Coder v. Arts’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

57 federal appellate · 16 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 98 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The only evidence that Maxwell intended to hinder or defraud the creditors of the partnership is that, while the firm and the partners were insolvent, King conveyed his interest to Maxwell, and the latter paid his mother in preference to his other creditors. The only way in which Maxwell could have made this payment in had faith would have been to have made it in whole or in part in secret trust for himself, or with the actual intent 1o hinder or defraud the creditors of the company more than the mere payment of the debt to his mother out of the property of the former partt nership, in preference to the claims of the partnership creditors, must necessarily have delayed or prevented their collection of their claims, and there was no evidence of any such trust or intent. The evidence was that he intended to pay his mother in preference to the partnership and to other creditors, that Ms mother had loaned him the money to engage in and conduct the partnership business, that he had purchased the interest of his partner, and that, as soon as the business and the property became his, he paid her the debt which he owed her. The facts that the payment to Mrs. Sargent had the inevitable effect to deprive the creditors of the partnership of an opportunity which they would otherwise have had to collect their claims in whole or in part, and that Maxwell knew that this would be its effect, and hence must have intended that result, do not establish the fact that he intended to hinder, dela”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Julius Bros.

2. “Another rule might prevail if the proceeds of the mortgaged property were insufficient to pay the mortgage debt and its interest in full and the mortgagee was seeking to collect an unpaid balance by sharing with other creditors in the distribution of the common property. He might not be entitled, then, to recover from the proceeds of the common property interest upon his debt to any later date than the unsecured creditors would recover interest upon their claims. But the proceeds of these mortgaged lands appear to be ample to pay the principal and interest of the debt to the mortgagee ... and where a trustee sells mortgaged property of the bankrupt’s estate free of the mortgage, and the proceeds of the sale are sufficient for that purpose, the mortgagee is entitled to payment of the interest upon his mortgage debt as well as the principal, out of the proceeds in accordance with the terms of the note and mortgage.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In Re Marfin Ready Mix Corp.

3. “* * * By the terms of the note and mortgage the mortgagor agreed to pay interest on his debt until it was paid, and that the mortgaged lands might be sold by the mortgagee, and that their proceeds might be applied to the payment of this debt and interest. The covenant for the sale and the application of the proceeds of these lands to the payment of the debt and interest was valid and binding, and it ran with the land, so that when the latter came to the hands of the trustee it was mortgaged for the payment of the interest as much as for the payment of the principal, and the proceeds of its sale necessarily came to his possession subject to the same charge. * * *”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Harrington