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152 Ga. 787

Mitchell County v. Phillips

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided February 18, 1922

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1922-02-18

<p>1. Where an election is held by a county to determine whether or not.a debt for a given amount and purpose shall be created by the issuance of bonds for that amount, and the result of the election is in favor of the issuance of the bonds, and the bonds are validated in the manner prescribed by law, the fact that the county commissioners fail, during the first and second years after the authority is given to issue the bonds, to exercise it, does not have the effect of abrogating the authority to make the issue; and it is their duty to make provision for the payment of interest and principal, and, for the purpose of paying the latter, to create a sinking-fund by the assessment of a tax, which should be collected even during the years before the bonds are sold, in case of a delay in selling the bonds. But where such a delay is for a period of one, two, or more years, inasmuch as interest will not be paid during the years elapsing before the bonds are sold, no tax should be assessed and levied for such period of time.</p> <p>2. Under the agreed statement of facts, the court did not err in refusing to enjoin the assessment of the tax upon the cotton which the plaintiffs in error contended was not theirs at the date upon which the liability for tax became fixed. Civil Code, § 4126; Flannery v. Harley, 117 Ga. 483 (48 S. E. 765).</p> <p>3. It is the duty of the board of county tax assessors “ to examine all the returns of both real and personal property of each taxpayer; and if in the opinion of the board any taxpayer has omitted from his returns any property that should be returned or has failed to return any of his property at a just and fair valuation, the said board shall correct such returns, and shall assess and fix the just and fair valuation to be placed on said property, and shall make a note thereof and attach the same to such returns.” 'Park’s Ann. Code, § 1116 (k). This provision of our statute relating to the duties of the board is not repealed by the act approved July 31, 1918 (Acts 1918, p. 232), relating to tax collections from delinquents.</p> <p>4. The tax paid by the plaintiffs under the assessment and levy for the year 1919 for the purpose of paying interest on the bonds was not recoverable in this action, the same having been paid voluntarily and without protest, so far as the petition shows. First National Bank of Americus v. Mayor etc. of Americus, 68 Ga. 119 (45 Am. R. 476); Hoke v. City of Atlanta, 107 Ga. 416 (33 S. E. 412).</p> <p>5. The question as to the legality of the increased assessment for the purpose of taxation of the property of the plaintiffs by the board of county tax assessors was decided adversely to the contention of the plaintiffs (who are plaintiffs in error in the cross-bill of exceptions) in the case of Ogletree v. Woodward, 150 Ga. 691 (105 S. E. 243); which this court declines to reverse upon a review made in accordance with a request of counsel for the plaintiffs. See also the case of Washington</p> <p>Exchange Bank v. Barnett, ante, 704 (111 S. E. 46).</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1922-02-18

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently February 1987

4 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Atkinson, J.

¶1(After stating the foregoing facts.)

¶21. We are of the opinion that under the evidence submitted to the court, the court properly enjoined the collection of the tax levied for the year 1920 to meet the payment of the interest coupons for that year. The bonds issued in pursuance of the authority given by the election and the validation of the bonds had not been issued and sold, and consequently no interest was *792accruing upon these bonds and did not accrue in the years 1919 and 1920. The failure of the county authorities to issue the bonds and sell them in the years 1919 and 1920 did not have the effect to abrogate the authority, vested in them by the election and the validation of the bonds, to sell the bonds; and they might at some subsequent date put the bonds upon the market and sell them. But during the years 1919 and 1920 no sale was made, and no interest was accruing during those years; and the commissioners, if they should sell any in after years, would remove and destroy the coupons attached to the bonds representing the years which had elapsed before the sale was made, and they would not raise the interest to pay these coupons thus removed from the bonds. But the bonds were dated August 1, 1919; this had been fixed in'the validation proceedings; and they would fall due August 1, 1949, and it was necessary that provision should be made 'for the payment of the principal of the bonds; and the collection of a tax for the purpose of creating a sinking-fund to meet the payment of the principal as it would fall due was in accordance with the law and was necessary in order to discharge the principal debt when it should fall due; and the court should not have enjoined the collection of that percentage of tax required for the creation of the sinking-fund for the purpose indicated. Consequently, the judgment of the court below granting the injunction is affirmed in part and reversed in part. It is affirmed in so far as it enjoins the collection of -the tax for the years 1919 and 1920, intended for the payment of interest on the bonds during those years; and is reversed in so far as it enjoins the collection of the necessary amount to create the sinking-fund.

¶32-5. The rulings made in headnotes 2, 3, 4, and 5, read in connection with the accompanying statement of facts, dispose of all the other questions in the record not disposed of by the preceding part of the opinion.

¶4 Judgment on the main till of exceptions affirmed in pari and reversed in part; judgment on the cross-till affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
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