152 Ill. 2d 274 - People v. Mitchell’s Empirical Analysis
1992
Citation profile
175 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 180 later decisions — most recently December 2025 · most notably 192 Ill. 2d 307 - People v. Easley (2000), 157 Ill. 2d 401 - People v. Hudson (1993)
175 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Batson v. Kentucky · Chambers v. Maroney · Arizona v. Fulminante · Dunaway v. New York
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 180 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"`"It is well settled in Illinois that any communication with a juror during trial about a matter pending before the jury is deemed presumptively prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair trial. Although this presumption of prejudice is not conclusive, the burden rests upon the State to establish that such contact with the jurors was harmless to defendant."'" Hobley, 182 Ill.2d at 460 , 231 Ill.Dec. 321 , 696 N.E.2d 313 , quoting People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill.2d 274, 341 , 178 Ill.Dec. 354 , 604 N.E.2d 877 (1992), quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill.2d 113, 132 , 122 Ill.Dec. 76 , 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988).”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“The State's purposeful discrimination is not automatically established by the mere coincidence that an excluded juror shared a characteristic with a juror who was not challenged. The excluded juror may possess an additional trait that caused the State to find him unacceptable, while the juror who was not challenged may possess an additional characteristic that prompted the State to find him acceptable to serve as a juror. [Citation.] `[A] peremptory challenge is based on a combination of traits, and a juror possessing an unfavorable trait may be accepted while another juror possessing that same negative trait, but also possessing other negative traits, may be challenged.'”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.