Armstrong v. Squadrito’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

53 federal appellate · 6 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 141 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “an investigation into substantive due process involves an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements[.]”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Castellar v. McAleenan · State v. Schulpius

2. “[A] body attachment writ for contempt constitutes a civil warrant. On the other hand, the Indiana courts have said that the body attachment warrant shares certain attributes with its criminal cousin — for instance, a civil warrant, like a criminal warrant, “authorizes the sheriff to take a person into custody and provides for bail.” Casselman [v. State], 472 N.E.2d [1310,] 1312 n. 3 [ (Ind.Ct.App.1985)]. In addition to these shared characteristics, several other considerations make us realize that the ostensibly clear demarcation line between [a] civil arrest warrant and a criminal warrant is, instead, a far more imprecise boundary. For instance, Indiana’s indirect contempt statutes repeatedly refer to determinations of “guilt” for contempt. The laws refer to an alleged contemnor as a “defendant.” The statutes mention that the court can “acquit” the alleged contemnor. The requirements and purposes for the rule to show cause closely resemble a criminal indictment. The contempt laws allow the court to “punish” the contemnor. All of these admittedly superficial, and mainly semantic, particulars make [a civil-warrant detainee’s] case appear closer to a criminal prosecution than it might seem at first blush. Not only does the contempt statute contain the language of criminal law, the Indiana courts have interpreted the law to provide the sort of due process protections normally associated with a criminal proceeding. This principle is most powerfully stated in Mitchell v. Stevenson”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Castellar v. McAleenan · 95 F. Supp. 2d 930 - Hunt v. Elkhart County Sheriff

3. ““Almost every element of a ‘first appearance’ under state statutes or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure serves to enforce or give meaning to important individual rights that are either expressly granted in the Constitution or are set forth in Supreme Court precedent ... (1) inform the suspect of the charge— Sixth Amendment (‘the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation’); (2) inform the defendant of the right to counsel and determine if the defendant is indigent and desires the assistance of appointed counsel — Sixth Amendment (“the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 ; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 , 90 S.Ct. 1999 , 26 L.Ed.2d 387 ; (3) inform the suspect of the right to remain silent under the privilege against self-incrimination — Fifth Amendment (‘No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself); Miranda v. Arizona, supra; (4)set or review bail — Eighth Amendment (‘Excessive bail shall not be required’), Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 , 72 S.Ct. 1 , 96 L.Ed. 3 .””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 78 F. Supp. 2d 1233 - Jackson v. Hamm · Hayes v. Faulkner County