153 Md. App. 601 - Fitzgerald v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 71 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Franks v. Delaware set out a procedure, requiring a detailed proffer from the defense before the defendant is even entitled to a hearing to go behind the four comers of the warrant. Under Franks, when a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant intentionally or recklessly included false statements in the supporting affidavit for a search warrant, and that the affidavit without the false statement is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the defendant is then entitled to a hearing on the matter. The burden is on the defendant to establish knowing or reckless falsity by a preponderance of the evidence before the evidence will be suppressed. Negligence or innocent mistake resulting in false statements in the affidavit is not sufficient to establish the defendant’s burden.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 157 Md. App. 580 - Ferguson v. State · 234 Md. App. 720 - Young v. State

2. “Bloodhounds have been chasing escaping prisoners and other fugitives through the swamps for hundreds of years, with posses following dutifully and trusting implicitly in the canine expertise, even at the closed doors of cabins and houses. The canine reactions, moreover, have traditionally been admissible as evidence even at a trial on the merits, let alone in an ex parte application for a warrant. The use of the sense of smell generally is a familiar tool of perception much older than the common law or the Bill of Rights. Indeed, Blair v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 218 , 204 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky.1918), stated that bloodhound evidence "was looked upon with favor as early as the twelfth century," as it related a declaration of King Richard I of England (1189-1199), "Dress yonder Marquis [who had stolen the banner of England] in what peacock robes you will, disguise his appearance, alter his complexion with drugs and washes, hide him amidst a hundred men; I will yet pawn my scepter that the hound detects him." It is hardly a new or unfamiliar investigative modality.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 920 So. 2d 1175 - State v. Rabb · 881 So. 2d 587 - State v. Rabb

3. “As in Place , the driving force behind Jacobsen was the recognition that because of the binary nature of the information disclosed by the sniff, no legitimately private information is revealed: That is, "the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about noncontraband items." . . . In our view, then, Place and Jacobsen stand for the proposition that a possessor of contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed. Stated otherwise, governmental conduct that can "reveal nothing about noncontraband items" interferes with no legitimate privacy expectation.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 920 So. 2d 1175 - State v. Rabb · 881 So. 2d 587 - State v. Rabb