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← 152 N.C. 604 - Bowers v. Bryan Lumber Co.

Bowers v. Bryan Lumber Co.’s Empirical Analysis

1910

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
1
states following
November 1934
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently November 1934

1 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

10191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We further said that, as the certificates had been signed by the president and delivered to the cashier, the bank had given to the latter the power to commit the fraud, and must answer for its negligent act, upon the principle that, ‘whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it.’ Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 70. It was said by Lord Holt in Hearn v. Nichols, 1 Salk. 289: ‘For, as somebody must be a loser by this deceit, it is more reasonable that he who employs and puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be the loser than a stranger.’ In Railroad v. Kitchin, 91 N. C. 39 , we held that, ‘where one of two persons must suffer loss by the fraud or misconduct of a third person, he who first reposed a confidence, or by his negligent act made it possible for the loss to occur, must bear the loss.’ The principle is well stated in the case of Railroad v. Bank, 60 Md. 36 , as follows: ‘It may be conceded, and was doubtless the case, that the agent had no authority in fact to issue such certificate. He had no real authority, as between himself and his principal, or other parties cognizant of the facts, for doing the particular acts complained of; but the company by its own act and, as it turned out, misplaced confidence placed the agent in the position to do, and procure to be done, that class of acts to which the particular act in question belongs; and in such case, where the”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “The Guaranty and Surety Company entrusted Willard and Vines with a bond, to which its corporate seal had been affixed, and it was licensed to do business, that is, to execute an indemnity bond, in this State. When this was done, the Guaranty and Surety Company put it in the power of Willard and Vines to induce others to believe that they had the power and authority to execute a bond in its behalf as surety, even if the signatures of the said agents were necessary to make it a valid bond as against the company after it had thus affixed its corporate seal and its corporate name had been signed to the bond.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.