defendant Jennie R. Tarr. Within ten days after the payment of said sums, the said Lillian L. Gonzalez is ordered to execute and deliver to plaintiff a deed of the property, and said Jennie R. Tarr is ordered to enter a satisfaction of her mortgage. “We think it is clear that this decree grants Mrs. Tarr certain substantial rights of which she might be deprived upon a reversal, or upon any conceivable modification of the judg ment, and that she is, therefore, an adverse party who should have been served with the notice of appeal.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Niles v. Gonzalez