153 Ind. App. 149 - Neill v. Ridner’s Empirical Analysis
1972
Citation profile
49 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently October 2002 · most notably 169 Ind. App. 413 - Weenig v. Wood (1976), Larsen v. Scholl (1980)
49 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on McGee v. International Life Insurance · Pennoyer v. Neff · Hess v. Pawloski · 47 Cal. 2d 447 - Hartford v. Superior Court · Falender v. Atkins
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In determining the validity of TR. 4.4(A) there is a recognition that the twin requirements of ‘minimum contact’ and ‘adequate notice’ must be observed. Both are present in a manner deemed by us to be more than sufficient to satisfy 14th Amendment due process. Noting that the alleged act here under consideration took place in Monroe County, Indiana, a greater amount of ‘minimum contact’ is present than delivering an insurance contract and mailing premiums (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. [1957], 355 U.S. 220 , 78 S.Ct. 199 , 2 L.Ed.2d 223 ); negligent skiing (McKennis v. Collingwood, U.S.D.C.Vt., 55 F.R.D. 156 , decided 13 April, 1972); or continued use of a confusingly similar trade name (Technical Publishing Co. v. Technology Publishing Corp. [1972], 339 F.Supp. 225 ), to cite but a few examples.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“no requirement that the act complained of be a tort as it was known at the common law”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““[W]e are of the opinion that the outstanding warrants, after service of summons was accomplished, served to deny the defendant the right to be fully heard in court, and was, therefore, a denial of due process of law. “There was obvious error in that both summons and warrants existed concurrently. IC 1971 31-4-1-13, Ind.Ann.Stat. § 3-635 (Burns 1968) does not contemplate such a situation, for it specifically relates that a warrant be issued in lieu of a summons, but more importantly the plaintiff effectively erected barriers of sufficient strength to keep the defendant from fully presenting his case, i. e., participation in blood testing, assisting counsel in cross-examination, and testifying in his own behalf, unless he subjected himself to the possibility of the now needless sanctions of incarceration and all that is entailed therein.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.