¶1dissenting. Under a proper construction of item 3 of the will of O. B. Stevens, Mrs. Julia A. Stevens, in her individual capacity, took a life-estate in the land in controversy, with a power of disposal. Melton v. Camp, 121 Ga. 693 (49 S. E. 690); Patterson v. Gaissert, 147 Ga. 472 (94 S. E. 563). The lease contract executed to L. E. Cannon to the property in controversy by Mrs. Julia A. Stevens, “executrix of 'the estate of 0. B. Stevens,” was not an execution of the powers conferred by item 3 of the will. Patterson v. Gaissert, supra. A life-tenant can not convey or lease property for a time beyond his own term, without express authority in the instrument creating the power. There is no such express authority conferred by the present will. The execution of the lease was an effort to exercise the power contained in item 4 of the will, which was as follows: “ That my executrix . . shall take charge of my estate after my death, and manage and control the same in her own right and title, without making an inventory or making any return to the court. . . In fact, I mean for her to take possession of my estate in her own right and title, and manage [italics mine] it as if I were living.” The power there expressed did not authorize the executrix, as such, to .execute the lease contract in question, beyond the period of her *92term as life-tenant. Broach v. Kitchens, 23 Ga. 515; Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 70 Ga. 806; Belt v. Gay, 142 Ga. 366 (82 S. E. 1071). The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer.
153 Ga. 88
Cannon v. Laing
Decided March 4, 1922
Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1922-03-04
<p>1. Where a testator nominated ■ his wife as executrix and bequeathed to her the residue of his estate real and personal, “ during her natural life, to be used as she thinks proper,” with power to dispose of any property thereof “ as she thinks to be best interest of the estate and to maintain herself, and at her death whatever may be left by her shall be equally divided between ” the testator’s heirs, and further directed that his executrix should take charge of, manage, and control the estate “ in her own right and title,” without making inventory, return, or bond and security, “ and manage it as if I were living,” the will created a life-estate in the wife, with remainder over, and conferred on her power individually to dispose of any part of the estate, and the power as executrix to take possession, management, and control of such property as fully as the testator could do if living.</p> <p>2. A lease by the executrix of land of the estate for the term of five years, for a consideration which on its face was a fair value for the rent of the property (the lessee executing rent notes for the whole term), should be construed as a legal execution of the power conferred on the executrix as such, rather than as indicating an intent to refer to her individual life-interest in the land. Hill,' J., dissents.</p> <p>3. 4. Where after the death of the executrix the land was sold by an administrator de bonis non, if the purchaser, with actual notice of the lease, unlawfully evicted the lessee before the expiration of the five-year term, an action for damages would lie.</p>
Relies on Melton v. Camp · Rakestraw v. Rakestraw · Broach v. Kitchens
Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know
Decided 1922-03-04
How this case has been cited
Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently December 1980
7 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
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