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← 152 U.S. 301 - Keokuk Co v. State of Missouri

Keokuk Co v. State of Missouri’s Empirical Analysis

152 U.S. 301 · 1894

Citation profile

217
cited by 217 later decisions
30
cited 30 times by the Supreme Court
24
states following
May 2019
most recently cited

59 federal appellate · 12 district · 64 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 217 later decisions (30 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2019 · most notably Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation (1971), Standefer v. United States (1980)

59 federal appellate · 12 district · 64 state decisions — followed in 24 states

4901894190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cromwell v. County of Sac · The Delaware Railroad Tax Minot v. The Philadelphia Wilington and Baltimre Railroad Company · Nesbit v. Independent District of Riverside · Shields v. Ohio

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 217 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““To tlie argument that this judgment constitutes an estoppel there are two answers: First. There was no such privity ot estate between the defendant in the suit, namely, the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Company, and the defendant in tilts suit, as makes the judgment in that case res adjudicata in this. The mortgage of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company, under the foreclosure of which this deíéndant purchased this road, was executed June 1, 3870, and neither the trustee under that mortgage, the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, nor the bondholders, whom this mortgage secured, were parties to that action, which was begun in 1873 to recover the taxes of 1872. While a mortgagee is privy in estate with a mortgagor as to actions begun before the mortgage was given, he is not bound by judgments or decrees against the mortgagor in suits begun by third parties subsequent to the execution of tile mortgage, unless he or some one authorized to represent him, like the trustee of a mortgage bondholder, is made party to the litigation, although it would be otherwise if the mortgage were executed pending the suit or after the decree.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Looking at the act in question in this case, we find that by section 1 any Missouri railroad company whose track should connect with the road of an adjoining state was authorized to make and enter into an agreement with such connecting company for the consolidation of the stock of the respective companies whose tracks should be so connected, making one company of the two, whose stock should be so consolidated upon such terms, conditions, and stipulations as might be mutually agreed between them; that by section 2 ‘such consolidation shall not be made, unless the terms and provisions thereof shall be approved by a majority of the stock, or the holders of a majority of the capital stock in each of said companies whose stock shall be consolidated’ ; that by section 3 the board of directors were authorized to adopt by resolution a new corporate name for the consolidated company, and call in the certificates of stock then outstanding in each company, and exchange them for stock in the new company; and providing that a copy of the consolidation agreement and the name adopted for the new company ‘shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and shall be conclusive evidence of such consolidation, and of the corporate name of the consolidated company.’ It is difficult to see how the Legislature could provide more clearly for the extinguishment of the prior companies and the formation of a new one than by providing that the two companies shall become one, that new certificates of stock”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The two suits are for distinct and separate causes of action. If there were any distinct question litigated and settled in the prior suit, the decision of the court upon that question might raise an estoppel in another suit upon the principle stated in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 [ 24 L. Ed. 195 ], But, as was held in that case, where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.” Keokuk & Western Railroad v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 301 , 315, 14 Sup. Ct. 592 , 597 ( 38 L. Ed. 450 ).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.