153 N.C. App. 187 - Fender v. Deaton’s Empirical Analysis
2002
Citation profile
3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently July 2025
3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Ragsdale v. Kennedy · Terry v. Terry · Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks · 140 N.C. App. 106 - NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Parker · State v. Cheek
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Little and SHMM impliedly warranted that their work would be performed and undertaken with due care and in accordance with the prevailing standard of professionalism,” (Answer and Crossclaims of DDG to Am. Compl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶ 75), places it within the broad reach of N.C. Gen.Stat. § l-15(c), which covers "cause[s] of action for malpractice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services .... ” In essence, the breach of contract claim, based upon the language of DDG’s Third-Party Complaint is no more than a repeat of the legal malpractice claim asserted against Little and Smith Helms. 9 . It should, however, be noted that the "discovery” portion of the statute is not infinitely available to Plaintiffs; it is limited by a further directive of the statute which states that "in no event shall an action be commenced more than four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action ....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[A] cause of action for malpractice arising out of the performance of or failure to perform professional services shall be deemed to accrue at the time of the occurrence of the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action. . . . [I]n no event shall an action be commenced more than four years from the last act of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action[.]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.