Baynard v. Ulmer

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Decided November 27, 1929

Supreme Court of South Carolina · decided 1929-11-27

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently November 1987

2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1929-11-27

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¶1 The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. ChiEE Justice Watts.

¶2 For reasons assigned by his Honor, Judge Johnson, it is the judgment of this Court that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.

Messrs. Justices Cothran, Beease, Stabeer and Carter concur.

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Case posture

Posture: Before JOHNSON, J., Beaufort, June, 1928. Affirmed.Action by Amlin D. Baynard again C.E. Ulmer, Jr., and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. The decree of Judge Johnson was as follows: This matter came before the Court upon exceptions by the plaintiff to the report of the Special Master herein, which exceptions impute error to the said Special Master in holding that the plaintiff was in his right mind and sufficiently in possession of all of his faculties to know what he was doing when he executed the deed in question; in holding that the said deed was not procured by undue influence or fraud; and in further holding that there was sufficient legal consideration shown to support the said deed. After hearing George W. Beckett, Esq., for the appellant, and W.J. Thomas, Esq., for the respondents, I took the matter under advisement, and have carefully considered the pleadings and testimony in this cause, as well as all authorities submitted to me by both parties to the cause. I have given the matter more than the usual attention because of sympathy for the grantor in his changed circumstances; that is, having made this deed conveying away his property at a time when he was single, no doubt believing he would never marry, and since having changed his mind and married, and now having a family; but, after a most careful consideration of the testimony, I find no evidence to show that the plaintiff was not in his right mind or not in possession of all of his faculties when he signed the deed, nor do I find any evidence to show undue influence or fraud, either actual or constructive. The testimony established to my mind beyond dispute that the grantor, then an unmarried man, without any apparent prospective of marriage, had long entertained a fixed purpose to bestow the land in question upon his nephews, who, save for their mother, were his only near relatives with whom he came in frequent contact, and I am of the opinion, from the testimony in the case, that the conveyance was the voluntary act and deed of the grantor; that it was willingly executed by him when he was in his right mind; that it was not induced by any suppression or misrepresentation of facts; that there was no fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of the grantees, who were at the time of the execution of the conveyance infant children, or upon the part of their father; and that there was no abuse of any confidential relation between the grantor and grantees. or the father of the latter. It is sufficient to add that confidence in or affection for a grantee affords no ground for assailing a voluntary deed, unless it further appears that such confidence was betrayed or the affection made use of to impose constraint upon the wishes or inclination of the grantor. I find nothing whatever in the record sufficient to raise the presumption that the deed in question was procured by or on behalf of the grantees through fraud or by improper influence; but, if the relationship between the parties were such as to raise such a presumption, I am of the opinion that the evidence on behalf of the defendants, and even the evidence of some of the plaintiff's own witnesses, over-whelmingly rebut such presumption. In the case of Du Bose v. Kell , 90 S.C. p. 207 , 71 S.E., 371 , 376 , the Court said: `Considering first the question as to the mental capacity of the grantor, the rule of law with reference to this matter may be stated in general terms to be that, while the mental incapacity which will render one unable to make a contract or a valid gift need not be so great as entirely to dethrone the reasoning powers, there must be at the time of the act or contract such insanity or mental weakness or unsoundness as amounts to an incapacity or occasions an inability to understand or comprehend the subject of the contract or act and its nature and probable consequences, in order to render the act or contract void in law. 22 Cyc., 1206; Rippy v. Gant [4 Iredell], 39 N.C. 443 ; Miller v. Craig , 36 Ill., 109 ; Dennett v. Dennett , 44 N.H. 531 , 84 Am. Dec., 97; Hay v. Miller , 48 Neb. 156 , 66 N.W., 1115 ; Dewey v. Allgire , 37 Neb. 6 , 55 N.W., 276 , 40 Am. St. Rep., 468; West v. Douglas , 145 Ill., 164 , 34 N.E., 141 ; Argo v. Coffin , 142 Ill., 368 , 32 N.E., 679 , 34 Am. St. Rep., 86; Mann v. Bank , 86 F., 51, 29 C.C.A., 547.' In the same case, the Court says further on page 208 of 90 S.C. 71 S.E., 376: `In order to render a deed void upon the ground of the mental incapacity of the grantor, it must appear that there was on his or her part such mental infirmity as to render him or her incapable of understanding the nature of the act. The test is not whether the grantor's mental powers were impaired, but whether, at the very time of the execution of the deed, he had sufficient capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and effect of the act which he was performing. Mere infirmity of mind or body, not amounting to an incapacity to understand the nature and consequence of the act done, will not render a person incapable of executing a valid deed. Nor will monomania or delusion existing in the mind of the grantor affect the validity of a deed, unless it be such as to actually influence his mind in the very transaction in question by rendering him incapable of appreciating the true nature and effect of the particular act in controversy.' (And authorities cited.) `As is said in Rowland v. Sullivan , 4 Desaus., 520, there must be made to appear some incompetency of mind, showing an incapacity at the moment of executing the deed or will, or some imposition practiced upon the testator or donor must be proved, to authorize the Court to exercise the high power of setting aside deeds or wills regularly executed.' In the same case, 90 S.C. p. 214 , 71 S.E., 378 , the Court says: `Where a deed is procured by undue influence exerted upon the grantor, it will be set aside by a Court of Equity upon a proper and timely application on the part of the person injured or aggrieved thereby; but, in order to avoid the deed upon this ground, there must be shown such an influence exerted upon the grantor as to overbear her will and to make the act of execution not the carrying out of a real purpose or intention of the grantor, but the mere mechanical performance by her of the wish and design of some other person. Neither fair argument, nor mere suggestion, nor even persuasion, unaccompanied by other circumstances to show a substitution of the will or purpose of some other person for that of the grantor, will amount to undue influence. In order to make it undue, it must appear that the influence exerted was such as to overcome or destroy the free will of the grantor and to make the deed as executed the expression not of his purpose, but that of some other person. 15 Cyc., 285; 9 Cyc., 455; Revels v. Revels , 64 S.C. 272 , 42 S.E., 111 , and authorities there cited; Conley v. Nailor , 118 U.S. 127 , 6 S.Ct., 1001 , 30 L.Ed., 112 . `But the line between due and undue influence, when drawn, must be with full recognition of the liberty due every true owner to obey the voice of justice, the dictates of friendship, of gratitude and of benevolence, as well as the claims of kindred, and when not hindered by personal incapacity, or particular regulations, to dispose of his own property according to his own free choice. Wallace v. Harris , 32 Mich., 380 .' `It is further an established principle of equity, well founded in right reason, that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understanding and who are thereby liable to imposition, and also all contracts or gifts between persons standing in confidential relations towards each other, will be closely scrutinized by the Courts to discover whether or not any undue influence was exerted or any confidence was betrayed to the prejudice of the weaker party or of the one reposing such trust and confidence (and authorities cited).' `Undue influence may be said to consist in any influence which is so far operative as to destroy free agency, so as to compel the person doing the act in question to do the same against his will. It is not material how such control was exerted, whether by physical force, threats, importunities, or any other species of mental or physical coercion, provided only it was so exerted as to destroy free agency and to make the act done not a true expression of the will of the person doing it, but in truth a carrying out of the purposes of some other person against that will. But the undue influence is to be proved and not to be presumed, unless the relation in which the parties stood with reference to each other is such as to raise a presumption of its existence. Yet, even where such a presumption arises, it is rebutted by evidence showing that everything between the parties was fair, open, voluntary, and well understood.' (And authorities cited.) As to the question of adequacy of consideration for the deed, there is no question in my mind that the consideration has been amply established, since it is understood that grantor had often expressed an intention to give the lands to his nephews and even now he does not deny that such was his intention, but his claim is that he intended to bestow such a gift by a will, which would be revocable at any time before death, rather than by deed, and it has always been held that love and affection are sufficient consideration to support a deed or gift. Lawrence et al. v. Clark et al. , 115 S.C. 67 , 104 S.E., 330 ; Mathis v. Hair , 112 S.C. 322 , 99 S.E., 810 ; Huggins v. Huggins , 107 S.C. 476 , 93 S.E., 129 . A deed under seal cannot be assailed by the grantor on the sole ground that it is without consideration. Brown v. Brown , 44 S.C. 378 , 22 S.E., 412 . In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that the appeal from the report of the Special Master should be dismissed, and the said report confirmed. It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the appeal be, and the same is, hereby dismissed, and the report of the Special Master be, and the same is hereby, confirmed and made the judgment of this Court.

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Supreme Court of South Carolina

Parallel citations

150 S.E 610