Ankrom v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Likewise, in the present case, we do not see any reason to hold that a viable fetus is not included in the term ‘child,’ as that term is used in § 26-15-3.2, Ala.Code 1975. Not only have the courts of this State interpreted the term ‘child’ to include a viable fetus in other contexts, the dictionary definition of the term ‘child’ explicitly includes an unborn person or a fetus. In everyday usage, there is nothing extraordinary about using the term ‘child’ to include a viable fetus. For example, it is not uncommon for someone to state that a mother is pregnant with her first ‘child.’ Unless the legislature specifically states otherwise, the term ‘child’ is simply a more general term that encompasses the more specific term ‘viable fetus.’ If the legislature desires to proscribe conduct against only a ‘viable fetus,’ it is necessary to use that specific term. However, if the legislature desires to proscribe conduct against a viable fetus and all other persons under a certain age, the term ‘child’ is sufficient to convey that meaning. In fact, proscribing conduct against a ‘child’ and a ‘viable fetus’ would be redundant. “The term ‘child’ in § 26-15-3.2, Ala. Code 1975, is unambiguous; thus, this Court must interpret the plain language of the statute to mean exactly what it says and not engage in judicial construction of the language in the statute. Also, because the statute is unambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. We do not see any rational basis for concluding that t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ankrom v. State

2. ““(a) A responsible person commits the crime of chemical endangerment of exposing a child to an environment in which he or she does any of the following: “(1) Knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally causes or permits a child to be exposed to,[ 1 ] to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Section ISA-12-260. A violation under this subdivision is a Class C felony. “(2) Violates subdivision (1) and a child suffers serious physical injury by exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia. A violation under this subdivision is a Class B felony. “(3) Violates subdivision (1) and the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in the death of the child. A violation under this subdivision is a Class A felony. “(b) The court shall impose punishment pursuant to this section rather than imposing punishment authorized under any other provision of law, unless another provision of law provides for a greater penalty or a longer term of imprisonment. “(c) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child, and that it was administered to the child in accordance with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled substance.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ankrom v. State

3. ““‘Principles of statutory construction instruct this Court to interpret the plain language of a statute to mean exactly what it says and to engage in judicial construction only if the language in the statute is ambiguous.’ Ex parte Pratt, 815 So.2d 532, 535 (Ala.2001). ‘[T]he fundamental rule [is] that criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State.’ Ex parte Hyde, 778 So.2d 237 , 239 n. 2 (Ala.2000).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Tulley v. City of Jacksonville